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SUMMARY
Specific implement as a remedy for breach of contract for the sale of goods is based 
on specific and certain grounds. For instance, the goods must be specific or 
ascertained, and the aggrieved party must apply for the remedy. These grounds are 
elemental in its nature as being an ordinary legal remedy.
Specific implement represents a general rule which can be applied in each case 
which carries similar requirements. It may become the criterion of solving the disputed 
contract whether it is for sale of goods or other categories of contract.
Grounds such as impossibility of performance of the obligation, exceptional 
hardship, i.e. "performance is too onerous for the debtor to perform", undue difficulty, 
and breach of contract by the pursuer, are considered the major restriction on the 
remedy in Scots and Iraqi systems. These grounds must be examined under the court 
discretion. However, such examination of these circumstances does not alter or change 
the nature of the remedy.
The aggrieved party must be willing to perform his obligation before specific 
implement can be granted.
Restricting the remedy of specific implement in Scots law to the purchaser and 
depriving the seller of it, is contrary to the true concept of the remedy. It seems that it 
is not an ordinary remedy at least for the aggrieved seller, who performs the contract he 
has undertaken, but has no opportunity to compel the purchaser, who wrongfully 
refused to take delivery of the goods.
Damages may be granted in addition to specific implement, when granting specific 
implement alone is not sufficient to indemnify the aggrieved party. Further, damages 
may be granted as an alternative to specific implement, in Scots law, when the 
obligation is not for delivery of specific or ascertained goods.. Further, if the 
obligation is of a negative character damages, not specific implement, should be granted 
concurrently with the remedy of interdict, which is based on two major factors, the
viii
wrong and the court's discretionary power.
In Iraqi civil law specific performance is granted whenever there is a breach of 
obligation of any nature, and certain grounds must exist before it can be ordered.
The action of specific implement is usually amenable to the court's jurisdiction 
unless stipulated otherwise whether by the nature of the jurisdiction or the defender's 
circumstances, or the contract circumstances.
In raising the action of specific implement certain procedural steps must be 
followed. A summons or a petition is required, the substantial part of which is the 
crave which should be framed unambiguously and definitely in a way which lets the 
court knows exactly and precisely what the pursuer, "plaintiff', asks for, otherwise the 
action may be rejected and the remedy, refused. This is vital, as granting a decree of 
specific implement on ambiguous and vague crave may lead to the imprisonment of the 
defaulting party.
After a decree of specific implement is pronounced may be affected by certain 
circumstances, especially when enforcement is rendered impossible. The court may 
either recall or amend the decree, otherwise such a decree will not be fulfilled.
Enforceability of the decree of specific implement in Scots law may be affected by 
the nature of the defender, as decree of specific implement is combined with 
imprisonment, and a party who cannot be imprisoned may avoid performance of the 
decree of specific implement. In Iraq the court may enforce the decree by ordering the 
refusing party to pay penalties regardless of his nature.
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1INTRODUCTION
Specific implement as a remedy for breach of a contract for the sale of goods is an 
order requiring the refusing party to perform his undertaking. It is called specific 
performance in Iraqi civil law and in English law. A party to a contract may request the 
court to order the party in breach to perform his undertakings/1) Scots law favours 
specific implement compared with English law, which favours a claim of damages/^) 
It has been suggested "A contract which cannot be enforced by specific implement, in 
so far as regards its form and substance, is no contract at all, and cannot form the 
ground of an action of damages. There are cases of contracts which give ground for 
actions of damages, though not of implement, but that is not from defect of form but 
from considerations outside of the written instrument. For example the court will not 
decree implement of a contract which the party cannot possibly perform because that 
would be to condemn the party to perpetual imprisonment,....".(3)
It is an enforcement of the contracting party's undertaking of his obligation to 
perform precisely and accurately/4) It is the natural way of terminating any obligation 
which is open to every party to any obligation against any party in breach/5) Thus the 
buyer has the remedy as of right. (6)
Specific implement, however may be defeated for many reasons such as Pretium 
affectionis and the uniqueness test.C7) Pretium affectionis means, ''some reason for 
demanding the particular articles sold, rather than other articles of the same kind and 
value".(^) So, can the remedy survive when such circumstances are introduced to it?
If the remedy of specific implement is an ordinary legal remedy/9) it should be 
based on certain legal conditions,(10) where by the remedy might become a remedy for 
breach not only of a sale of goods contract, but of other contracts in general. Specific 
implement may be defeated by the operation of certain grounds/! 1) These grounds 
may be either equitable/12) or legal/13) Damages, may be granted in lieu/14)
Although specific implement in Scots law is an ordinary legal remedy, it is
2restricted to one party in the sale of goods contract and to one obligation,(15) i.e., "the 
purchaser, and the obligation of delivery of specific or ascertained goods". While in 
Iraqi civil law specific performance is open to every party to the contract and to every
obligation. (16)
It is a decree issued by the court against the refusing party to perform what he has 
undertaken to do in Scots law, to do or not to do in Iraqi civil law. Therefore, the two 
systems differ.. To obtain a decree of specific implement, the pursuer should apply for 
the remedy clearly and unambiguously/^) for if the crave is ambiguous, the decree 
will not be pronounced, and even if pronounced will not be enforceable against the 
defaulting party/18)
Specific implement is the most direct and just remedy for breach of a contract for 
the sale of goods. It is granted at the request of the aggrieved party to obtain what he 
has contracted for. Is not specific performance the natural end of any obligation against 
the refusing party?
The importance of the remedy arises from the fact that it is an ordinary legal 
remedy, and it is granted to the aggrieved party as a matter of right/19) Further, it is 
not an exceptional remedy. If specific implement is treated as an exceptional remedy, 
certain questions arise, namely:
1-Will the remedy be rendered a discretionary remedy? And, does it become an 
equitable remedy?
2-Will the court's discretionary power be increased?
3-Is there any risk of denying the right of the aggrieved party, because there is no 
rule or principle by which the court can examine whether the party is entitled to the 
remedy of specific implement?
4-Would involving the considerations of pretium affectionis and uniqueness in 
granting or refusing the remedy of specific implement require the use of the court's 
discretionary power?
5-May the importance of the remedy of specific implement be indicated by the
combination between the remedy and the sanction of imprisonment of the refusing 
party, bearing in mind imprisonment is a discretionary matter?
The remedy of specific implement as a case for study is subject to the following 
questions:
1-As specific implement in Scots law is considered an ordinary remedy and it is 
granted to the aggrieved party as a matter of right, why is it restricted only to the 
aggrieved purchaser in the sale of goods contract?
2-The fact that specific implement can only be ordered against the seller of goods in 
Scots law, raises contradiction and conflict in the concept and the nature of the remedy.
3-Is specific implement affected by the principle of "where complete justice cannot 
be achieved by damages, specific performance shall be granted, and vice-versa"?
Specific implement is an ordinary remedy, however, it is coupled with damages 
whether additionally or alternatively.
The purpose of this work is to define the circumstances under which the remedy of 
specific implement should be granted and ieftised, to draw line between a remedy of an 
ordinary legal nature, which is granted to the aggrieved party as a matter of right, and 
that of equitable, exceptional and discretionary nature, and to show that specific 
implement is not dominated by the court's discretion or by certain exceptional 
circumstances which may destroy the concept of the remedy.
The study proceeds by examining the case of the remedy of specific implement 
from different angles, such as the nature of the remedy, the definition, upon which 
grounds the remedy shall be granted or refused, by or against whom the remedy shall 
be granted or refused, the relationship between the remedy and other remedies, and 
procedures of the action of specific implement.
The study of the remedy of specific implement will be examined in five chapters. 
They are as follows:
Chapter One: The efficacy of specific implement as a remedy for breach of the 
contract for sale of goods. In this chapter, the definition of specific implement is 
considered.
4The concept of specific implement sometimes gives the impression that it is not a 
remedy. It is performance of the obligation accurately and precisely. Nevertheless, it 
is a decree against the refusing party to perform what he has undertaken to do in Scots 
law, to do or not to do in Iraqi civil la w .( ^ O )  The nature of the remedy is also 
examined. It is an ordinary remedy, which is granted as a matter of legal right to the 
aggrieved party. It is not discretionary or equitable remedy.
In Chapter Two, the grounds for granting or refusing the remedy of specific 
implement are considered. The remedy it is said, is based on certain legal grounds 
rather than discretionary conditions.
The grounds for refusing the remedy are dealt with exhaustively. These grounds 
are impossibility, exceptional hardship, breach of the contract by the buyer, and breach 
of the contract by the seller.
In Chapter Three, the case of who is entitled to the remedy of specific implement as 
a remedy for breach of the contract for sale of goods, or who is subject to perform his 
obligation specifically, is considered.
Four classes of persons are dealt with, namely: The purchaser, the seller, the 
insolvent, and the assignee or assignor. Each case is examined to show whether 
specific implement is an appropriate remedy, bearing in mind, the seller in Scots law is 
deprived of the right of specific implement against the refusing purchaser, no matter 
what sort of breach the purchaser has committed.
In Chapter Four, the distinction between specific implement, damages and the 
remedy of Interdict in Scots law is considered.
The question of damages, whether they are adequate or inadequate and to what 
extent this principle affects the remedy of specific implement, is also considered, as is 
the question, whether damages are granted in addition to or in substitution for the 
remedy of specific implement.
The remedies of interdict, and specific performance are examined. Interdict is 
essentially different from specific performance, that is an exceptional, discretionary and
5equitable remedy. The granting of interdict is based on different grounds from that of 
specific implement in Scotland. While the remedy of specific performance for breach 
of an obligation to refrain from doing something is specific performance in Iraqi civil 
law.
In Chapter Five, Jurisdiction and Procedural aspects, are examined.
Procedures of the action of specific implement are considered in three steps; First 
raising the action and other proceedings of the action, where by the remedy of specific 
implement may be granted or refused, in accordance with the state of the summons, 
initial writ, or a petition
Secondly; the case of a decree "judgment" of specific implement which should be 
pronounced clearly and should specify precisely what should be done by the other 
party. The court should bear in mind the consequences of such a decree, for failing to 
perform the decree may expose the defaulter party to imprisonment. The court's 
discretion towards granting the decree, and its power if new circumstances have arisen 
after pronouncing the decree, are examined.
Finally, the case of enforcement of the decree of specific implement and the 
surrounding circumstances are examined.
The defaulting party, sometimes cannot be imprisoned because of its special nature, 
therefore the decree cannot be enforced against such a party. There are also cases 
where the court may either recall or amend the decree to suite the new situation.
Specific implement as a remedy for breach of a contract for the sale of goods is 
examined in both Scots and Iraqi laws comparatively under the following Chapter 
headings:
Chapter one: Efficacy of the remedy of specific implement in the contract for the
sale of goods.
Chapter Two: The grounds for granting and refusing the remedy of specific
implement
Chapter Three: By or against whom specific implement is granted.
Chapter Four: Distinction between specific implement, damages, and interdict. 
Chapter Five: Jurisdiction and Procedures.
Conclusion.
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8CHAPTER ONE 
EFFICACY OF THE REMEDY OF SPECIFIC IMPLEMENT IN 
THE SALE OF GOODS CONTRACT
Introduction
Specific implement is a remedy granted against a refusing party to a contract, 
ordering him to perform precisely what he has undertaken to do, or to refrain from 
doing what he has undertaken not to do.(l)
Such a concept may make one think that specific implement is not a remedy in the 
technical sense, for it reflects the concept of the performance of the obligation. It is the 
natural end of any obligation against the refusing party. Above all it is the duty of the 
contracting party to perform precisely what he has undertaken to do,(2) or to refrain 
from doing what he has undertaken not to do. Specific implement is based on certain
legal grounds. The concept of specific implement in Scots law must be considered in
\
the light of conflicting principles which may cast doubt on its nature as an ordinary 
legal remedy. Two issues will each be examined as follows:
Section One:Definition of specific implement.
Section Two:The nature of specific implement
Section One:-Definition of Specific implement
Specific implement as an order against the party in breach of contract for the sale of 
goods may be considered as a remedy despite it is regarded as a natural end and as 
performance of the obligation. It is the ordinary legal right for the aggrieved party to 
have and to obtain what he has contracted for. It is his right to have his contract 
specifically performed, although it is not always possible for the other party to do so.
The definition of specific implement may raise the question of whether it is as an 
ordinary legal right resulting from the obligation between the contracting parties!
Specific implement carries the character of a remedy not only due to breach of 
contract for sale of goods, but also due to breach of other contracts other than the sale
of goods contract. Thus, the definition of specific implement will be considered in 
Scots and Iraqi systems respectively as follows:
Sub-section 1: Definition of the remedy of specific implement in
Scots law
To define specific implement as a remedy for breach of contract, two categories of 
contracts should be considered, namely:
1-In general contracts other than the sale of goods contract
Specific implement in Scotland is of a different nature from that of specific 
performance in English law P) it is open to the creditor of the obligation as a matter of 
right It is a judicial order against the refusing party to enforce him to perform the 
obligation, which he has undertaken.^) it was stated,^) "is frequently open to a party 
to a contract to request the court to ordain the other party specifically to implement his 
contract and to perform what he undertook to do, to obtain, that is a decree ad factum 
praestandum".
Is specific implement a remedy, or, is it just an order by the court against one of the 
contracting parties to perform his undertaking towards the other party?
The position of specific implement in Scots law is a little vague. The following 
arguments suggest it is not a remedy.
1-The natural end of any obligation is to perform what the contracting party has 
undertaken to do.(7) Thus, ordering the party to fulfil his undertaking precisely is not a 
remedy given to the aggrieved party. It is performance of the obligation against the 
contracting party who has refused to perform his undertaking.
2-The court may order specific implement when no loss or damage has resulted to 
the pursuer from the defender’s breach.^) It is performance of the obligation. 
Furthermore, there is an assumption that an obligation is enforceable by such a decree 
unless there is an equitable ground for refusing it.(9) This indicates that specific 
implement is the way that the obligation should be terminated against the refusing party, 
for it was laid down,(10) that a contract is not a contract at all if it cannot be enforced 
by specific implement.
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3-Specific implement will be regarded as an appropriate remedy if the defender 
refuses to comply with the contract, and damages in addition to, will be decreed/* 
The grant of specific implement is not to compensate the party for loss or damages he 
has suffered, but it is to enable him to obtain what he has contracted f o r / * ^ )  It is to 
achieve his satisfaction.
Specific implement is open to the contracting party as a matter of r i g h t / 1 3 )  Thus 
he can apply to the court to obtain a decree ad factum praestandum, "rather than merely 
compensation for non-implement" /  * ^ )
The principle is that specific implement is granted to the aggrieved party as an 
ordinary legal right/*5) and, as Lord Ingilis observed, that "A contract which cannot 
be enforced by specific implement, in so far as regards its form and substance, is no 
contract at all, and cannot form the ground of an action of d a m a g e s " / *^) indicate that 
specific implement is a general mle applicable to any obligation carries the basic 
elements for granting the remedy, unless there are certain circumstances of law or 
certain equitable grounds stand against granting i t /17)
Considering whether specific implement is a remedy or is a legal right is not of 
great practical importance, because, "both categories are equally legal rights there being 
correlative duties imposed on other persons, and sanctions for non-implement. A 
buyer has a legal right to have delivery of the goods sold to him, and he also has a legal 
right, failing delivery, to have specific implement of the contract or to recover damages 
for non-delivery"/IRem edies in general are not distinct from rights, but kinds of 
legal righ ts/1^1 Specific implement is granted as a matter of legal right to the 
aggrieved party. Consequently, it is a remedy against the party in breach to fulfil his 
obligation, and to achieve the pursuer’s satisfaction from his contract.
2-In the Sale of Goods Contract
The general rule of Scots law is, that, a party who has contracted to obtain a 
particular article is entitled to have it and receive the aid of the court, by assuring that,
11
by a decree ad factum praestandum that article should be handed over to him.(20) 
Furthermore, it has been stated as a general rule of contractual) that a contract, which,
"cannot be enforced by specific implement is not contract at all". Thus, unless
there are equitable grounds or grounds in law, specific implement cannot be
r e f u s e d . ( 2 2 )
Consequently it seems that any obligation, especially, a sale of goods contract, is 
enforcable by such a decree.
The primary right of the creditor, (the buyer in the case of the sale of goods), in a 
contractual obligation is, to have his contract specifically performed, for Scots law has 
conferred such a right only on the buyer,1(^although, Scots law allows claim for 
specific implement generally,1(24) rather than money damages. Moreover, in respect of 
contracts for moveables, specific implement is competent when the obligation is to 
deliver a specific article ( g o o d s ) . @ 5 )
It is submitted, that since specific implement as a remedy in Scotland is one of the 
ordinary remedies, @6) it is considered by Lord President Inglis as a criterion in 
considering whether a contract exists or not,(27) and as long as it is open to the buyer, 
in the contract of sale of goods. The same principles govern specific implement as a 
remedy for breach of any obligation "contract", whether it is sale of goods or 
land...etc. All are governed by the same rules and and affected by the circumstances 
which stand as a bar against the remedy being granted. Such concurrence and similarity 
between specific implement as a remedy for breach of contract of sale of goods, or as a 
remedy for breach of other contracts, appears from the following principles:
1- The subject-matter of the obligation, whatsoever its nature, should be and must 
be s p e c i f i c ^ )  in order to grant specific implement, for if it is neither specific nor 
ascertained, no specific implement can be granted.
2 -  The c r a v e , (29) should be precise, definite and unambiguous, as it would be 
impossible to crave specific implement unambiguously and indefinitely when the 
subject-matter of the obligation is not specific. Further, indefinite and vague crave
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leads to a decree in a vague terms or indefinite, which cannot be enforced 
thereafter.1(30) In addition, it has been pointed out,(31) that, "if the contract itself is 
vague or indefinite it may become void, or at least not have indicated the defender’s 
duty of implement with such precison as to make it reasonable to make an order against 
him that he implemented it". Moreover, "it must be clear what he should have done 
before the court will order him to do it".(32)
3-The grounds and circumstances, for refusing to grant specific implement as a 
remedy for breach of the contract for the sale of goods apply to breaches of other 
obligations. Such grounds include, impossibility of performing specifically,(33) 
exceptional h a r d s h ip ,(34) unenforceability of the decree itself.1(35) Therefore, specific 
implement can be defined as follows:
A decree issued under certain circumstances ordering the refusing party, who mav 
be imprisoned if he refuses, to fulfil what he has undertaken to do precisely, where the 
obligation is of specific or ascertained subject-matter.
The above definition, it is believed, covers the whole area of the remedy whether it 
arises under the sale of goods contract or in other contracts, because specific implement 
is subject to the same rules and principles and is affected by the same circumstances 
wherever it operates.(36)
The definition of specific implement leads to a consideration of three essential 
matters, namely:
1-The circumstances of granting and refusing the remedy of specific implement.
2- Contempt of court and imprisonment of the refusing seller.
3- Specific or ascertained subject-matter.
The circumstances under which the decree is granted or refused will be fully, 
considered in chapter two of this work.(3?)
2.1-Contempt of court and imprisonment of the refusing seller
Specific implement as has already been stated, is an order issued by the court to 
compel a defender (the seller), to fulfil his obligation precisely. If he has refused to
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comply with such an order he is considered to have committed a contempt of court. 
The other contracting party, (the buyer), may insist on him implementing his obligation
specifically .(3 8)
The court has jurisdiction to imprison the refusing party for up to six months, if it is 
satisfied that the contracting party against whom the decree was granted is wilfully 
refusing to comply with it.(39) The Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) 
(Scotland) Act 1940 in Sec.l, provides; that, "1-No person shall be apprehended or 
imprisoned on account of his failure to comply with a decree ad factum praestandum 
except in accordance with the following provisions:
(i):On an application by the person in right of such a decree,...., to the court by 
which the decree was granted, the court may if it is satisfied that the person against 
whom such a decree was granted,...., is wilfully refusing to comply with the decree, 
grant warant for his imprisonment for any period not exceeding six months".
The onus, it was stated, in such a case is, "on the creditor to show wilful refusal 
and it is, presumably, necessary that a charge should have expired without implement 
of the decree".(40) The contemnor will be imprisoned if he disobeys the court's decree 
wilfully. It is questionable whether the party in breach can be imprisoned, when unable 
to perform such order.
Imprisonment is considered as an appropriate way of enforcing the contract only 
where a party refuses to comply with the decree, when able to fulfil it (41) Therefore, 
such imprisonment is an appropriate way of ordering the performance of the obligation, 
for it was laid down in Stark's Trustees v. Duncan. (42) ^at, "a person is not entitled 
to disobey an order made by the court, and then to claim to show that the court ought 
not to have made the order". If the party cannot comply with the decree of specific 
implement by reason of either, that performance of the obligation has become 
impossible, or new circumstances have arisen, by which the remedy is rendered either 
exceptionally hard on him to perform, or even unduely difficult,'(43) the refusing party, 
it is believed, cannot be condemned as a contemnor and he is not subject to
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imprisonment, in accordance with the spirit and the meaning of the provisions of Sec.
1, of the Act, which states, "1- is wilfully refusing to comply with the decree....
It is of course, subject to the satisfaction of the court which considers the intention of 
the party in doing so and the surrounding circumstances. The court, in case of 
contempt should exercise discretion, and when determining whether any conduct forms 
contempt must exclude from its cosideration all matters which might prejudice or be 
thought to prejudice its judgment.^^ Furthermore, "there is no point in ordering him 
to perform and thus an order that can only be enforced on the person of the defaulter 
will not be issued when he cannot be enforced to c o m p l y  ".(45) a  decree ad factum 
praestandum is regarded as unenforceable,1(46) if compliance with it is impossible, 
even if the impossibility due to the refusing party's own f a u l t . ( 4 7 )
Imprisonment of the defaulter is not a penalty .(48) it is an "invocation of the power 
inherent in every civil court to ordain performance of acts within its jurisdiction, and in 
default to commit the defaulter to p r i s o n " . ( 4 9 )  n  j s  a primary sanction for non­
implementation of the court's order "ad factum praestandum", which has been 
disobeyed by one party who will be imprisoned until he convinces the court of his 
readiness to filful the decree.(^)
If a contracting party is a corporate body, no imprisonment can be pronounced 
against it although it can carry out the obligation.^!) Imprisonment of all the members 
is out of the q u e s t i o n . ^ )  where the defender is a foreigner, subject to the jurisdiction 
of the Scots Courts only on some exceptional grounds, these Courts, as they have no 
power to enforce a decree ad factum praestandum by his imprisonment, will not 
pronounce a decree which would be futile.(53)
It has already been noticed that the purpose of imprisonment is the performance of 
the obligation by the defaulting party. However, what if the defaulting party still insists 
on not performing his obligation even after having been imprisoned?
The contemnor cannot be imprisoned for more than six m o n t h s . ^ 4 )  He must be 
freed thereafter. So, if after he has been freed he still refuses to comply with the
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decree, the court must order him to pay damages. Nevertheless, according to Sec. 1(1) 
of law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1940,"where the decree is 
for delivery of corporeal movables, the court may grant a warrant to officers of court to 
search any premises in the occupation of the respondent", "or the court will consider 
the case and order damages" as appears to the court to be just and equitable in the 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s " . ^ )  Damages are not, always, the most valuable remedy to the 
aggrieved party. He may wish to have what he has contracted for. It seems, that, there 
is no way to enforce the refusing party to comply with the decree after having him 
imprisoned, even if he still has the goods in his possession somewhere unknown. 
Therefore, it is suggested, that the best way to order the contemnor to comply with the 
decree is, to order him to pay a penalty beside his imprisonment. This task can be done 
by the court within its discretionary power.
2,2-Specific or ascertained goods
Goods, which contribute to form the definition and the concept of specific 
implement, fall into two categories. They are either specific or ascertained. Therefore, 
they will be examined as follows:
2,2.1-Specific goods
To have specific implement ordered as a remedy for breach of contract of sale of 
goods according to Sec. 52 (1) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 there must be delivery of 
specific or ascertained goods.
Specific goods are defined as, goods which are identified and agreed upon at the 
time of making the sale contract.^6) Thus, according to another argument,(57) unless 
they are specific at the time of making the contract, they cannot become so in a later 
stage. Furthermore, it has been stated,(58) that, "specific goods are by the agreement 
of the parties designated as unique goods which can be delivered by the seller in 
performance of his obligation, their individuality is established, so that there is no room 
for further selection or substitution".
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It is clearly enough, that, goods might be "identified and agreed upon" in order to 
become specific by either party describing them precisly and specifying them 
accurately. For instance, the white car in the garage in my house, the black cow in my 
farm, provided that, there is no other car or cow identical to them in the referred 
places.1(59)
Specific implement where the goods are non-existent, or future:
It was stated,(60) that the question of whether goods must be in existence at the 
time of making the contract, has not been determined. Nevertheless, the definition of 
specific goods, is not conditional on the goods existing when the contract is made.(61) 
That may raise a conflict with the definition of specific goods, which is "goods are 
identified and agreed upon at the time of making the sale contract".(62) The goods may 
be described definitely, particularly and specifically although they are non-existent. 
The contracting parties will agree upon their nature and specification at the time of 
making the contract. For instance, the 100 cars of Toyota to be produced in my factory 
in the coming year, or as in the case of, Reardon Smith line Ltd. v. Yngvar Hansen 
Tangen.(63) the vessel to be built, although it was identified only by serial construction 
number. The individuality of specific goods must be established, so that the seller can 
deliver them in performance of his obligation,(64) without any room for furhter 
selection or substitution.^) Thus, non-existent goods are specific, provided that they 
are identified and agreed upon by the contracting parties at the time of making the 
contract. The opinion of Lord Atkin,(66) to the contrary, that the Act is clearly and 
plain enough in identifying the meaning of the specific goods, and must be applied in 
the same sense. Furthermore, non-existent goods are not excluded by the provison of 
Sec. 61(1) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979.
The same arguments may be applied to future goods. Treitel..suggests there is no 
linguistic difficulty or logical reason, as regards, identifying and agreeing on such 
goods as specific goods, as the subject-matter is identified and agreed upon even if it 
does not exist at the time the contract is made.1( 6 ? )  In Howell v. C o u p l a n d . ( 6 8 )  it was
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stated, that the authorities on such a matter are confused, but, B e n j a m i n , (69) pointed 
out that, "there is nothing which requires us to read in to the definition of'specific 
goods" a condition that they should presently exist". Others,1(70) have doubted 
whether future goods can ever be specific. However it was stated,(71) that "it is not 
true that all future goods automatically fall into that category", (unascertained goods), 
for in Varlev v. Whipp.(72) the court considered a reaping machine to be specific 
goods, when the contract was for the sale of a specific second-hand reaping machine 
which at the time of making the contract, the seller did not possess and had still to 
acquire. It is submitted, therefore, that future goods can be a subject-matter of specific 
implement, so long as, they are identified and agreed upon by the parties, and they can 
be considered as a specific goods when they are sufficiently identified.
It seems, that the main basis for considering the goods as specific, is the agreement 
of the contracting parties in respect of the goods, specifying them in a way leads to no 
misleading, ambiguity or vagueness about their nature, quality or quantity, no matter 
whether they presently exist or not, or whether they have been produced or will be 
produced in the future.
As regards the distinction between future and non-existent goods, and to what 
extent such distinction affects the grant of the remedy, it appears that there is in fact no 
distinction between these two categories of goods. The remedy can be granted 
whenever the goods are agreed upon by the contracting parties, they become the 
subject-matter of the remedy.
Despite all the above arguments and discussion concerning the concept of specific 
goods, and despite the definition in the Sale, of Goods Act 1979, Sec. 61, uncertainity 
and doubt remains concerning the concept of specific goods in Scots law.
It is not clear, whether Scots law adopts Engish law's view or it has his own view. 
For instance, in Sutherland v Montrose Shipbuilding C o . . ( 7 3 )  ft was ft^d down by 
Lord Cowan, that,"it is vain to say, in such a case, where specific vessel had been 
contracted for and built, and was ready to be delivered, delivery of it should have been
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refused". Furthermore, B e l l , (74) stated, that "In relation to the subject, sale may be:
1- of a certain specific thing, clearly distinguished in description or set apart for the 
buyer....". Further, it was s t a t e d , (75) that, "of every such specific article bought, 
delivery may be legally enforced from the seller...". Also the subject according to 
B e l l , (76) can be "of a commodity or thing to be prepared or provided for delivery at 
some future time".
Again, "of a thing to be made or provided by the seller the same thing to be 
furnished, it will be at the buyer's r i s k " .(77) The seller may be obliged to deliver a 
specific article, "a fortiori is this principle true in the case of a ship, contracted to be 
b u i l t " . (78) So, " i t  cannot be thought doubtful that the vessel contracted for, when 
finshed and ready to be launched, although after the period stipulated by the contract, 
might have been claimed by the pursuer, and delivery compelled by the a c t i o n "  .(79) 
Thus, Scots law regards non-existent and future goods, as specific, avoiding the 
discussions and the arguments, in relation to the concept of specific goods, which have 
taken place in English law, by relying on the definition of specific goods, under Sec. 
61 (1) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979
Scots law considers that future goods may be specific and may become thereafter 
the subject-matter of a decree of specific implement. Thus it was stated that, "there is 
nothing to prevent the parties dispensing with appropriation, and the seller, who has 
induced a buyer to rely on his assertion of an immediate passing of the property cannot 
be heard to deny that he has not appropriated the goods to the contract".(^0)
2.2.2: Ascertained goods
The Sale of Goods Act 1979 contains no precise definition of ascertained goods. 
Sec.61 provides that "where there is a contract for sale of unascertained goods no 
property ...is transferred to the buyer unless and until the goods are ascertained". The 
Act does not tell how such goods are ascertained. Furthermore, Sec.17 (1) provides 
that," where there is a contract for the sale of specific or ascertained goods the property 
in them is transferred..". Sec. 52 (1) also refers to ascertained goods. The word
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"ascertained" is not defined by the Act.(81) However, it was stated,(82)that ascertained 
goods are " goods which at the time the contract was made were not identified and 
agreed upon but which since its inception have become so". Further, Benjamin 
suggested a defintion based on the definition of specific goods in that specific goods by 
Sec. 61(1) mean: "goods identified and agreed on at the time a contract of sale is made, 
and "unascertained goods" means "goods are not identified and agreed on at that 
time".'(83) Conversly, ascertained goods are goods identified and agreed on at the time 
of making the contract.^)
Although Sec.16 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979, refers to unascertained goods 
become ascertained, the Act does not define unascertained goods. Nevertheless, it was 
pointd out (85) that ascertained goods mean, "goods originally unascertained, which 
are identified in accordance with the parties agreement after the contract of sale is 
made". Thus, ascertained in Sec. 52 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979, means the same 
thing as s p e c i f i c . ( 8 6 )  in the leading case of Re W a i t . ( 8 7 )  Lord Atkin expressed the 
opinion that, ascertained goods meant, goods, which were identified according to the 
agreement of the contracting parties after the obligation was entered into. Conversley 
Sankey J., in Thames Sack & Bag Co. v. Knowles &Co. Ltd..(88) stated that 
ascertained goods mean, "that the individuality of the goods must in some way be 
found out and when it is, then the goods have been ascertained". In addition, goods can 
be regarded as an identified and ascertained goods if they are specific and in a certain, 
specific p l a c e . ( 8 9 )  Nevertheless, an unappropriated part of ascertained bulk cannot be 
considered as ascertained goods for the purpose of Sec. 52 in order to grant specific 
performance.^)
In Wait & James v. Middland B a n k . ( ^ l )  it was stated, by Roche J. that, 
"ascertainment, might take place by any method which is satisfactory to the parties 
concerned". Moreover, a part of the goods purchased from a bulk which is specified, 
may become ascertained by process of exhaustion, which, it was said to be "the only 
effective way of ascertaining the goods which are in bulk".(^)
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In the above c a s e , (93) w  & J sold 250,750 and 250 quarter of wheat by three 
separate contracts. The buyer took delivery of 400 quarter only of the total amount sold 
to them. The remaining 850 quarter being left in the warehouse. It was held, "that what 
remained in the warehouse alone, become by process of exhaustion ascertained goods 
within Sec. 16 of the Sale of Goods A c t . . . ".(94) if the specified bulk is sold by more 
than one contract when the goods of one purchaser are separated from the bulk, these 
goods will be ascertained, "not withstanding that the bulk has been allocated distinctly 
to the several contracts".(9^) In addition the goods are considered ascertained even if all 
these contracts are made with a single b u y e r . ( 9 6 )
The more accepted view, considering the concept and the definition of ascertained 
goods is, Lord Atkin's view, in the leading case of Re Wait.(97) Wait bought 1000 
tons of western white wheat, he later sold 500 tons to a sub-purchaser, who paid by 
cheque before receiving the goods. Wait paid the cheque into his bank. He then 
become bankrupt. The sub-purchaser having recieved no goods, claimed specific 
performance. His claim was rejected on the ground that the 500 tons of wheat were 
neither specific nor ascertained, "as they had never been appropriated to the contract" of 
sale.
In examining Atkin's L.J.’s v i e w , (98) Sankey J.’s v i e w , (99) and Roche J.'s 
view,'(100) it appears, that each opinion complements the other. Nevertheless, there is 
a difference between Atkin L.J's view and Sankey J's v ie w ,(^ )  for Atkin L.J's 
opinion requires the identification in accordance with the agreement after the formation 
of the obligation. Whereas Sankey J's v i e w ,(^02) requires only that, "any process of 
identification will do even if the agreement contained no provision to that end, and, 
even if the process of identification was not in accordance with such provision on the 
matter as the agreement did contain".
Again, Roche J's opinion is, that, ascertainment can be achieved by any method 
which satisfies the contracting parties.(^03) Therefore, it seems, that any subsequent 
identification will constitute ascertainment of the goods.(^ 4 )
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In Karlshamns Oliefahriker v. Eastport Navigation Corporation. The Elafl. (105) 
by four identical contracts, the claimants bought from East Asiatic Co.Ltd. 6000 tonnes 
of fair mercantable copra c.i.f. Karlshamn, 5 per cent, more or less in seller’s option. 
The contracts provided inter alia that the weight devided between 95 per cent, and 102 
per cent, of the mean contract quantity was to be settled at contract price, that the weight 
delivered in excess of 102 per cent, was to be accepted at market price or the contract 
price whichever was the lower. In June or July 1975 the respondent owners' vessel 
Elafi loaded a cargo of 22000 tonnes for the ICEC. Part of the cargo was covered by 
12 bills of lading each acknowledging the reciept of 500 tonnes and stating the 
destaination as Karlshamn. The remainder of the cargo was to be delivered at 
Rotterdam and Hamburg. While the vessel en route to Europe ICEC negotiated the 
bills to E.A.Ltd. who forwarded them endorsed in bank to the claimants. On August 
13, ICEC sold to Frank Fehr and Co. Ltd. 500 tonnes of cargo and on the same day 
Frank Fehr resold the goods to the claimants. On August 24, the vessel arrived at 
Karlshamn and commenced discharge. During the night of August 26/27, water 
entered hold 4 resulting in damages to about 825 tonnes. The whole cargo was 
delivered ex ship to the claimants in a single lot without separation of the portions 
covered by the bill of lading or the Frank Fehr contract. The claimants claimed 
damages from the respondents. They claimed a right of suit in tort as the owners of the 
goods, on the ground that they were the persons to whom the property in the goods 
passed.
It was held, "that (l):if the entire cargo had been sold to the claimants under a single
contract,   it was very probable that the property would have passed to the
claimants.
(2):if half of the cargo was sold to each of two buyers no property would pass until 
the goods had been discharged and physical separation effected between the goods 
delivered under each contract and there could be no claim in tort in the absence of any 
ascertainment...
(3) : ; where there were multiple contracts of sale in the hands of different buyers
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in relation to undivided bulk, the property did not pass until the goods were not only 
physically separated but separated in a way enabled an individual buyer to say that a 
particular portion had become his property under his contract of sale.
(7):on the of bills of lading claim, if there had been no sale of the surplus to...., the 
claimants on representation of the bills of lading could not have insisted on dilivery to 
them of the entire quantity remaining on board; and bills of lading which had become, 
by process of exhaustion the only remaining documents of the title in respect of an 
undifferentated bulk did not become documents of the title for the whole of the bulk."
In recent case, Re London Wine Co. (Shippers)/* ^ )  l .W.C. ran a scheme 
whereby persons could purchase wine for investment. The buyer bought wine from 
LWC which, under the terms of the contract of sale, would remain in the warehouse in 
bulk. All wine bought from LWC remained in bulk storage and was not divided up or 
allocated to any particular purchaser prior to delivery. The purchaser was provided 
with document of title confirming him to be the owner of the wine that he had bought. 
The company’s bank borrowings were secured by a floating charge over its assets. In 
August 1974, the bank appointed a receiver who sought directions from the court with 
respect to three consignments of wines held for purchasers by L.W.C. In each of the 
categories no appropriation had taken place and it was impossible to specify which 
particular quantity of wine comprised in the bulk stored in the warehouse were 
attributable to any one contract of sale. It was held, that, in each case, the wine 
remained the company's property.
"The cases of wine for each particular purchaser were unascertained". "It was not 
possible to ascertain which cases belonged to which purchaser".
The concept of ascertained goods, in Scots law has not been considered in depth, 
by either the judiciary or the jurisprudence.
It was said once, by T.G.Wright,(107) that> «jn Scotland, the right to compel 
delivery is competent to a buyer although the goods are not specific, if it be in the 
power of the seller to make them so and deliver them. If, for instance, the sale be of
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part of a whole, the seller may be compelled to separate and deliver without having the 
option of paying damages for breach of contract and retaining the goods". Therefore, it 
would be reasonable to think that ascertained goods in Scotland are goods, which 
become specific after the formation of the contract, or, where it is in the seller’s power 
to specify and identify by separating them from a bulk, they are so identified.
In Havman & Son, v. M ' L i n t o c k f l ^ )  a  flour merchant owned large quantity of 
bags of flour deposited in a warehouse. He contracted to sell some of the bags. He 
handed the purchaser an order for delivery addressed to the warehouse. The custodier 
acknowledged that the sacks were held on the purchaser’s account. It was held: "that, 
as the goods sold were unascertained, no property in them had passed to the 
purchaser...". It was laid down by the Lord P re s id e n t/^ )  that "these flour bags 
were not separately marked and although, doubtless, if the buyer here had gone to 
storekeeper and had got him to put aside the sacks or mark them, or put them into 
another room, that would have passed the property".
In Pochin &Co. v. Robinows & Marioribanks.^  *0) Lord President Inglis stated 
that, constructive delivery cannot be effected, since the goods remain "unascertained 
portion of their general stock".
The goods should be specific in the sense that, they may be capable of being 
identified either as one total undivided quantity stored in a certain place or a particular 
warehouse, or, at least, a specified quantity as a part of a specified whole.(1 * Again, 
"to permit of an act of appropriation the goods must be individualised as a distinct 
entity'”.(H2)
It seems, that Scots law concurs with the English law, for the following reasons:
1-There is no special definition of the concept of "ascertained goods" in Scots law 
which differs from English law.
2-Ascertained goods, according to many scholars, have the same concept and 
defintion in both systems, for Scots scholars rely heavily on the English authorities. It 
was stated, that (H3) "specific implement is a remedy open only to the buyer where the
24
sale is of a specific article or of ascertained goods, i.e. probably goods made specific 
after the contract of sale, subsequently manufactured, acquired or appropriated to the 
contract, or such that their individuality has been found out".
The above statement of a Scots scholar, relied heavily on the cases such as, Re 
Wait.(H4) Thames Sack Co. v. Knowles.^  *5)
Special reference is made to the cases of Laurie & Morewood v. Dudian/ ^ ^  and, 
to Wait & James v. Middland Bank.(H7) in the work of another Scots scho lar.^^) 
concerning the concept and the definfition of ascertained goods.
3-It was stated that, ascertained g o o d s , m e a n ,  "goods which at the time the 
contract was made were not identified and agreed upon but which since its inception 
has become so". Furthermore, in the case of Havman v. M ' L i n t o c k . ^ O )  the goods 
must be separated and marked in order to be identified and specified from the other 
goods. Arguably, therefore the definition of ascertained goods in the case of Re 
W a i t , is followed by Scots law.
Sub-Section 2: Definition of the remedy of specific performance in
Iraqi civil law
General Background
In its wider sense, Iraqi civil law is the most important branch of law regulating the 
private relationship of individuals in society. It is the basic source of private law. For 
instance, law of contract, commercial law, the law of civil remedies, law of persons, 
law of property, Agricultural law, private international law, are parts of civil law.
The most fundamental legislation put in the statute books in Iraq is the Civil Code 
No 40 of 1951. Untill 1951 it was the Ottoman Civil Code which was the basic 
authority for the civil law of Iraq.
The chairman of the drafting committee was the late professor Abdul razzaq Al- 
sanhoori of Egypt. He held the view that the Iraqi Civil Code could be the same as the 
Egyptian Civil Code No.131 of 1948, which was influnced by the French Civil Code. 
Al-sanhoori tried to persuade the Iraqi committee to adopt the Egyptian Civil Code
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without much modification. The Iraqi members of the drafting committee objected to 
copying the Egyptian Civil Code on the grounds that they wished to take account the 
judicial views of all schools of Islamic law and jurisprudence, and adopt the view 
which they would find most suitable to the Iraqi nationals in modem setting.
The committee made a compromise which was to use the Islamic method of 
presentation as in the Egyptian Civil Code, but with the provision that the Iraqi Civil 
Code must be drawn in order of priority, from the various schools of Islamic law and 
jurisprudence, and the Egyptian Civil Code should be consulted and drawn upon only 
as secondrary source in comparison to the islamic jurisprudence. As a result to this 
compromise the Iraq Civil Code includes a great many more provisions derived from 
islamic law and Jurisprudence than does the Egyptian Civil Code.
The Iraqi Civil Code, is distinct from the Syrian Civil Code of 1949 and the Libyan 
Civil Code of 1953, for these two codes are based substantially on the Egyptian Civil 
Code.
As regards remedies in Iraqi Civil Code, they fall into two categories.(l) self-help 
remedies, (2)Judicial remedies. Remedies of self-help are four categories, namely:
1-Right to avoid the contract because an option.
2-Right to withhold the payment under the doctrine of mutuality (If on party is in 
breach to his contract the other party is entitled to withhold performance of the 
contract), this is called in the Iraqi Civil Code as "haq-al-habis" (right to withhold).
3-Right to set-off. If a contracting party commits a breach to his contract, the other 
party (the aggrieved party) can seek redress, by way of set-off in specified 
circumstances.
The judicial remedies also include many categories, namely:
1-Rescission: This remedy is developed under Islamic legal concept of various 
"options" which allows the contracting party to withdraw from the contract under 
certain circumstances.
2-Award of damages: This category is based on the principle of "La-zarar-wla-
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ziraar" (No losses should be inflicted)
3-Specific performance: A remedy entitles the aggrieved party to require 
performance of the obligation by the debtor. It is based on the Islamic principle of 
"ufu-bil-uhud" (fulfil your contract).
Specific performance has a very wide concept in islamic jurisprudence. It is a 
remedy can cover all the contracts.
Interestingly the Iraqi civil law jurisprudence and scholars in general have shown 
no sign of concern towards the influence of the islamic jurisprudence on specific 
performance, despite the principle of "ufu-bil-uqud" (fulfil your contracts) covers every 
contract.
This study will avoid considering specific performance under Islamic law and 
jurisprudence, for the following reasons:
1-The principle "ufu-bil-uqud" (fulfil your contracts) is a very wide principle and 
covers the contracts in general.
2-It has been pointed o u t , (*22) that "Islamic jurists never addressed themselves to 
an Islamic general theory of contract applicable to all types of contracts. As it can be 
observed from all traditional text on Islamic law, the manual on law of contract contain 
rules governing a number of individual kinds of contracts but not a general concept of 
contract." Thus it is hard to follow the rules and principles of specific performance in 
the Islamic jurisprudence.
3-The Qur'anic verse of "ufu-bil-uqud" (fulfil your contract) covers all possible 
contracts however different they may be.(123)
4-Lack of materials and references may be another ostacle to achieve comparative 
study with the Islamic law and jurisprudence.
To define specific performance in Iraqi civil law, two categories of contracts will be 
considered, namely:
1-In general contracts other than sale of goods contract
Specific performance is, the performance of the obligation by the debtor precisely
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and accurately within the terms of the contract. It is an enforcement of the debtor’s 
performance of what he has undertaken to do or not to do/124) jt js natural way of 
terminating any obligation against any party in breach to that o b l i g a t i o n / ^ )  j t  j s  0 p e n  
to every creditor in any co n trac t/^ )
The debtor cannot be compelled to perform, unless the creditor applies for specific 
p e rfo rm an ce /^?) Specific performance is considered as a natural end of the 
obligation against the refusing party. Thus, it may be asked why it cannot take place 
without the court’s order? This in turn questions the definition of specific performance; 
whether it is a remedy to compensate the aggrieved party against the failure of the 
debtor, or merely an order to perform the obligation against the party in breach.
Specific performance may be divided into voluntary specific performance, and 
obligatory specific performance. Performing the obligation voluntarily does not 
concern the court and raises no problem against either contracting party/128)
The question of whether specific performance as a remedy or as a performance of 
the obligation, has been fully considered in Iraqi civil law more than in Scots law.
Specific performance, it is said, is the most important way, if not the only way to 
perform the o b l i g a t i o n / 1 2 9 )  Furthermore, the debtor will not be held liable when the 
creditor applies for specific performance, provided that, performance is still 
p o s s i b l e / 130) Whereas, if performance of the obligation has become impossible by 
reason of the debtor's fault, he is held liable to the creditor, unless the impossibility 
arose beyond his control/131)
If granting specific performance is possible and it has been demanded by the 
creditor, the court will order it, and so far, the debtor is not liable, i.e. "his contractual 
liability will not a r i s e " / 1 3 2 )
It is questionable whether the function of specific performance to compensate the 
aggrieved party, or, is it merely a mean of giving the aggrieved party his right to have 
what he has contracted for.
Every party to a contract should perform what he has undertaken to do. Refusing 
to do so may expose the debtor to the court's order, which can be enforced by an order
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of the Execution Administration Office/133) por instance,when the obligation can be 
performed by way of taking the specific goods from the debtor or by building a house 
by another builder instead of the refusing party, such performance cannot be regarded 
as a compensation for the creditor, although, it is performance of the obligation. 
Furthermore, if a breach of a contract has taken place by one of the contracting parties, 
compensation is given in lieu of performance, and such compensation, it was 
stated/134) cannot be regarded as a specific performance. Therefore, it is submitted, 
that the essence of principle of specific performance in Iraqi civil law, is not as a 
remedy for breach of contract, but as an order by the court to compel the refusing party 
to perform his undertaking specifically for the following reasons:
1-The remedy for breach of contract, such as damages or "compensation in lieu" 
cannot be regarded as a performance of the obligation. It has been pointed o u t/^ 5 )  
that, it is as a finanacial sanction against the refusing party as a consequence of his 
refusal to perform his obligation.
2-Damages may be granted in addition to specific performance for any loss or 
delay, by reason of, the debtor’s f a u l t / 1 3 6 )  xhus the aggrieved party may be deemed 
to have been compensated by obtaining damages.
3-Monetary remedies, especially damages, are usually granted against the debtor 
for his wilful non-performance. Where performance of the obligation is possible and 
the aggrieved party has not suffered any loss, there is no need for damages.
4-Monetary remedies are always sought, when performance is impossible, 
exceptionaly hard or unduely difficult, as well as other c i r c u m s t a n c e s / 137)
Thus, the principles of Iraqi civil law indicate that specific performance is not a 
remedy. It is an order against the refusing party whether to perform what he has 
undertaken to do, or to refrain from doing what he has udertaken not to do. 
Nevertheless, such an order, it is believed, carries the aim and the purpose of any other 
remedy. If, for instance, the contracting party has refused performance while he is still 
able to do so, the court will order him to perform his undertaking. It is an order to
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achieve complete satisfaction for the aggrieved party. It is the creditor’s satisfaction 
which is latent in having what he has contracted for.
2-In the sale of goods contract
The general principle in Iraqi civil law, is that a party to a contract for sale of goods 
is entitled to have his contract specifically p e r f o r m e d / 13 8) An order of specific 
performance may be granted, so long as, performance of the contract is possible and 
can be enforced against the party in b re a c h /^ )  jf specific performance has become 
impossible, whether it by reason of the debtor’s fault, or by any reason beyond his 
control, specific performance cannot be enforced against h i m / 1 4 0 )  damages is the
only remedy/141)
Specific performance is the primary right of the contracting parties in a sale of 
goods, and it is granted as a matter of right to the aggrieved party, whether seller or 
buyer. Therefore, the debtor is not entitled to pay damages instead of performing his 
obligation specifically if such performance is p o s s i b l e / 1 4 2 )
Specific performance in Iraqi civil law represents a general rule, which can be 
applied to all types of contract, whether sale of goods contract, land, agency,
hirepurchase etc, because, Article 246(1) of Civil Code provides, that, ”A debtor
shall be compelled to perform his obligation specifically if such performance is 
possible".
The above provision indicates that, the debtor may be any party to the contract. The 
seller is a debtor and as a creditor at the sametime and as is the buyer, according to 
Article 246(1) of Iraqi Civil Code.
Article 177 (1) of Iraqi Civil Code provides, "In bilateral contracts if one of the 
parties does not perform his obligation, the other party may after serving a formal 
summons on the debtor, demand performance of the contract...". Thus the seller and 
the buyer are treated as debtor or creditor and they may be subject to the order of 
specific performance. Further, according to Aricle 247 of Iraqi Civil Code, subject to
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the rule with regard to transcription, an obligation to transfer ownership or any other 
real right, transfers ipso facto that right, if the object of the obligation is specifically 
identified and is owned by the debtor. Transfer of ownership is therefore the natural 
outcome of the contract and may be enforced, as soon as, the contract is concluded. If, 
for instance, the object of the contract of sale is a car which is specifically identified and 
owned by the seller, the ownership of that car is transferred as soon as the contract is 
concluded and without the need of any incidental procedures, such as delivery.1(143) 
Thus, ordering the seller to deliver the thing sold to the buyer is the proper way to end 
the o b lig a tio n /^ ) Where the object of the contract is not specifically identified, this 
will be a bar against transferring the property and thus against specific performance of 
the obligation, unless the object, which is described only as species, becomes specific
by individualisation/*^)
Generally, if the obligation is to do something,(146) such as, the obligation of the 
seller to deliver goods to the buyer in a certain place and at a fixed time such an 
obligation must be performed by delivering these goods to the buyer. If he refuses to 
do so, he shall be compelled by the Execution Administration Office, which will put the 
court's order in force, by taking these goods from him and deliver them to the
buyer/*47)
Specific performance whether it is a remedy for breach of contract for the sale of 
goods, or as a remedy for breach of other contracts, may be in one of two forms, to do, 
(to give something) and, not to do something. These two forms of specific 
performance are subject to the same conditions and to the same circumstances. It 
means, that ( ordering the seller, to deliver goods to the buyer, and ordering him to 
refrain from disturbing the buyer in his enjoyment are of the same nature and concept). 
The seller is bound to take every necessary step to transfer the title of the thing sold to 
the purchaser, and to abstain from doing any act which might render that transfer 
impossible or exceptionally hard/*48) He will be held liable and will be enforced to 
comply with his obligation within the circumstances of the case.
Thus if the seller, warrants the buyer against disturbance of his enjoyment of the
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thing sold, either totally or partially, whether such disturbance is caused by his act, or 
that of a third party,'(149) he is held liable and he will be ordered to fulfil what he has 
undertaken to do or not to do. It is an order for specific performance.
Ordering the seller or the buyer to refrain from doing something is considered as 
specific performance in Iraqi civil law with the slight difference that it obliges the debtor 
to respect his obligation by not doing what he has undertaken not to do.(^O)
Ordering the debtor to perform his obligation specifically, whether it is in the sale of 
goods contract or in other contracts, and whether it is to do something or to refrain 
from doing something, may be subject to circumstances and conditions, such as, 
i m p o s s i b i l i t y , (151) exceptional hardship or difficulty that the debtor may suffer if he is 
enforced to p e r f o r m , (152) ancj the form and the nature of the creditor's application to 
the court to decree such o r d e r .( 1 5 3 )  Thus, the question of granting or refusing specific 
performance depends very much on the circumstances surrounding each case, 
although, it is submitted, that, the main factor in achieving the result and the 
consequence of any obligation is the possibility of performing the obligation. 
Therefore, specific performance can be defined as follows:
A decree issued bv the court under certain circumstances and conditions, ordering 
the debtor, who mav be imprisoned in the case of the refusal, to do or not to do what he 
has undertaken precisely, where the object is either specifically identified or becomes 
specific bv individualisation.
Three essential elements arise from the above definition, namely:
1-The circumstances and conditions of granting and refusing specific performance.
2-Imprisonment of the refusing party and contempt of the court.
3-The identification of the object.
The grounds under which specific performance is granted or refused, will be fully 
considered in Chapter Two of this w o r k .  (154)
2.1-Imprisonment of the party in breach/ 155)
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Specific performance is an order against the party in breach to force him to perform 
his obligation. The Exeution Adminstration Office adopts the court's order to compel
such performance/
It is questionable whether performance can be achieved where the debtor still 
refuses to perform the obligation.
Imprisoning the refusing debtor is a very effective way to compel him to perform, 
although the Iraqi Civil Code does not contain any provision as regards imprisoning the 
refusing debtor in order to enforce him to perform what he has undertaken.
Imprisonment of the debtor is provided for by the Execution C o d e / 157) ^  Articles 
40, 49, which regulates imprisonment of the refusing party under certain conditions. 
They are as follows:
1-According to Article 40 of the Execution Code; unless there is request by the 
creditor, and judgment by the court acting as e x e c u t o r / 15 8) the debtor cannot be 
imprisoned.
2-If the executor is not a judge, the case is examined by the judge of the Court of 
First Instance to decide whether the debtor should be imprisoned or whether 
imprisonment is inappropriate in the circumstances of the case.
3-If the executor is satisfied that the debtor is able to perform his obligation, totally 
or partially, without offering appropriate settlement and has no property which may be 
confiscated and has refused any settlement offered by the executor, he may order the 
debtor to be i m p r i s o n e d / ^ )  Nevertheless, the executor is not entitled to imprison the 
debtor before asking the creditor about any settlement offered by the debtor, for 
imprisoning the debtor is unjustified and invalid when he is unable to comply with the 
decree, unless he refuses to comply with the decree w i l f u l l y / 1 6 0 )
All the above factors are subject to the court's discretionary power to examine 
whether they are applicable. In a c a s e / 1 6 1 )  the Court of Cassation, reversed the 
decision of the Execution Administration's headquarters, when it ordered the debtor to 
pay the debt in insalments of fifty Dinars per month with a guarantor according to the
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request of the agent of the creditor. The debtor then failed to comply with the order 
because of his poor financial situation. The debtor asked the creditor to prove that he 
was in a good enough financial situation to pay. The Administration of Execution 
Office decided that this settlement by the debtor was out of proportion to the whole 
debt. Therefore he should be imprisoned for six months. The debtor challanged that 
decision in the Court of Cassation, which reversed it, for the following reasons:
1-The debtor's new settlement was not shown to the creditor to ascertain whether it 
was accepted or rejected.
2-The imprisonment was not requested by the creditor.
As the debtor was in a poor financial situation, he had no intention of refusing to 
comply with the decree of specific performance. A refusing party who wilfully fails to 
comply with the court's decree may be imprisoned, for Article 42 (1) of the execution 
code provides that, "A debtor who agreed to offer a settlement for paying his debt, but 
he has discontinued to do so, he is subject to imprisonment".
Where a party is unable or is prevented from performing his obligation, no 
imprisonment can be ordered against him, for it was said, unless there is unjustifiable 
attitude by the debtor towards performance of the obligation, his imprisonment is 
invalid. Further, under Article 41(1) of the Execution Code, imprisonment of the 
debtor is not allowed in the following circumstances:
-If he is an insolvent debtor, imprisonment in such a case is p o i n t l e s s / ^ )
-Imprisonment of the debtor is not allowed in the case of child as Article 48 of the 
Execution Code states "....imprisonment is invalid when non-delivery is beyond the 
debtor's control or who is liable to fulfil the court's judgment".
The debtor may not be imprisoned twice for one debt, if it is proved that he cannot 
pay his d e b t / 163) f o r  tjjere j s  no po^t in imprisoning him again if he cannot perform 
Thus, imprisonment will not be ordered, unless the court is satisfied that it is effective 
in compelling the refusing party to comply with the decree of specific performance.
Imprisonment of the refusing party should not be for more than four m o n t h s / 164) 
If the debtor still refuses to comply with the decree, the Execution Administration
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Office enforces compliance with the decree by either taking the object from the debtor, 
if it is specifically identified, or by ordering him to identify the subject-matter as regards 
its individuality, as imprisonment does not extinguish the debt.1(165)
If the subject-matter is not with the debtor and it cannot be found after searching the 
debtor's permises, the court if it is convinced that the thing is still with the debtor, it 
may order him to pay a penalty if he refrains to comply with the decree of the
c o u r t /
Sometimes imprisonment cannot be ordered against the contracting party in breach, 
not because it is unduly difficult to perform or it is impossible or there is exceptional 
hardship on the party to perform his obligation and to fulfil the court's decree, but 
because, the contracting party is a corporate body. The corporate body may then subject 
to special t r e a t m e n t / 1 6 7 )
2.2-Goods specifically identified and goods only are described as 
specie, but become specific bv individualisation
There are two discriptions of goods which may constitute the subject-matter of the 
sale contract by which specific performance may be ordered, namely:
-Goods specifically identified.
-Goods which become specific by individualisation.
2.2.1-Goods specifically identified
According to Article 247 of Iraqi Civil Code; "...an obligation to transfer ownership 
or any other real right transfers ipso facto that right, if the object of the obligation is 
specifically identified and is owned by the debtor".
When the thing sold is specifically identified, the ownership of such a thing is 
transferred, as soon as, the contract of sale is made/168) provided that the thing sold is 
owned by the s e l l e r / 1 6 9 )
What are goods specifically identified?
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The meaning and the concept of these goods is clear in Iraqi civil law, for the term 
clearly expresses the meaning. Goods may be specifically identified, such as a 
particular car, a black horse, a portrait, or a golden watch of a certain type,...etc. 
Thus, if a particular horse or a portrait which is owned by a seller A has been sold to a 
purchaser B, the ownership of that article will be transferred to B as soon as they 
conclude the contract. Furthermore, Iraqi civil law jurisprudence, considering the 
meaning and the concept of goods which are specifically identified, does not further 
analyse and explain the meaning of the said term.
Goods specifically identified mean, goods which are agreed upon at the time of 
making the contract.
2.2.2-Goods which become specific bv individualisation
Article 248 (1) of Iraqi Civil Code provided "when an obligation to transfer 
ownership or any other real right, has for its object a thing which is described only as 
regards its species, the right is not transferred, unless the object is specifically 
identified".
No title can be transferred where the object is not specifically identified. Further, 
an object which described as regards its species can be identified and specified by way 
of i n d i v i d u a l i s a t i o n / ™ )  The concept of a process of individualisation must therefore 
be considered.
Individualisation, is a process of separating a quantity of generic goods from its 
bulk by any method, by which the thing sold, "the generic goods" becomes specifically 
identified/™ ) It occurs by any method which suits the nature of the goods. Thus 
goods may be individualised by measuring, weighting, marking, counting, or any other 
method, which renders them specifically identified/™ ) Individualisation, may take 
place at the time of delivery or before delivery, but it is impossible to individualise the 
goods after delivery/™ )
In cases where the seller refuses to individualise the goods, Article 248 (2) of Civil
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Code provides, that "if, however, the debtor does not perform his obligation, the 
creditor may, upon an order of the court, or in case of urgency even without such an 
order, acquire at the expense of the debtor, an article of the same kind; he may also 
claim the value of the articles without prejudice to his rights to damages, in either case". 
Thus, the purchaser is entitled either to buy goods of the same kind "upon an order of 
the court", and then require the seller to pay the c o s t , (174) or> t0 ^  f o r  t h e  value of 
the goods, for he may not be interested in having them any more after the dispute has 
arose between himself and the seller, without prejudice to his right to claim 
d a m a g e s / 1 7 5 )
Buying an article of the same kind at the expense of the seller may be regarded, as if 
the buyer was granted damages to buy the article himself. That is undoubtedly, not 
specific performance, because, specific performance is to order the debtor to perform 
what he has undertaken to do or not to do precisely and accurately. He has not 
undertaken to pay expenses or damages. Surely, then, the buyer, who insists on 
having the same thing that he has contracted for, but he has failed to have it, cannot be 
satisfied with the alternative remedy of d a m a g e s / ^ )
The goods do not always exist at the time the contract is made. The parties to the 
contract may agree to sell and to buy goods which do not exist at the time of making the 
contract, so long as they will exist in the future. The contract can be concluded even if 
the goods do not exist at the time the contract is m a d e / 177) Article 514 (2) of Iraqi 
Civil Code provides, that, " The sale of future rights and things is valid if they are 
identified sufficiently to prevent the contracting parties from being ignorant and 
misrepresented as regards the object individuality.
Future and non-existent goods in Iraqi civil law, form an object to the contract of 
sale, since, the contracting parties are fully aware and sure as regards their individuality 
and existence in the f u t u r e / 1 7 8 )  The concept of future goods follows that of a 
category of moveables which is identified as regards its species, because they need to 
be identified and specified and their titile is not transferred to the buyer at the moment 
the contract is made, but at the moment the goods e x i s t / 1 7 9 )  and identified
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specifically.^^0) por example, a producer of cars has contracted with 1000 buyers 
separately to sell them 1000 cars. At the time the contract is made, there is no car 
available. He has to produce them in a later stage. The title of each car is transferred to 
the buyer as soon as the car is produced, but each car should be identified and specified 
to each buyer. After such identification each buyer becomes the owner of a certain and 
specific car.
As long as future and non-existent goods are able to be identified specifically, and 
not of the category which is prohibited by the law, therefore, it is believed, that these 
goods form a subject-matter for decree of specific performance in the sale of goods 
contract, in accordance with Article 129 (1) of Iraqi Civil Code, which provides that, 
"things those take place in the future may form an object to the obligation even if they 
do not exist at the time the contract is made, provided that they are identified and 
specified sufficiently in a way prevents any misrepresention or misleading to their 
identity, individuality and nature.^ ^ 1) Thereupon, specific performance can be 
ordered when such goods form the subject-matter of the contract.
Comment
1-Specific implement is an order of the court to compel performance of the 
contract. It is not to compensate the party for loss he has suffered, but to let him 
obtains the goods he has contracted for. Nevertheless, it is considered a remedy for the 
aggrieved party, because it achieves his satisfaction in enforcing the refusing party to 
comply with the contract.
2-Ordering the refusing party to perform his contract specifically is combined with 
imprisonment. However, imprisonment of the refusing party is subject to the court 
discretionary power. Furthermore the court’s discretionary power plays role in 
examining the refusing party's intention toward the decree of specific implement and 
whether his refusal is wilfully or not.
3-Specific performance in Iraqi civil law is to order the refusing party to do or to
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refrain from doing something. While in Scots law specific implement is an order of the 
court to enforce the refusing party to do someting. Whereas ordering him to refrain 
from doing something is a different remedy called "interdict".
4-Imprisonment of the refusing party in both systems is not a penalty, but a civil 
method of compelling him to perform the decree of specific implement.
5-Scots and Iraqi law are concurred as regards the concept of specific goods, i.e., 
"goods specifically identified", for in both systems the goods should be agreed upon at 
the time the contract is made.
6-Ascertained goods in Scots law, and goods become specific by individualisation 
in Iraqi civil law carry the same concept and the same meaning, for ascertainment and 
individualisation of the goods include that goods must be identified and specified by 
any method suits their nature.
Section Two:The nature of specific implement as a remedy for breach 
of contract for the sale of goods
Specific implement as a remedy for breach of contract for the sale of goods is the 
right of the aggrieved party to obtain what he has contracted for. It is an ordinary legal 
remedy and not equitable one. It is doubtful whether granting or refusing the remedy is 
affected by the court's discretionary power.
The nature of the remedy will be considered in two sub-sections as follows:
Sub-section 1: The nature of the remedy of specific implement in
Scots Law
Three important issues will be considered, namely:
1-Specific implement is an ordinary legal remedy.
2-Specific implement is not equitable remedy.
3-Specific implement is not discretionary remedy.
1-Specific implement is an ordinary legal remedy
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The general rule of Scots law is, that the aggrieved party to the contract is given a 
legal right to compel the refusing party to perform his o b l i g a t i o n / 1 8 2 )  and "although, 
he may elect to do so, he cannot be compelled to the alternative of an action of 
damages"/! ^ 3) Furthermore, specific implement is defined as one of the remedies to 
which a party to a contract is entitled where the other party to it refuses to implement the 
obligation which he has u n d e r t a k e n / ^ )  Therefore specific implement is the primary 
and the normal remedy, and as it was s t a t e d / 1 8 5 )  "i d 0  not think it is too much to say 
that our (Scots) law differing from the Law of England".
The concept of the remedy of specific implement as an ordinary legal remedy relies 
on the following circmstances and facts, namely:
1-Specific implement confers on the aggrieved party, (the buyer in the sale of 
goods ), the right to have what he has contracted for, because, as it was stated/186) 
that "it is frequently open to the party to a contract to request the court to ordain the 
other party specifically to implement his contract and to perform what he has 
unedertaken".
2-The only way for the aggrieved party to resort to the alternative remedy of 
damages, is, when implement of the contract either rendered i m p o s s i b l e / ! ^ )  or 
exceptionally hard for the defender (the seller) to perform/188) or when the refusing 
party claims that the pursuer is in breach of his o b l i g a t i o n / 189)
3-The difference between specific implement in English and Scots Law, appears 
clear, for in many cases, specific performance in England has been given to a purchaser 
by Court of Equity, which, it was s t a t e d / 1 9 0 )  " is  unknown to the law of Scotland". 
Thus Scots law, "is not unfavourable to demand for specific performance, in this 
respect differing from the law of England, which favours an award of d a m a g e s " / ^ ! )
4-It is believed, that the grant of specific implement is not based on equitable 
grounds, although, refusing it is based on the court's discretionary power, for when 
granting it, the court must consider certain legal grounds, such as the pursuer's 
application and the goods, must be specific or ascertained/!^) On the contrary, the 
court may refuse to order specific implement either because it is impossible or because
40
other equitable grounds exist.1(193)
5-In Me Arthur v. L a w s o n . ( 1 9 4 )  Lorcj inglis observed that, "A contract which 
cannot be enforced by specific implement, in so far as regards its form and substance, 
is no contract at all, and cannot form the ground of an action of damages". Thus Scots 
law is favourable to grant specific implement rather than damages.
2-Specific implement is not equitable remedy
Should the remedy of specific implement, despite being an ordinary and legal 
remedy, be considered as an equitable remedy.
In Stewart v. K e n n e d v . ( 1 9 5 )  Lord Watson, defined the concept and the nature of 
specific implement in Scots law when he stated that, "I do not think that upon this 
matter any assistance can be derived from English decisions; because the laws of the 
two countries regard the right to specific performance from different stand points. In 
England the only legal right arising from a breach of contract is a claim of damages; 
Specific performance is not a matter of legal right, but a purely equitable remedy, which 
the court can withhold when there are sufficient reasons of conscience or expediency 
against it. But in Scotland the breach of a contract of the sale of a specific subject such 
as landed estate given the party aggrieved the legal right to sue for implement".
The above dictum of Lord Watson is a clear indication that specific implement is not 
an equitable remedy. Further, it was stated by Lord Macnaghten (196) "specific 
performance is part of the ordinary jurisdiction of the court", and "the superior court 
having equitable jurisdiction, must also have a discreton, in certain exceptional 
c a s e s ".(197) jn addition, "the law of Scotland does not compel parties to form their 
contracts upon equitable principles",(198) and, specific implement is granted when 
certain grounds are available.(199)
The court will not order specific implement where there are grounds against 
granting it. It means, that the court must examine the situation of the party who should 
perform but he faces circumstances,(^00) which render performance, either impossible,
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unduely difficult, or exceptionally hard. Thus ordering the refusing party to perform 
without considering these circumstances, would be regarded inequitable order, and 
"that would condemn the party to perpetual imprisonment".(201)
The principle of "where complete justice cannot be done by damages, specific 
performance is granted and vice-versa",1(202) cannot be applied to specific implement in 
Scots law if it is meant by this principle to alter the concept and the nature of specific 
implement as an ordinary and legal remedy. Whereas, if the grant of damages instead 
of specific implement is to acheive more justice, as in the case of impossibility, 
hardship and undue difficulity, damages are considered the alternative remedy to 
specific implement.
The equitable remedy will not be ordered, " i f  to grant it would give rise to hardship 
to the d e f e n d a n t " , (203) Further it is considered" the most accurate method of achieving 
the compensation goal of contract r e m e d i e s " . (204) jt seems that to let the buyer obtains 
the particular chattel achieves more justice than to give him damages as an alternative 
remedy.
The above argument are applied to the remedy of specific implement as a legal 
remedy not as an equitable remedy, within the court’s discretionary p o w e r . ( 2 0 5 )  The 
court considers the cirumstances surrounding the remedy of specific implement andwill 
order it when it is satisfied, not because specific implement is an equitable remedy and 
it achieves justice more than damages, but because it is an ordinary legal right for the 
aggrieved party. Thus the court, "has inherent power to refuse" the remedy,'( 2 0 6 )  
"upon equitable g r o u n d s " . ( 2 0 7 )
3-Specific implement is not a discretionary remedy
The court's discretion is involved in refusing the remedy of specific implement. 
This may cast doubt, that the remedy is a discretionary remedy, despite being an 
ordinary and legal remedy.
A contracting party, who wishes to enforce his contractural right against the other
42
party, must apply to the court. Nevertheless, "the court will not support an attempt to 
enforce them in an unreasonable way".(208) Because too much uncertainity will occur 
and the court in such a case will not be sure, whether it is equitable or reasonable to 
allow the party to carry out his right of the contract.(209) farther, where a party's 
"claim satisfies the requirements, he is entitled to his remedy and the court has no 
discretion to grant or withhold or qualify it".(210) In Grahame v. Kirkcaldy 
Magistrates. 11) it was observed that, "a superior court having equitable jurisdiction, 
must also have a discretion in certain exceptional cases, to withhold from parties 
applying for that remedy which in ordinary circumstances, they would be entitled as a 
matter of course. In order to justify the exercise of such a discretionary power there 
must be some very cogent reason for depriving litigants of the ordinary means of 
enforcing their legal rights". The court has no power to refuse specific implement if it 
is an appropriate remedy and there are no equitable grounds against granting it,(212) 
for, the remedy is not one for the court to grant it if thinks fit,(213) jt must grant jf 
is clear that what would be ordered to be done could be done reasonably.(214)
Nevertheless, the Lord President,1(215) stated, that "in the circumstances it is wihin
the discretion of the court to say which of these remedies the pursuers would be entitled 
to". Thus, he thought that the appropriate remedy was damages. Lord Shand pointed 
out ,(216) "it must always be in the discretion of the court to say whether the remedy of 
specific implement or one of damages is the proper and suitable remedy in the 
circumstances".
In accordance with the above argument, it is submitted, that in Scots law, the court 
has discretion to order the refusing party (the seller) to perform the contract, for the 
following reasons:
1-The court’s main task is to order the refusing party to perform his contract 
specifically. Further, the court will not consider the equitable grounds when granting 
it. Whereas, the conditions,(217) for granting the remedy, such as the pursuer's 
application, and the object is specific or ascertained, should be considered. However, 
the grounds for rejecting the remedy,'(218) practically associate with the action of
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specific implement by the refusing party in any legal case to claim the remedy.
2-The court cannot refuse specific implement, where the remedy is appropriate 
provided that, there are no grounds against granting it,@19) for in the law of Scotland, 
if the obligation is prestable in face of any one, it might be enforced by granting a 
decree of specific implement, when the reason for refusing such a remedy upon 
equitable grounds are a b s e n t , (220) i.e.,"performance of the obligation is not impossible 
or exceptionally hard, or unduly difficult".
3-Specific performance, "in England is a matter of discretion, and defences are 
admitted, which are inadmissible according to the doctrines and practice of the court’s 
of Scotland, where specific performance is part of ordinary jurisdiction of the 
court".1@21) This indicates, that specific implement in Scots law is not a discretionary 
remedy if there are no defences against it by the party in breach. This, in practice, may 
indicate that there is always exception to the general rules, for the court has 
discretionary power towards specific implement especially when the court refuses the 
remedy upon equitable grounds. When it is said that specific implement is not 
discretionary remedy, this should be put in a sense where there are no defences against 
the remedy. If there is a single defence, whether a claim of difficulty, hardship or 
impossibility the remedy is rendered under the court's discretion.
The refusing party will not submit to and accept the pursure's claim without raising 
any counterclaim. So, raising any claim against the pursure means that the court's 
discretionary power will be involved, and the remedy of specific implement is subject 
to its discretion, but still as an ordinary remedy, because, when the claim, which stands 
against it, is proved wrong or insufficient, the court has no power to refuse the remedy.
4-Involving the court's discretionary power in considering whether specific 
implement is an appropriate or inappropriate remedy does not change its nature, for the 
court main concern is to consider whether the equitable grounds and the other grounds 
exist or not and to examine these grounds, and their influence on granting the remedy.
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Sub-Section 2:The nature of specific performance in Iraqi civil Law
Three issues will be considered, namely:
1-Specific performance is an ordinary, legal remedy.
2-Specific performance is not equitable remedy.
3-Specific performance is not discretionary remedy.
1-Specifc performance is an ordinary legal remedy
In Iraqi civil law specific performance arises from a court order to compel the 
debtor (seller or purchaser) to perform precisely what he has undertaken to do or not to 
do (222) The aggrieved party, according to Article 246 (1) of Civil Code, is entitled to 
have the right of specific performance. It provides, that "A debtor shall be compelled to 
perform his obligation specifically if such performance is possible”. Thus, specific 
performance is considered the primary remedy for breach of the obligation and the 
normal way to achieve performance of the c o n t r a c t .(223) it is the legal way of obliging 
the refusing party to perform his obligation. Nevertheless, compelling the debtor to 
perform his obligation specifically sometimes requires the debtor personal 
in t e r f e r e n c e .  (224) Such a case, however, may not takes place in the contract of sale of 
goods, because performance of the obligation specifically can be ordered against the 
seller by enforcing him to deliver the goods, or by taking the goods from him and 
deliver them to the buyer,1(225) or> by ordering the buyer to pay the price.
As a general rule specific performance cannot be substituted by d a m a g e s .(226) 
However, the aggrieved party may resort to damages as an alternative remedy, when 
granting specific performance is impossible,1@27) or exceptionally hard for the debtor 
to do s o , (228) or when the aggrieved party seeks for damages instead of specific
p e r f o im a n c e . ( 2 2 9 )
Specific performance will not be ordered, unless certain conditions exist,1(230) ancj 
there are no grounds or circumstances stand against granting it.(231)
When the seller refuses to deliver goods to the buyer, the court must grant decree of 
specific performance, ordering the seller to comply with his obligation, if it is
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p o s s i b l e . ( 2 3 2 )  when the debtor offers to perform his obligation specifically, but the 
creditor has applied for damages, the court will not refuse specific performance and
order d a m a g e s . ( 2 3 3 )
It seems, that the possibility of performance of the contract specifically, deprives 
the court of the power to refuse the remdy of specific performance. Also, because it is 
a legal remedy, it is not subject to the court’s discretionary power when it is applicable.
2-Specific performance is not an equitable remedy
Specific performance is a legal right for the aggrieved party to compel the refusing 
party to perform his obligation. However, doubts remains whether refusing the 
remedy upon equitable grounds does not change the nature of the remedy, and whether 
involving the court's discretionary power has such effect.
The grounds and circumstances which are considered equitable, such as, 
impossibility, exceptional hardship, i.e., "performing specifically is too onerous for the 
debtor", or undue difficulty,....etc, affect the grant of specific performance, and the 
remedy may be refused for equitable reasons.
Article 1 (2) of Iraqi Civil Code, provides; "In the absence of provision of law 
which is applicable, the court shall decide according to the custom and in the absence of 
custom in accordance with the principles of Islamic law without being restricted to a 
certain school of Jurisprudence. The principles of equity shall be applied by the court, 
if the principles of Islamic law are absent."
Thus, equity is one of the sources of Iraqi civil law, (234) which should be 
followed by the court where the other sources are absent, in order to achieve
j u s t i c e .  ( 2 3  5 )
Moreover, Islamic law as it is known "Al-shari'-ah" (the right path) is a major 
world legal system distinct from both the franco-german civil law and Anglo-American 
common law systems. Islamic law is not an independant branch of Scholarship, but 
only one of facets of the Islamic faith itself. It is on the basis of divine revelations that 
Muslim Jurists and theologians have pronounced the rules govening the relations
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among men, and between man and G o d . @ 3 6 )  i n  this sense Islam is essentially a 
religion of law regulating and directing every aspect of human experience.
Theoretically, Islamic law corresponds to the nutural school of law and contains the 
two concepts of an ethical quality in law and capacity of human reason to decern 
it.@37) it should be noted that the basic principles of Islamic law, as contained in the 
Qur'an and the Sunnah (the prophet’s practice and the tradition of the early Muslims), 
are pervasive-that is, they exist independently of man. So far as the treatment of 
Islamic law is concerned, Iraqi civil law has taken the middle path between the two 
extremes of:
(1)-Regulating it in its entirety, and,
(2)-Going for radical reform and abandoning islam.@38)
Furthermore, when specific performance is too onerous for the debtor, it may be 
substituted by damages, provided that this way of performance does not seriously 
prejudice the creditor.@3 9) Also, when as a result of exceptional and unpridictable 
circumstances of general character, performance of the obligation becomes excessively 
onerous, in such way as to threaten the debtor with exorbitant loss, the court may, 
according to the circumstances and after taking into consideration the interest of both 
parties, reduce to reasonable limits, the obligation that has become excessive, in 
accordance with, the principles of equity.@40)
In addition, the Law Reform of the Legal System C o d e , @41) has emphasised on 
the balance between contractual rights and obligations. It permits the alteration of the 
contract by the court to achieve the balance between the debtor and the creditor in order 
to achieve justice and to prevent arbitration and unjust consequences.
It seems, that the principles of equity play essential role in refusing specific 
performance. When it is impossible to order the refusing party to perform, he will be 
ordered to pay damages, unless he claims that, impossibility of performance arose by 
reason beyond his c o n t r o l . @42) Subsequently, neither specific performance nor 
damages will be decreed, because, ordering damages or specific performance in such
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circumstances would be considered inequitable.
When performance of the obligation specifically is too onerous for the debtor, he 
will not be compelled to do so, provided that non-performance will not seriously 
prejudice the creditor.
If performance seriously prejudices the creditor, the court will order specific 
performance, unless the benefit that the creditor obtains from performance of the 
contract specifically is less than damages and losses the debtor may s u f f e r . ( 2 4 3 )
It is submitted, that specific performance is not an equitable remedy, despite the 
effect by the principles of equity, for the following reasons:
1-Every debtor is obliged to perform his contract specifically, and he has no 
alternative choice when such performance is p o s s i b l e . ^ 4 4 )
2-Before granting specific performance, the court must make sure that certain 
grounds of law are e x i s t , ^ 4 5 )  i.e.,"the grounds for granting the remedy of specific 
performance".
3-Refusing specific performance is based on equitable grounds, such as 
imposibility, or performance is too onerous for the debtor, in addition to other grounds 
of law. However, even if the remedy is refused upon equitable grounds, it remains 
legal and ordinary remedy, for it is not to achieve justice better than damages, but to let 
the aggrieved party obtains what he has contracted for. Therefore, the principle of, 
"where complete justice cannot be done by damages, specific performance is granted 
and vice-versa", cannot be applied to specific performance because damages are not the 
alternative remedy to specific performance in the ordinary circumstances .(246)
3-Specific performance is not a discretionary remedy
The court has discretionary power to examine the circumstances surrounding the 
grant of the remedy of specific performance. It is questionable whether the remedy is a 
discretionary remedy, despite being ordinary, legal and not equitable remedy. Specific 
performance is not an equitable remedy in Iraqi civil law, although refusing it
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sometimes is subject to equitable g r o u n d s .( 2 4 7 )
The court’s discretionary power appears heavily in examining the equitable grounds 
for refusing the remedy, such as impossibility, or exceptional hardship, or undue 
difficulty. The Iraqi Civil Code does not define the term of "too onerous for the 
debtor". Thus, the court must consider the above term in every disputed case/248) jf 
performance became impossible because of either reason the court will examine such 
impossibility and its effect on the parties and their obligations. The court is restricted 
by the proofs and evidence which are brought by the contracting p a r t ie s .  (^49) Thus the 
court's discretionary power will be involved in refusing the remedy.
The court examines the effect of such a ground on the balance between the rights 
and the obligations of the contracting parties. Thus, it was stated,1(250) that the court 
should take the ordinary debtor’s case as a standard,(251) to measure and to compare 
other cases.
It is submitted, therefore, that the court generally has no discretionary power to 
grant specific performance or to refuse it, where the refusing party raises no claim 
against the aggrieved party, or where no equitable circumstances stand against granting 
it. However this is immaterial, for the action will not be raised by the aggrieved party
unless there is refusal to perform by the party in breach. It appears that refusing the
/
remedy by the court under its discretionary power does not change the nature and the 
concept of the remedy. Where any claim by the refusing party is proved wrong, the 
court must grant specific performance.
Comment
1-Specific implement in Iraq and Scotland is an ordinary legal remedy. Granting it, 
depends on certain grounds of Law,where there are no defences by the refusing party, 
and no equitable circumstances stand as a bar against grantingit.
2-The possibility of performance of the contract specifically by the debtor, and the 
absence of any ground for refusing the remedy, in both laws, deprives the court of any 
discretionary power to refuse granting the remedy.
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3-In Scotland and Iraq, specific implement is not equitable remedy despite the role 
of the grounds and circumstances in refusing it, and despite the achievement for the 
aggrieved party in ordering the debtor to perform specifically. In addition, specific 
implement in both Laws is not affected by the principle of "where complete justice 
cannot be done by damages, specific implement is granted and vice-versa".
4-The remedy of specific implement in Scots and Iraqi systems is not discretionary 
remedy, where no defenses are raised by the refusing party against specific implement.
5-The court's discretion appears heavily in refusing the remedy, because examining 
the exceptional grounds requires the court's discretion.
CONCLUSION
1- Specific implement represents a general rule which can be applied to every 
obligation whether it is contract for sale of goods or lease or hire-purchase,...etc. The 
availability of certain grounds of law and the absence of certain equitable grounds 
encourges granting the remedy.
2- Specific implement is a remedy as well as an order against the refusing party. It 
is grantedto the aggrieved party as a matter of ordinary legal right. It is to enable him 
obtaining what he has contracted for. It is an achievement of the party's satisfaction and 
need.
3- Imprisonment of the refusing party to enforce him to perform his obligation 
specifically is not a natural consequence to his refusal, for specific implement is not 
automatically combined with imprisonment It should be considered and examined by 
the court within its discretionary power. It reflects the neccessity and importance of the 
remedy of specific implement.
4-The remedy of specific implement is subject to the court's discretionary power, 
but the court does not have discretionary power to grant specific implement when the 
legal conditions are available, provided that, there are no equitable grounds or defences 
against granting it, or these grounds are proved wrong or they have no effect on the
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refusing party ability to perform his obligation.
5-The involvement of these exceptional circumstances does not change or alter the 
nature and the concept of the remedy of specific implement, even if it is refused as 
consequence of their effect.
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CHAPTER TWO 
GROUNDS FOR GRANTING AND REFUSING THE 
REMEDY OF SPECIFIC IMPLEMENT
Introduction
Specific implement is granted, where certain grounds, i.e., (the goods are specific 
or ascertained, and the pursuer has applied for the remedy), exist. Nevertheless, 
specific implement may be opposed by the defender, claiming one of several defences, 
for instance, impossibility, exceptional hardship, or undue difficulty, or breach of 
contract by other party. Thus, where valid defences are raised, the remedy fails under 
the court’s discretion, and it may be refused. It is not however a discretionary remedy, 
because of its essentially legal rather than equitable nature.
The issue of granting and refusing the remedy of specific implement will be 
considered in two sections.
Section One: Grounds for granting specific implement
Granting the remedy of specific implement is based on specific grounds of law. 
They will be considered in two Sub-sections, namely:
Sub-Section 1:-Granting specific implement in Scots law
It is submitted that the buyer, even in the sale of goods contract has the remedy as a 
matter of right.^^ In addition, in a contract for movables, specific implement will be 
granted if the contract is for a specific article.
In Stewart v. Kennedy.1@) it was laid down, that specific implement is a primary 
and distinctive remedy of Scots law of voluntary obligation, and the aggrieved party is 
entitled to it as of right by means of decree ad factum praestandum. Consequently it is 
open to the buyer in the sale of goods contract to apply to the court to compel the seller 
to fulfil his contract specifically.^)
The first question to consider is whether any specific implement may be granted
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over any specific or ascertained goods, or whether they should be of a special, or 
unique nature. Secondly, must "pretium affectionis" be averred by the 
pursuer?^),i.e. (the goods have special value to him).
In Union Electric Co. Ltd v. Halman & Co..(5) Lord President Dunedin affirmed 
the relevence o f "pretium affectionis" in Scots law by saying "It is argued that this is 
an action ad factum praestandum and the subjects arrested cannot satisfy the judgment 
in such an action. Now it seems to me that when a person asks for delivery of specific 
article of which there is a pretium affectionis, the decree that he wants is the tme decree 
for specific performance; but when he says to the other person, "we have a contract; 
under that contract you are bound to deliver; you have not delivered; deliver or else pay 
damages", he is not asking for a decree ad factum praestandum in the proper sense at 
all". According to that dictum the criterion of whether the remedy of specific implement 
or damages is applicable, is whether the article represents pretium affectionis. If the 
goods do not represent any pretium affectionis, albeit they are specific, it is 
questionable whether specific implement will be granted or refused.
Although Lord President Dunedin did not answer that case clearly, it can be 
concluded from his dictum, that, specific implement would not be granted. This is 
doubtful. It is entirely against and inconsistent with the concept and the nature of 
specific implement in Scotland.^) Furthermore, in Sutherland v. M ontrose 
Shipbuilding Co.S ^  Lord Cowan relied on Addison's text book, which reflects 
English law, by stating, "whenever the object of sale is such that is an uncertainly 
whether the purchaser can procure another chattel of the same kind and value, or the 
possession of it is desirable for certain purposes, which no other chattel of the same 
kind will answer...", which casts further doubt on Lord Cowan statement. It thus 
seems that there is confusion in the Scots judiciary towards the case of "pretium 
affectionis" and the case of "uniqueness". Thus, the circumstances of pretium  
affectionis and uniqueness should not be considered as bars against granting or for 
refusing specific implement. They are inapplicable in Scots law, by virtue of the
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following reasons and facts:
1-Specific implement is an ordinary lagal remedy,^) and it is not an equitable,1^  
or discretionary remedy, even if it is opposed by the refusing party claiming 
impossibility or exceptional hardship or undue difficulty ...etc.^®) n  js granted a 
matter of legal right to the aggrieved party. If the matter were otherwise, i.e. " the 
matters of pretium affectionis and uniqueness are applicable in Scots law of specific 
implement", its nature would be turned up-side down.
The two considerations, i.e. (pretium affectionis) and the uniquness should be 
dealt with separately in greater depth as follows:
A -Pretium affectionis
Pretium affectionis is a value accorded to the goods which the buyer has contracted 
for. The goods may have a special value to the purchaser. As Gloag pointed out,(^) 
there must be some reasons for demanding the particular article sold rather than other 
articles of the same kind and value. Obviously it is not an easy task to conclude that the 
goods represent"pretium affectionis". The test of why a purchaser prefers or has an 
imaginary value towards a particular type or kind of goods, is obscure. No one can 
conclude or confirm the reason behind everybody's desire and wish, or why he prefers 
such an article. The buyer himself sometimes does not know why he prefers particular 
goods. The court must therefore ascertain subjective grounds whether there are 
sufficient reasons for the purchaser to insist on delivery of particular goods. It 
becomes concerned with the buyer subjective values regarding such goods. 
Consequently, specific implement shall depend on the court's discretion to find out 
whether the buyer has, "some special reasons for demanding and having the particular
goods'1. ^ )
Above all, an application of pretium affectionis would render the remedy of 
specific implement discretionary, where as specific implement must be granted under 
certain legal conditions, and not as the court thinks fit.(^)
Specific implement will be refused where grounds in law or equiitable grounds 
stand against it.(^ ) it is questionable whether pretium affectionis can be regarded as
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one of these equitable grounds.
There is no clear answer as to whether pretium affectionis is an equitable ground. 
Neither case law nor jurisprudence provide a clear conclusion. Nevertheless, it is 
thought that a pretium affectionis is not an equitable ground as it is just a subjective 
desire or wish, or, as it was s a i d / *5) ft js "some special reason for demanding or 
having the particular goods". Therefore, it is illogical to consider failure of a buyer to 
prove that he has some special reasons for having the goods, as an equitable ground for 
refusing performance by the seller. Furthermore, pretium affectionis cannot be 
compared with the equitable grounds such as, impossibility, exceptional hardship or 
undue difficulty....etc, because these grounds affect the ability of the contracting party 
to perform his contract/!**)
If a consideration of pretium affectionis is involved in granting or refusing specific 
implement, that would render the remedy equitable instead of legal. This is accepted in 
English law where the remedy has always been regarded as equitable and therefore 
discretionary. Also, specific performance in English law "is not granted, unless justice 
cannot be achieved by damages"/!?) Where as Scots law has never accepted the said 
principle. Once pretium affectionis is introduced to the concept of specific implement, 
a conflicting consequence will arise, and damages will be regarded adequate remedy for 
breach of the sale contract and, as Lord Young suggested,1(18) that "where complete 
justice would be done to the other party by damages" they will be granted as an 
alternative to specific implement.
The principle that a purchaser should be denied specific performance merely 
because he cannot prove pretium affectionis, in turn reflects the legal nature of the 
remedy in the English law system, especially it "was not a remedy to which a party was 
entitled at Common law "/!9) Moreover, a party who wished to obtain specific 
performance "was compelled to resort to the separate jurisdiction of the Court of 
Chancery, which at times refused its assistance, even where a legal right was 
established, leaving the party who invoked it to his ordinary remedies".(20) Again
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specific performance in English law "is not a matter of legal right, but a purely equitable 
r e m e d y " , ( 2 1 )  and "the only legal remedy arising from breach of contract is a claim of 
d a m a g e s ".(22) Furthermore, "In England the remedy of specific performance is an
extraordinary remedy   where specific performance is part of the ordinary
j u r i s d ic t io n  o f  t h e  c o u r t" , o f  S c o t la n d . ( 2 3 )
A Scots Court also has discretionary power to refuse the remedy on equitable 
grounds,(24) but pretium affectionis,(25) js not one of these equitable grounds. 
Therefore, pretium affectionis has no role to play in granting or refusing specific 
implement. Above all, even if, pretium affectionis were an equitable ground, that 
would not alter the nature and the concept of the remedy of specific implement to that of 
an equitable or discretionary remedy.
The principle of pretium affectionis gives rise to another substantial matter, 
namely, that the remedy may become exceptional rather than ordinary legal remedy, for 
howmany kinds of goods represent subjective value to the buyer, and the buyer can 
aver pretium affectionis? Also, howmany buyers will fail to prove pretium  
affectionis?
Undoubtedly, the majority of sale contracts are for sale of normal or ordinary 
commodities. The goods, which are special and which the buyer can aver some special 
reasons to have, being far less numerous. Specific implement, then will be refused in 
the majority of the sale contracts on the ground that the goods do not represent any 
pretium affectionis, because they are ordinary goods, and they are easily obtained in 
the market. Specific implement, then becomes a very restricted remedy and does not 
cover the whole area of sale of goods contract. It becomes exceptional remedy, only 
for a certain category of goods and purchasers.
It is submitted that in Scotland a party who seeks specific implement of a contract 
for the sale of goods, does not need to show or to aver pretium affectionis, as long as 
the article is specific or ascertained, for the consideration of pretium affectionis is not 
an equitable or legal ground for refusing the remedy of specific implement. In addition,
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refusing the remedy of specific implement and granting damages alternatively on the 
ground that the article (the goods) does not represent any pretium affectionis to the 
purchaser, conflicts with the general rules of specific implement in Scots law, and it 
does not satisfy the concept and the nature of the remedy.
Damages cannot be granted in substitution for the remedy of specific implement 
merely because the contracting party fails to show or aver pretium affectionis for the 
following reasons:
1-"If he elects to do so, he cannot be compelled to the alternative of an action of 
damages, unless implement is shown to be impossible" (26), not because he (the party) 
cannot aver pretium affectionis.
2-By saying that, "if it is a particular article to which a peculiar and special
value attaches, and where complete justice cannot be done by damages the court will
order specific p e r f o r m a n c e " ,(27) the remedy will be rendered exceptional and 
extraordinary. It is not granted, unless justice would not be done by d a m a g e s .(28) 
Thus, specific implement will become discretionary and equitable remedy.
It seems that all this confusion and inconsistency arises because the principle of 
pretium affectionis has been adopted haphazardly from specific performance in 
English law.
B-Uniqueness test
To what extent does the uniqueness consideration affect the right of the aggrieved 
party to obtain specific implement?
In Sutherland v. Montrose Shipbuliding Co..(29 ) Lor(j Cowan said "It may be, 
that in a sale of goods or commodities generally, where delivery is not made at the time 
specified by the contract, the remedy of the purchaser is to claim damages calculated on 
such principles, as with due regard to the market price at the time, and place of 
delivery, will secure complete indemnity to the purchaser. Specific performance in 
such a case, may not be claimed, and is not necessary to enable the buyer to place 
himself in the position he would have been in had delivery been made in terms of the
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contract. It is different where the contract relates to some specific things or articles; for 
then the obligation to deliver will be enforced". Then he stateded, "It is vain to say, in 
such a case where specific vessel had been contracted for and built, and was ready to be 
delivered, delivery of it could have been refused".
He added again that, "This could not be recognised in the sale of a specific article or 
thing, as a particular horse, or some specific article of furniture, or of house".1(30) jt 
should be noticed that the above dictum may lead to a conclusion of two different 
concepts, namely:
First:- Lord Cowan considered a specific thing or article as an article which was 
agreed upon by the contracting parties. Thus the remedy of specific implement would 
be granted, whether the article is unique or it is easily obtainable. This concept 
complies and is consistent with the concept and the nature of specific implement.
Secondly:- A specific article means only that which represents uniqueness. This 
concept, unfortunately represents the idea of Lord Cowan towards specific goods and 
specific implement. He considers specific thing means a particular horse not just any 
horse, or some specific article of furniture or of a house. This concept, it is believed, is 
inconsistent with the Scots law of specific implement, because it conflicts with its 
nature as a legal ordinary remedy, and turns it to be an exceptional discretionary 
remedy. Furthermore, as has already been shown,(31) that the concept of specific 
goods does not require that the article must be of a unique nature for granting specific 
implement. In addition, the concept of uniquness is entirely an English law 
principle,(32) an(^ even English law, which considers specific performance as 
equitable, exceptional and discretionary, it was s a i d ,(33) "it is hard to see why specific 
relief was granted in respect of an Adam-style door, but refused in respect of a set of 
Hoeppel white chairs". It was also c o n t e n d e d ,(34) that "the equitable relief is reserved 
in the law only for contracts involving unique goods, is not correct. Specific 
performance has been applied by the courts to numerous circumstances in which 
"uniqueness" of the goods or services is not obvious". Thus, even at Common law
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there is support for granting specific performance regardless of the uniqueness 
consideration. Why then Scots law is keen to adopt this troublesome principle and its 
consequences of under or over compensation.^)
The above analysis may lead to the conclusion that uniqueness is not one of the 
principles which play a r o le ,(36) in  granting or refusing specific implement in Scotland. 
For, the goods to be specific or ascertained within the legal meaning of that term, it is 
submitted, is sufficient for specific implement to be decreed.
2- It may be emphasised the irrelevance of pretium affectionis in Scots law by 
s t a t i n g ,(37) that "The requirement of pretium affectionis has, as Gloag concedes, no 
actual decision to justify it. It is based on a conjectural obiter dictum of Lord Cowan in 
Sutherland v. Montrose Shipbuilding co.. relying upon an English text book writer, 
apparently unaware that the remedy was unknown to Common law, only resorted to 
exceptionally by Courts of Equity, and even under Statute wholly within the discretion 
of the court". It seems that the circumstance of pretium affectionis has been denied 
strongly to be a principle of Scots law of specific implement, as a restriction on
l
granting or refusing the remedy, for Scots law and English law are entirely different 
considering the nature nd the concept of that remedy. Moreover, the consideration of 
pretium affectionis complies with a remedy of a discretionary, exceptional, and 
equitable nature, which is the nature of specific performance in English law. 
Furthermore, Gloag pointed out,(3 8) that, "It is probably the law, though there is no 
actual decision that the party who asks for a decree ad factum praestandum in 
implement of a contract of sale must aver a pretium affectionis". Again, there is doubt 
for this consideration to be accepted as a principle of specific implement in Scots law. 
If, however, the circumstances of pretium affectionis and uniqueness have to be 
applied on the case of goods and specific implement in Scots law, it is reluctantly 
believed, that specific implement in Scots law runs after the English law of specific 
performance without too much choice, and consequently, the remedy will be no longer 
considered ordinary legal remedy, but it is equitable, exceptional and discretionary
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remedy.
Granting specific implement in Scotland, is based on certain legal grounds. They 
are as follows:
1-Specific ( 3 9 )  or ascertained goods.(40)
2-Application for such a remedy by the purchaser.(41)
1-Specific or ascertained goods
Where the goods are specific or ascertained within the concept which has already 
been c o n s i d e r e d , ^ )  specific implement should be ordered. It has been a r g u e d , ( 4 3 )  
that, "In Scotland the right to compel delivery is competent to a buyer, although the 
goods purchased are not specific, if it be in the power of the seller to make them so and 
deliver them. If, for instance the sale be part of a whole, the seller may be compelled to 
separate and deliver without having the option of paying damages for breach of contract 
and retaining the goods". Thus, "if it is in the power of the seller to make the goods, or 
even part there of, specific and delivers them the buyer has the right to compel 
delivery".(44) Thus, it is "scarcely arguable that in Scots law a seller can evade 
specific implement by refusing to appropriate the g o o d s " . ( 4 5 )
In Sutherland v. Montrose Shipbuilding C o..(46) Lord Cowan considered the 
concept of specific goods and the extent to which specific implement relies on it by 
saying, "it cannot be thought doubtful that the vessel contracted for, when finished and 
ready to be launched, although after the period stipulated by the contract, might have 
been claimed by the pursuer, and delivery compelled by action", "it is vain to say, in 
such a case, where a specific vessel had been contracted for and built, and was ready to 
be delivered, delivery of it could have been refused".(47) Further,".... of every such 
specific article bought, delivery may be legally enforced from the seller; and he cannot 
by disregarding his obligation to deliver at the particular time stipulated, retain the 
subject and convert the purchaser's claim into damages".'(48) "He ( the purchaser) is 
entitled to have the specific subject he has bought delivered to him ".(49)
In Munro v. Liquidator of Balnagown Estate Co..(5Q) Lord Blades pointed out, 
th a t" Failure on the part of the buyer to remove timber from the seller's land by a
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specific date may sound in damages for the failure to remove, but, ....it confers on the 
seller no right to prevent the buyer from removing timber which he has severed from 
the land". Lord President Cooper ,^1 ) rejected the above opinon, by stating, "it is
impossible to pronounce any decree ad factum praestandum which is not absolutely
precise in every particular, both as to time and as to place, and we are not yet in a 
position to give such particularly to any order in this case".
Scots courts have jurisdiction to order specific implement, i.e."the delivery of 
specific or ascertained goods". Furthermore, to secure granting specific implement by 
Scots courts in the case of breach of a contract for the sale of goods, where the goods 
are specific or ascertained, all the circumstances related to granting the remedy of 
specific performance in English law, such as the goods are of "unusual beauty, rarity 
and d i s t i n c t i o n " , ^ )  or pretium affectionis could not be estimated and measured in 
damages,1(53) 0r "the equitable as well as the statutory, discretion to order performance 
of a contract for the sale of goods will be exercised only if an award of damages would 
be an inadequate remedy", (54) or specific performance will be refused if the sale 
contract relates to goods which are "an ordinary article of commerce",1(55) should be 
ignored.
The Scots Courts must avoid these circumstances, in order to give the remedy of 
specific implement the real and true face of being a legal and ordinary remedy, and to 
isolate it from the influence of English law. As Lord H e r s c h e l l , ( 5 6 )  said once, "I do 
not think it would be of any advantage to devote time to an analysis of the English 
decisions, or to inquire whether a Court of Equity in England would require a decree 
for specific performance under the circumstances which are alleged to exist in the 
present case. For I think if that proposition could be established it would afford no 
guide to the conclusion which ought to be arrived at where a decree of spcific 
implement is sought in the courts of Scotland".
Again, Lord Watson,1(57) emphasised the idea of avoiding the circumstances and 
the restrictions of the remedy in the English, by saying "In England the only legal right
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arising from a breach of contract is a claim of damages, specific performance is not a 
matter of legal right,... But in Scotland the breach of a contract for the sale of a specific 
subject .... gives the party aggrieved the legal right to sue for implement". 
Furthermore, Lord Macnaghten,^) suggested that Scots courts cannot and should not 
take the risk of accepting the circumstances which surround the remedy in English law, 
by saying, "In England the remedy of specific performance is an extraordinary remedy. 
It is always a matter of discretion, and defences are admitted in a suite for specific 
performance which are inadmissible according to the doctrine and practice of Scots 
courts, where specific performance is part of the Scots ordinary jurisdiction of the 
court".
Therefore it is competent in Scots law to grant specific implement where the goods 
are specific or ascertained regardless of considerations of uniqueness or pretium  
affectionis. (59) Nevertheless, this view has not been universally accepted by Scots 
scholars opinions stating that, (60) "ft js not normally appropriate for generic goods 
where other goods can be obtained from an alternative supplier and damages for non­
delivery is normally an adequate remedy". Gloag,(61) was not sure whether pretium 
affectionis is a Scots law’s principle. Alternatively, it was s t a t e d ,(62) that the 
circumstance of pretium affectionis is an English law principle despite being referred to 
in a Scots case which relied on "an English text book w r i t e r " .(63) ft seems that specific 
implement is granted where the goods are specific or ascertained regardless of whether 
these goods are unique or ordinary, or whether the purchaser can aver pretium  
affectionis.
2-The purchaser’s application for specific implement
Specific implement cannot be decreed without being requested by the pursuer, for 
Sec. 52 of Sale of Goods Act 1979, provides that, "1-In any action for breach of 
contract to deliver specific or ascertained goods the court may ....on the plaintiffs (the 
pursuer's) application, by its judgment or decree direct that the contract shall be
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performed specifically, without giving the defendant (the defender) the option of 
retaining the goods on payment of damages.
2-The plaintiffs (the pursuer's) application may be made at any time before 
judgment or decree".
The above provision shows the importance of the pursuer's application for granting 
of specific implement. Nevertheless, specific implement will not be decreed unless the 
time of performance has arrived, eventhough there has been a prior refusal to 
implement.^) Also, "if it is too soon to require the contract to be performed, it is too 
soon to find that the defender is in default".(65) Consequently, the pursuer should not 
expect to have the contract specifically performed. However, a contracting party, for 
instance the buyer, may commence proceedings for specific performance if the other 
contracting party (the seller) has intentionally and deliberately declared that, he no 
longer intends to perform the contract.(66)
A contracting party may request the court to ordain the other contracting party to 
perform specifically what he undertook to do.(6?) Thus, to request and demand 
specific implement, and for such a decree to be competent, it is essential that a claim for 
specific implement should be precisely framed and should specify exactly what the 
defender must do to comply with the order of specific implement,^) for, such a claim 
is the basis of the court’s decree, and the court, "In pronouncing decree ad factum 
praestandum  has to bear in mind the concequences and sanctions of such a
decree".(69)
Granting a decree of specific implement without the pursuer's application could lead 
to unpleasant consequences, such as ambiguity or vagueness, bearing in mind, the 
"Failure to implement such a decree exposes a defender to the penalty of imprisonment 
which it is in the power of the pursuer to put in force".(^0) Further, how can the court 
express the decree of specific implement without being applied for, clearly, specifically, 
and definitely?
The court cannot do so without a clear, unambiguous and specific crave, for Lord 
President again expressed his fear of the consequences by saying, "I therefore think
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that in the case of decrees which may be thus enforced, or which expose a defender to 
penal consequences, it is right that the court should so express the decree that the 
defender shall be in no doubt regarding the obligation he has to discharge".(7*)
Furthermore, a decree of the court, "ordering performance of some specified act can
be obeyed by some specific act done on the part of the d e f e n d e r " . ^ )  Thus, a decree 
which is indefinite in its terms, cannot be enforced against the d e f e n d e r .(73)
So far, it seems that granting specific implement relies very much on a definite, 
specific and unambiguous crave. An ambiguous and vague crave leads to the refusal 
of the remedy of specific i m p l e m e n t . ^ )
The court cannot grant specific implement in favour of the purchaser without an 
application from h i m . ( 7 5 )
The choice of applying for either specific implement or for damages depends on the 
circumstances of each case. For instance, if the buyer applies for damages but the 
seller has already delivered the goods,i.e. "performed his obligation specifically", is the 
purchaser entitled to refuse specific implement and to insist on his application for 
damages?
Performing the obligation voluntarily, i.e., discharging the obligation, should be 
respected at any time,^because it is the natural end of the obligation. To say that the 
buyer is entitled to his application for damages instead of accepting performance of the 
obligation by the seller is unacceptable, for the buyer has contracted with the seller to 
obtain the goods not to obtain damages. The purchaser is liable for not taking delivery 
of the goods within a reasonable time, when the seller is ready and willing to deliver 
and he requests him to take d e l i v e r y , ( 7 6 )  provided that, there is no fault by the seller. 
If both parties are in default as to delivering and taking delivery of the goods, neither 
the seller nor the buyer can claim d a m a g e s . ( 7 7 )
If the purchaser applied for damages, but he changes his mind and asks for specific 
implement before performance of the contract by the seller, then as long as, the 
defender (the seller) has not performed his obligation specifically, the buyer may ask
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for damages. If the seller has performed his obligation specifically, the buyer has no 
option to ask for damages. As long as the decree has not been made yet, the purchaser 
is able to ask for specific implement instead of damages. Sale of Goods Act 1979, in 
Sec.52 (2) provides, that "The plaintiffs (the pursuer’s) application may be made at 
any time before judgment or decree". There upon, the purchaser may apply for 
damages instead of specific implement and the seller may offer to pay damages instead 
of performing specifically. It should be emphasised however that this arises as a matter 
of agreement and not of right.
The agreement between the contracting parties to have damages instead of specific 
implement is legal and it flows from the principle and doctrine of freedom to 
contract,(78) because "the party who enters into a contract having well-known incidents 
will be held bound to fulfil the obligations which the law implies as resulting from an 
agreement to inter that contract, irrespective of the question whether he knew of those 
obligations, or intend to subject himself to them".(79) Again, by provision of Sec. 55 
(1) of Sale of Goods Act 1979, "where a right, duty, or liability would arise under a 
contract of sale of goods by implication of law, it may,...., be negatived or varied by 
express agreement, or by course of dealing between the parties,..". Furthermore, to 
agree on damages instead of specific implement could be "a contractual obligation 
(which) must have as its basis the agreement of the parties, express in words, writing 
or conduct".(80)
The two parties may agree to conclude a new contract or to rescind a contract was 
previously concluded.0*1) In addition, if the sale of goods contract contains a 
stipulation for a remedy in the event of breach of a certain kind or in certain 
circumstances, then the stipulated remedy may be invoked if a breach of the stated kind 
takes place,(82) and no specific implement will be granted. Parties may make express 
provision for payment of a stated sum, or a sum calculated in a stated way, by a party 
in breach, or in breach in particular ways, of the contract.(83) Thus, a stated sum is 
subject to the rules of liquidated damages.
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Sub-section 2: Grounds for granting specific performance in Iraqi
civil law
Under the Iraqi Civil Code in Article 246 (1) "A debtor shall be compelled to 
perform his obligation specifically if such performance is possible". Thus, specific 
performance is ordered against the party in breach if such performance is possible. 
However, granting the remedy is based on specific legal grounds without them the 
creditor is not entitled to have his contract specifically performed.
It is questionable whether granting the remedy in Iraqi civil law is affected by the 
considerations of pretium affectionis and uniqueness.
Before considering the ground for granting the remedy pretium affectionis and 
uniqueness will be examined:
-Pretium affectionis and Uniqueness
In Iraqi civil law, specific performance is unaffected by the considerations of 
pretium affectionis and uniqueness, and neither the Civil Code nor the jurisprudence or 
even the judiciary have paid any attention to them and no consideration has been taken 
at all, by virtue of the following grounds:
1-According to Article 246 (1) of Civil Code specific performance is granted 
whenever it is possible. It provides, that "A debtor shall be compelled to perform his 
obligation specifically, if such perormance is possible". This provision may lead to the 
conclusion, that there is no way to substitute specific performance by damages, if 
performing the obligation is possible. Further, under the above Article there is no hint 
to the above considerations. It means, that specific perormance is granted with or 
without the considerations o f"pretium affectionis and uniqueness"
2-Even when specific performance is refused, the grounds for refusing it are 
obvious and c le a r ,(^4) and the considerations ofpretium affectionis and uniqueness do 
not constitute any part of these grounds.
3-Although, damages are not an alternative remedy to specific p e r f o r m a n c e , ^ )
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they might be ordered sometimes due to certain exceptional g r o u n d s / 8 6 )  but not 
because they achieve justice more than specific performance, or because the buyer 
cannot aver pretium affectionis or the goods are not unique.
4 -  The seller has the right of specific performance against the purchaser. He cannot 
be asked to aver pretium affetionis or uniqueness, where he applies for specific 
performance against the purchaser who refuses to pay the price. Surely, there is no 
way to consider pretium affectionis or uniqueness in such a case.
5-The debtor should perform specifically his obligation, as long as, it is 
p o s s i b l e . (^7) There is no escape from this result by claiming that goods are easily 
obtainable or ordinary commodities. This argument is not found in Iraqi civil law and 
jurisprudence, and it has not been taken into consideration by the judiciary t o o / 8 8 )
Granting specific performance is based on certain legal grounds. To obtain a useful 
comparison with Scots law, these grounds are dealt with in a different way from that 
which is followed by the Iraqi civil law jurisprudence, because under jurisprudence 
there are three grounds for granting specific p e r f o r m a n c e / 8 9 )  These are, 1st; the 
possibility of performance of the obligation specifically by the d e b t o r / 9 0 )  2nd; 
granting specific performance should not be too onerous for the d e b t o r / 9 1 )  and 3rd; 
the creditor should apply for such a r e m e d y / 9 2 )  where as it was stated that there are 
five grounds to grant specific p e r f o r m a n c e / 9 3 )  Nevertheless, it is submitted that, 
considering the main grounds,which relate to the goods in the sale contract and the 
applicant are more important and essential than the surrounding circumstances. The 
case of grounds for granting the remedy, which are dealt with by the jurisprudence in 
Iraqi civil law as conditions on which the remedy is based, is a matter subject to the 
court's discretion especially where performance of the obligation is impossibile, or 
where it is too onerous for the debtor to perform. Thus, examining whether specific 
performance is possible, and wherher it is too onerous for the debtor to perform his 
obligation specifically, should be treated as grounds for refusing not for granting the 
remedy of specific p e r f o r m a n c e / ^ )
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The grounds for granting specific performance are as follows:
1- Goods must be specifically identified.
2-Goods are described as specie, then identified by way of individualisation.
3- The creditor's application for specific performance.
1-Goods must be specifically identified. ^ )
According to Article 247 of Iraqi Civil Code, "..an obligation to transfer ownership 
or any other real right transfers ipso facto that right if the object of the obligation is 
specifically identified and is owned by the debtor". If the object of the contract is 
movable specifically identified, the debtor is obliged to deliver it to the creditor (the 
buyer). If, for instance, the debtor (the seller) has refrained from delivering the goods 
to the creditor, (the purchaser), and he still possesses them, the purchaser is entitled to 
ask the court to order the seller to deliver them.(96) Nevertheless, when the goods are 
no longer available, whether because they are hidden, or they are destroyed and they no 
longer exist, specific performance becomes impossible, and damages become the 
alternative remedy to specific p e r f o r m a n c e . ^ ? )
The buyer has the right to insist on having the goods delivered to him, when the 
seller refuses to do so. However, does the seller need to be summoned before the 
buyer’s application for specific performance?
Generally, the Civil Code in the case of specific performance does not require a 
formal summons to be served on the d eb to r.^ ) However, Article 177 (1) of Civil 
Code provides, "In bilateral contracts if one of the parties does not perform his 
obligation, the other party may after serving a formal summons on the debtor, demand 
the rescission of the contract with damages if they due...". Thus, according to the 
above Article, the summons is important to inform the seller that he has committed a 
breach to his obligatiom, and to notify him that he may be subject to the court's order to 
perform his obligation specifically. In addition, summons may help to prove that the 
seller is in breach of his o b l i g a t i o n . ^ )  Nevertheless, the provision of Article 177 (1) 
of Civil Code does not seem to require serving a formal summons on the refusing seller
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before ordering him to perform specifically. It says, "after serving a formal summons 
on the debtor..". There is no indication that a summons is required to inform the failing 
party before enforcing him to perform what he has undertaken to do or not to do. 
However, serving a summons on the refusing debtor has been considered 
fundamentally important by Iraqi civil law jurisprudence in the case of breach of 
contract and remedies. Therefore, the refusing debtor should be informed before 
ordering him to perform specifically/100) The reason behind this is, that Iraqi 
jurisprudence relies on Egyptian civil law jurisprudence,(101) and on Egyptian Civil 
Code in Article 157 which provides, "In bilateral contracts if one of the parties does not 
perform his obligation, the other party may after serving a formal summons on the 
debtor, demand the performance of the contract or its rescission, with damages....".
Serving of a summons on the debtor cannot find support in Iraqi Civil Code, 
especially in Article 177 (1) or in Articles (246-251) of the Code, which are devoted to 
the remedy of specific performance, for the Iraqi Civil Code makes no provision for 
serving of a summons claiming specific p e r f o r m a n c e . (102) jn addition, Article 256 of 
Iraqi Civil Code provides, that "Damages, unless otherwise provided in Law, are not 
due before the debtor has been formally summoned". Thus, why has the Civil Code 
failed to provide clearly and expressely for the serving of a summons on the refusing 
debtor in the case of specific performance if it is fundamentally important and so 
necessary to obtain specific performance against him? where as the serving of a 
summons has been provided for, in the case of damages.(103) Furthermore, Article 
258 of Iraqi Civil Code provides that, "A formal summons on the debtor will not be 
necessary in the following cases:
(a)-if specific performance of the obligation has become impossible due to the 
debtor's fault ".
It seems that the case of serving summons on the debtor to obtain specific 
performance does not represent a major factor in such a case. Furthermore, relying on 
Egyptian civil law jurisprudence while Iraqi Civil Code is silent towards such a case 
leads to either difficulty or injustice or may open the door widely to the court's
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discretionary power. However, serving a formal summons on the debtor would be 
considered a useful procedure for both parties.
2-The goods are described as specie but become specific bv 
individualisation/ * ^
According to Article 248 (1) of Iraqi Civil Code, goods of the above description do 
not assist transferring their ownership, unless they are identified specifically. It 
provides; "when an obligation to transfer ownership or any other real right, has for its 
object a thing which is described only as regards its specie, the right is not transferred, 
unless the object is specifically identified". Thus, if the object of an obligation is to 
deliver fungibles, for instance, wheat, or rice, and the debtor has refused to deliver the 
good s/105) the creditor, (the purchaser) is entitled to oblige the debtor to specify the 
goods/106) for the debtor's refusal to identify the goods, gives the creditor the right to 
raise a claim of specific performance against him, i.e., "to enforce the debtor to specify 
the goods"/107) Specification of the goods can take place either by the creditor 
himself under the court's permission, or by an expert/108)
Before identifying the goods specifically, whether by i n d i v i d u a l i s a t i o n / 1 0 9 )  or any 
other method suits their nature, the title of the goods cannot be transferred to the 
p u r c h a s e r / H O )  and thereupon, no specific performance can be ordered as the seller 
may have other movables of the same kind.
If the debtor (the seller) does not have movables of the same kind, the creditor (the 
purchaser) may upon an order of the court, or in case of urgency even without such an 
order acquire at the expense of the debtor, an article of the same kind. He may also 
claim the value of the articles without prejudice to damages in either c a se /m )
The creditor is entitled to obtain an article equivalent to the article which he has 
contracted for, at the debtor’s expense. It is questionable , whether buying goods of 
the same kind as the contractual goods at the debtor's (the seller) expense, by the 
buyer, is or is not considered specific performance. It is agreed by scholars and by
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jurisprudence, that the above case is specific performance, and no arguments have been 
put to the contrary.(1 12) However, it is thought, that the above case is not specific 
performance, but amounts to the seller paying damages to the purchaser, so he may buy 
similar goods by himself. This is supported by the following arguments:
1-Specific performance is defined as: ordering the debtor to perfrom what he has 
undertaken to do or not to do, precisely and accurately.(1 13) Thus, how can ordering 
the debtor to pay damages "expense" to the purchaser be considered an accurate and 
precise performance? Surely, it is not specific performance, but an order to grant 
damages.
2-According to Article 246 (1) of Civil Code, "the debtor shall be compelled to 
perform his obligation speicifically if such performance is possible". Thus, both within 
the definition of the remedy and under the provision of Article 246 (1) of Civil Code, 
the debtor cannot be ordered to pay damages if it is possible to perform specifically. 
Subsequently allowing the buyer to buy goods at the expense of the seller, means that 
the seller cannot perform his obligation specificlally, for there is no way to allow the 
buyer to buy articles of the same kind of the contract's object if the seller is able to 
perform specifically, i.e. "to deliver the goods, which he has agreed to deliver".
3- There is no difference between ordering the seller to pay damages for the 
purchaser instead of delivery, and allowing the purchaser to buy article at the seller 
expense, for the buyer can buy the article of the same kind with damages. 
Furthermore, ordering damages in substitution for specific performance regardless of 
the circumastances and grounds of refusing the r e m e d y , ( 114 )  j s  not the policy of Iraqi 
civil law. Nevertheless, the Iraqi Civil Code has provided, surprisingly, for the buyer 
to buy articles at the expense of the refusing seller. Unfortunately, this case is 
inconsistent with the nature and principles of specific performance. If performing 
specifically by the seller becomes impossible or too onerous, damages would be the 
alternative, otherwise the seller must be compelled to perform his obligation 
specifically/H^)
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4-There are two ways that the creditor (the purchaser) can obtain his right, either 
ordering the debtor to perform specifically, or ordering him to pay damages/1 16) jn 
the above case, delivery of the goods to the purchaser by the seller may become 
impossible or exceptionally hard or unduly difficult. The court then permits the 
purchaser to buy goods of the same kind at the cost of the s e lle r /11^) This is a sort of 
damages granted to the purchaser. He is not obtaining the same thing that he has 
contracted for, but another thing of the same kind.
3-The creditor's application for specific performance/
Specific performance cannot be granted, unless it is applied for by the creditor. 
Furthermore, if the creditor does not apply for specific performance, but for damages 
instead, and the debtor has fulfilled what he has undertaken to do, he (the creditor) 
cannot refrain from performance, and cannot insist on having damages/ H ^) 
However, before performance by the debtor, the creditor may change his mind and ask 
for specific performance instead of damages/1^0) provided that, the application for 
specific performance is made before the court's judgment in the disputed case/121) If 
the creditor applies for damages, and the debtor does not show any readiness to 
perform specifically, the court should award d a m a g e s / 1 2 2 )
Where the debtor refuses to perform his obligation the creditor must fulfil two 
conditions before specific performance will be granted, namely:
1-The debtor’s refusal to perform his obligation specifically or even his delay in 
doing so, should not occur by reason of the creditor's non-performance of his 
obligaitorn towards the debtor. If so, the debtor is entitled to refuse or to delay his 
p e r f o r m a n c e / 123) T h e  debtor's refusal in such a case is deemed to be legal, especially 
in the case of bilateral c o n t r a c t s / 124) according to the principle of "Exceptio Non 
Adimpleti Contractus".
2-The time for performance has passed.
Comment
1-specific implement in Scotland is granted in respect of specific or ascertained
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goods whenever it is possible. The same is true of the Iraqi civil law of specific 
performance, for the grounds such as specific or ascertained goods form the corner 
stone of granting the remedy in both systems.
2-The considerations of pretium affectionis and uniqueness do not affect the 
remedy. Although, the picture is very clear in Iraqi civil law, in Scots law a confusion 
surrounds the influence of these two factors on specific implement. Nevertheless, the 
overall impression is, these two factors should not influence the remedy of specific 
implement.
3-The existence of the legal grounds is sufficient to grant the remedy in both 
systems regardless of the considerations of uniqueness or pretium affectiomis.
Section Two: Grounds for refusing specific implement
Specific implement is not always granted. It may be refused where certain grounds 
are available. These grounds subject to the court's discretion, which takes into account 
the ability of the contracting party to perform, and to what extent performance of the 
contract can be achieved. The refusing party may claim impossibility, or exceptional 
hardship, i.e., (performance too onerous for the debtor), or breach of the contract. 
These circumstances should be examined, for they affect performance of the contract 
and afortiori, specific implement thereafter. They will be dealt with as follows:
1-Impossibility of performance.
2-Exceptional hardship.
3-Breach of contract by the seller.
4-Breach of contract by the buyer.
Sub-Section l:Impossibilitv of performance of the obligation
The contract may be rendered impossible for reasons, which constitute a ground for 
refusing the remedy of specific implement. Such issues as, who should be held liable 
for impossibility of performance, the time at which the impossibility can be considered 
effective, and other fundamental matters which play a role in the case of impossibility in
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Scots and iraqi systems respectively as follows:
1-Impossibilitv of performance of the obligation In Scots Law
The general rule of the Scots law is, that a decree ad factum praestandum shall not 
be granted, when it is impossible for the contracting party (the seller) to perform his 
o b l i g a t i o n / * ^ )  f o r  t h e  pUrp0Se of such a decree is, to enable the pursuer, (the 
purchaser), to secure his right under the contract, not to punish the defender.
Impossibility of performance cannot be considered in detail in this work, and is 
fully considered in the undemoted works/!26)
The issues such as, on which basis impossibility is regarded as a ground for 
refusing specific implement, when should impossibility take place to have such 
influence on specific implement, to what extent the court has discretionary power 
towards impossibility, and where the crave or the decree itself is ambiguous and vague 
to some extent, are substantial in considering impossibility as a ground for refusing 
specific implement.
Time of impossibility
Impossibility of performance of the obligation may occur either by the defender's 
or by the pursuer's default. The question of who is entitled to have his contract 
specifically performed, should be considered. In addition, where there is a contract for 
the sale of a specific thing and without the fault of either party, the thing perishes before 
the time for delivery, the contract is void, and the purchaser is not entitled to implement
or even to dam ag es/* ^ )
It may be discovered after the contract was made, that performance was impossible 
at the time the contract was made. If so, the contract is void.(*28) what is possible or 
impossible depends very much on the circumstances in each case. If, for instance, A 
has contracted with B to transfer a property to him (B) but A has transferred that 
property to another person C, A, is in breach of contract towards B. It, however, B 
cannot obtain specific implement but damages i n s t e a d / * ^ )
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The rights and obligations of the parties may vary according to whether 
impossibility arises before or after the contract is concluded.
If a contract was concluded and the goods were destroyed before the risk has 
passed to the buyer, the contract is avoided/130) However, if the property in those 
goods has passed to the purchaser he bears the risk, unless the contracting parties agree 
otherwise. So, the purchaser in this case, is not relieved from paying the sale price but 
the seller is relieved from his obligation to deliver/13 1) jn certain circumstances, the 
risk may remain with the seller, although the property in the goods may have passed to 
the purchaser. Such liability may be inferred from the terms of the c o n t r a c t / ^ )
Nevertheless, the fact that performance of the contract has become less profitable 
and more difficult is not sufficient ground for refusing specific i m p l e m e n t / 133) 
Whatever the ground of the impossibility, the effect on the decree is the same.
Basis of impossibility
If performance of the contract becomes impossible by the fault of either party, this 
does not affect or alter the consequence. A decree adfactum praestandum will not and 
should not be p r o n o u n c e d / 1 3 4 )  for the following reasons:
1-It is impossible for the decree of specific implement to be executed if it is 
pronounced in such circum stances/^)
2-It is impossible for the defender (the seller) to comply with the decree, and this 
may otherwise invoke unjust consequenses, such as imprisonment/136)
In Mac Arther v. L a w s o n / 1 3 7 )  the pursuer of an action for damages for breach of 
contract sets forth a letter of employment which, after an obligation by the defender to 
pay a certain salary for the first two years, proceeded... "At the expiry of the second 
year I engage to give you a substantial interest by way of partnership in my business, 
so that your anual income may be considerably increased". The pursuer averred that at 
the end of the two years, the defender refused to implement the remainder of the 
contract. It was held, that "the action was irrelevant, in respect that there were in the 
letter no termini habiles out of which a contract of copartnery could have been
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formed".
Lord President Inglis o b s e r v e d , ^ 8 )  " T h e  court will not decree implement of a 
contract which the party cannot possibly perform, because that would be to condemn 
the party to perpetual imprisonment". Furthermore, the impossibility may terminate the 
obligation, so, there would be no specific implement granted, "where neither of the 
parties is responsible for the event which precludes performance, the result, if it affects 
the contract at all, is not to render it avoidable at the instance of one or other party, but 
automatically to avoid it so that neither party remanins under any o b l i g a t i o n " / ! ^ )  jn 
addition, a contract is terminated by what is known as f r u s t r a t i o n / *40) Consequently, 
a contract will be discharged and the contracting parties will be released from 
performing their future obligations according to the principles of r e s t i t u t i o n / ^ )  A 
decree of specific implement, if it is pronounced while the obligation is impossible to 
perform, could not possibly be respected and obeyed.
If the loss is due to the fault of the seller, he is liable for s u c h . l o s s / ^ 2 )  jf  delivery 
is delayed by either party, the goods are at the risk of the defaulting p a r t y / *43)
Thus, where impossibility of performing the obligation occurrs, specific implement 
will not be ordered, as the decree cannot be i m p l e m e n t e d / ^ )
Ambiguity and vagueness of the decree or the crave
Basically, impossibility as a ground for refusing specific implement relates to the 
contract itself and the surrounding circumstances, however, impossibility may relate to 
the decree ad factum praestandum itself. If, such a decree lacks some of the conditions 
which should be included, it becomes impossible to p e r f o r m / 1 4 5 )  a  decree ad  
factum praestandum must be specific, clear, and precise as Lord President 
R o b e r t s o n / *46) pointed put, that "In pronouncing decree ad factum praestandum the 
court has to bear in mind the consequences and sanctions of such a decree. Failure to 
implement such a decree exposes the defender to the penalty of imprisonment which is 
in the power of the pursuer to put in force". Therefore, "the court should so express
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the decree that the defender shall be in no doubt regarding the obligation he has to 
discharge".1(1^7)
Further, "The court will not pronounce a decree ad factum praestandum except in 
terms of such precision as will leave the defenders in no doubt as the exact obligation to 
be discharged by them. The same principle, of course, applies to a declarator 
preliminary to a decree of specific p e r f o r m a n c e " / ^ )
In Munro v. Balnagowan Estates Co. L i q u i d a t o r / ^ )  L m d  President Cooper said 
"It is impossible for us with propriety to pronounce any decree ad factum praestandum 
which is not absolutely precise in every particular, both as to time and as to 
place ".
Thus, a decree ad factum praestandum could be regarded unenforceable when it is 
unclear, indefinite and vague. In such a case specific implement cannot be discharged, 
because the defender does not know what to do. It is suggested, however that the 
above statement is a theoretical concept more than practical one, for the court will not 
grant an ambiguous or vague decree against the defender who is expected to perform 
and respect such an order.
Equally, a vague, and ambiguous crave will not be a c c e p t e d / ^ O )  por a decree of 
specific implement to be competent, it is essential that the claim for the decree be 
precisely framed and specifies exactly what the defender must do to comply with the 
d e c r e e / ^  1) Thus, the pursuer should state precisely, clearly, and unambiguously 
what should be done by the d e f e n d e r / 152) The party who is subject to a decree ad 
factum praestandum, which carries the penalty of imprisonment for non-compliance 
"is entitled to know exactly what he is ordained to do, and therefore decree will not be 
granted on conclusions couched in vague and indefinite terms"/153)
The court's discretion
The court's discretionary power to examine whether there is impossibility 
surrounding the performance plays a substantial role.
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Specific implement will not be decreed, if it is impossible to perform or to be 
e n f o r c e d / ^ 4 )  Therefore, if the case of impossibility is disclosed clearly or is obvious 
to the court and to the pursuer, that the defender cannot perform the obligation because 
it is impossible for whatever reason, the court will refrain from compelling the debtor to 
perform specifically, and consider the reason why performance is impossible, in order 
to grant damages instead if they are due, or other relevant remedy. The court will also 
consider the time the impossibility arose. Consequently, the court has a very wide 
discretionary power to consider impossibility and its circumstances. Nevertheless, that 
does not prevent the remedy from being an ordinary legal remedy as a matter of right to 
the aggrieved party, as the court will find that the remedy can be granted if the refusing 
party is able to perform his obligation specifically. If the court has found that 
possibility, it has no other choice but to compel the party to perform.
2-Impossihilitv of performance in Iraqi civil law
It is established as a general rule that if performance of the obligation becomes 
impossible, the obligation is extinguished and the debtor is not obliged to 
p e r fo rm /155) for there is no ground of law for performing an impossible
o b l i g a t i o n / 1 5 6 )
The issues such as, on which grounds impossibilty is considered as a ground for 
refusing specific performance, at which time should impossibility arise to have an effect 
on specific performance, to what extent, the court has discretion toward impossibility, 
and where the petition for specific performance or the decree itself is to some extent 
vague or ambiguous, are important issues in considering impossibility as a ground for 
refusing the remedy of specific performance.
Basis of impossibility
Impossibility, occurs either by the debtor's fault or by the creditor's fault or by the 
fault of neither. A decree of specific performance will not be granted where any of 
these causes operates. This is based on Article 246 (1) of Civil Code which provides,
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"A debtor shall be compelled to perform his obligation specifically if such performance 
is possible". Thus, if such performance is impossible, specific performance will not be 
granted. If impossibility occurs beyond the debtor’s control, the creditor will obtain 
nothing/*57)
The goods may perish either partially or entirely by an "Act of God". In the case of 
partial deterioration the buyer has the option either to rescind the contract or to uphold 
the sale at a reduced price/^ 8 )  No damages can be obtained in such a case because 
the deterioration of the goods has not occurred by the seller's fault/
Where the goods perish entirely before delivery, the seller is held liable/* ^ 0) As 
performance of the obligation has become impossible, the contract is rescinded without 
any option to either party/*61) Subsequently, specific performance will not be 
granted, for the subject-matter is no longer available and ordering the debtor to perform 
his obligation in such a case, means ordering him to do something impossible.
Impossibility is considered a ground by which specific implement is refused, for no 
one can do or achieve or perform something impossible.
According to Article 425 of Civil Code, "an obligation is extinguished if the debtor 
has established that its performance has become impossible by causes beyond his 
control". Thus, the obligation will be extinguished and no duties or rights can be 
concluded thereafter within the meaning of Article 425. It is inconceivable to compel 
the party in breach to specific performance in such circumstances.
Time of impossibility
If impossibility has occurred before the contract is made, no obligation is concluded 
and the debtor, therefore is not obliged to perform/* ^ 2)
If the goods sold have perished before delivery, the seller is liable, as delivery of 
the goods is one of his obligations under the contract/**^)
If the goods perish by reason of the buyer's fault before delivery, he is liable to pay 
the price to the seller/*^) The buyer’s obligation to pay the price, cannot be rendered
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im possible/165) un(jer Article 547 (2), which provides, "....if the sold thing has 
perished or the value has diminshed before delivery by reason of the buyer's act, he 
must pay the whole price....". It is, in Iraqi civil law, specific performance against the 
buyer to pay the price of the perished goods.
If the goods have perished by reason of the seller’s a c t / 166) 5ut before delivery, 
he is liable to pay damages and to refund the price if it has been paid. Article 547 (2) of 
Civil Code states;"....if the reason is by the seller's act, he must pay damages".
Goods may, also perish before delivery by cause beyond the seller's control. This 
case has already been c o n s i d e r e d / 1 6 7 )
Impossibility of performance must occur after the contract is c o n c lu d e d /16^) in 
order to be considered as a ground for refusing specific performance. If it takes place 
before the contract is made, there is no contract, and no obligation can be concluded
thereafter/169)
Generally, the buyer is not liable for any loss or risk before delivery of the goods. 
However, he will be held liable for such events before delivery in certain 
circumstances, namely, where there is an agreement between the seller and the buyer, 
by which the buyer he who bears liability and risk at the time of making the 
contract/170) where the seller has served formal summons on the buyer for taking 
delivery of the goods, but the buyer has refused to do so/171) where the buyer has 
taken possession of the thing sold without paying the price and without the seller's 
permission, (172) and where the buyer refuses to pay the price, the seller has a right of 
retention/173)
If impossibility has occurred after delivery, the buyer is liable for such impossibility 
whatever the cause, whether because of his own fault, or force majure, or exceptional 
and unpredictable e v e n t s / 1 7 4 )  for liability lies with the delivery of the goods not with 
passing of p r o p e r t y / 1 7 5 )  Nevertheless, if destruction of the goods has resulted from 
the seller's fault even after delivery, he is liable for the l o s s / 1 7 6 )
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The courts discretion
The court has discretion in refusing specific performance where impossibility has 
resulted from the fault of either party. Where impossibility results from a cause 
independent of the parties, the contract is automatically rescinded,1( 1 7 7 )  a n d  the court 
has little power to interfere, except to adjudicate on whether the cause has given rise to 
impossibility or not. All these considerations need to be examined by the court within 
its discretion. Nevertheless, the court may interfer, where there is dispute where the 
impossibility results from a cause independent of the contracting parties/* ^ 8) 
Impossibility as a ground for refusing specific performance must be a b s o l u t e / * ^ )  n o t  
only unduely difficult or exceptionally hard or u n p r o f i t a b l e / * * ^ )  before specific 
performance can be refused.
Where there is temporary impossibility, it is the task of the court to examine the 
surrounding circumstances and to postpone or delay performance of the obligation until 
the expiration of these circumstances/***** unless such delay conflicts with the nature 
of the contract/**^)
Furthermore, if the subject-matter of the contract is an article which is described 
only as specie, the debtor (the seller) will not be discharged from performing his 
obligation specifically even if the goods have perished by reason beyond his control. 
This rule is not absolute, however only relative. It cannot be applied in every case, 
such as, for example the goods of that kind are the last remaining quantity of what the 
seller p o s s e s s e s / * * ^ )  Thus, the case is a matter of discretion, which should be 
examined by the court.
Ambiguity and vagueness of the crave or the decree itself
Impossibility of performance of the contract must be distinguished from 
impossibility within the decree itself. It may arise within the decree itself whether 
before or after pronouncing it.
Unfortunately, Iraqi civil law scholars, and Iraqi jurisprudence, have not paid any 
attention to the question of impossibility which arises within the decree itself. The
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reason may be, that Article 10 of Iraqi Civil Procedure Code has explained that, if there 
is ambiguity or vagueness in the court's decree, whether it is total or partial, which 
makes it difficult or impossible for the Office of Administration of Execution to 
understand the real intention of the court, the executor, is able to inquire and to ask the 
court for interpretation of its ambiguous judgment. The litigants have to attend the 
court's hearing for interpretation and clarification of the vague decree/*^) Also, the 
court acting on its own motion, or according to the application of one of the litigants, 
may amend or reconsider what has already been determined in case of clerical or
incidental e r r o r s /
The judgment should be granted clearly and unambiguously in order to make it easy 
for the defendant to perform, and for the Execution Administration Office to take charge 
of ordering and watching the debtor in his performance of the judgment. If such a 
decree is vague or ambiguous, the Office of Administration of Execution cannot enforce 
the debtor to fulfil it. Thus such a decree is impossible to perform even temporarily, 
for the debtor does not know how to comply with it.
Specific performance may not be granted as a result of a vague or ambiguous crave 
or petition. Although this case is more theoretical than practical, it does sometimes 
occur.
The subject-matter of a petition forms an essential part in deciding and determining 
any case, and therefore that subject-matter should be specified and identified in a 
manner which enables the court to solve the disputed case clearly and decisively. Thus, 
the court will not accept any ambiguous or vague petition, or vague crave, because the 
court, as a general rule, cannot determine something unknown or a m b i g u o u s / * ^ )  
This would clearly lead to unjust and unfair consequences
The court is restricted to what the plaintiff has applied for and cannot exceed it or 
grant him something different. Therefore the plaintiff should, where necessary, be 
asked to clarify and to identify his crave and the suject-matter, when he applies for the 
remedy of specific performance.
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Comment
1-The impossibility of performing the obligation is a ground for refusing the 
remedy of specific implement in both jurisdictions, whenever it takes place and 
whatever the reason is.
2-The reason for treating impossibility as a ground for refusing specific implement 
is the same in both systems, i.e.the unfair consequences and illogical results of 
compelling performance. Further, such an order would not be respected by the party 
against whom it is made.
3-Iraqi civil law differs from Scots law as regards the buyer's obligation to pay the 
price. This obligation cannot be rendered impossible at all in Iraqi civil law, and the 
buyer is always subject to perform such an obligation specifically. Where as, in Scots 
law an action for the price is not regarded as an action for specific implement.
4-The defaulting party is always liable for causing impossibility, and a party who 
brings about impossibility through his own conduct cannot claim specific implement 
against the other party to the contract.
5-Impossibility of the decree itself is similar in both systems, although it is clearer 
and more enlarged in Scots law than in Iraqi civil law.
The case of ambiguous crave which leads to an ambiguous and vague decree has 
been dealt with, more fully, by Scots law than by Iraqi civil law. It is a theoretical 
matters rather than practical.
Sub-Section 2:Exceptional hardship
Specific implement in Scots and Iraqi laws may be refused upon the ground of 
exceptional hardship, i.e., "performance too onerous for the debtor". The concept of 
this ground is not clear and may vary according to the circumstances of the disputed 
case and the court's discretion. Exceptional hardship, does not include more difficult 
or less profitable performance for the aggrieved party. It will be considered as follows.
1-Exceptional hardship in Scots Law.
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2-Performance is too onerous for the debtor in Iraqi civil law.
1-Exceptional Hardship in Scots law
Specific implement of a contract may be refused on the ground that performance of 
the obligation would cause undue difficulty and exceptional hardship for the defender. 
This raises questions of the grounds on which exceptional hardship is to be considered, 
whether the debtor’s or the creditor’s financial situation affects the decision of the 
court, and at what time exceptional hardship should be considered as a ground for 
refusing specific implement?
The concept of exceptional hardship
The concept of hardship, it has been said, to be difficult to d e f i n e / 187) ancj »* re]ief 
ought not to be granted to a party simply because the bargain proves to be more 
onerous or less advantageous than expected"/*88) However, it has been suggested 
that, "hardship may be taken to refer to any case in which the concequences to the 
defendant of enforcement would require him to bear an unreasonably or unexpectedly 
heavy b u r d e n " / *  8 9 )  It has further been stated t h a t / ^ O )  » jn  exceptional cases a 
decree ad factum prestandum may be refused, in circumstances where it would 
generally be competent, on the ground that the hardship to the defender involved in 
compliance would be out of all proportion to the benefit to be obtained by the pursuer". 
Furthermore, "It has been recognized that in some cases the burden of enforcing the 
contract is so unexpected or unreasonable as to be unjust, and that relief against 
hardship may be given without denying reasonable expectations and thereby subverting 
the fundamental goals of contract’’/*^*)
Specific performance is not refused merely because performance is inconvenient or 
difficult for the d e f e n d a n t / * ^ )  specific performance is denied if the hardship suffered 
by the defendant would be so much greater than the detedment than the plaintiff would 
suffer if he is restricted to damages, that it would be unreasonable to order r e l i e f / * ^ )  
Thus specific performance may be denied due to hardship if, on the balance of all the 
material circumstances, it appears that confining the plaintiff to damages would be
96
just. (194) in some cases, specific performance has been refused where the 
disbursement of a large sum of money would be required by performing in specie, so 
as to cause considerable deteriment to the defendant's financial situation/*^5) Thus it 
can be suggested that, exceptional hardship must be judged on the circumstances of 
each case rather than by reference to any exhaustive legal definition, as Lord 
L a n g d a l e / * 9 6 )  stated, "though you cannot define what may be considered 
unreasonable, by way of general rule", for its concept is flexible and involves the 
court's discretion within the circumstances of every case.
The court’s discretion
The case of exceptional hardship is a purely discretionary matter, for "the
court,   must always have regard to the circumstances of each case, and see whether
it is reasonable that it should, by its extraordinary jurisdiction, interfer and order a
specific performance ".(197) gpjy pointed o u t / *  98) that where "an applicant
for specific performance were to proceed instead for damages the extent of 
inconvenience or injury suffered by him would be relatively small, but that if 
performance were ordered in specie, the consequences to the defendant would be 
ruinous or at least extremely harsh". The court must examine all the surrounding 
circumstances to determine whether they disclose a reason for refusing or granting 
specific implement. The ultimate decision is a matter for the court’s discretion. The 
courts will take into consideration the possibility of minimizing the parties' injuries or 
any other material i n c o n v e n i e n c e / *99) as many cases, for example, specific 
performance has been ordered conditionally/^OO)
In Davidson v. M a c p h e r s o n / ^ O * )  a tenant bound himself to reclaim certain waste 
lands during the currency of the lease. The tenant refused to proceed with his 
reclaimation after having implemented his obligation partially. The landlord brought an 
action to have the tenant doing so. He pleaded that to bring it into cultivation would 
involve his financial ruin. It was held, that this defence was irrelevant.
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Lord Young pointed o u t , (202) t^at "Frequently the court will not order specific 
performance. Indeed, as a rule it will not order specific performance where that would 
be hard on the party who is required to perform..". Again, in Moore v. P a t e r s o n . ( 2 0 3 )  
A contracted with B to form a street through ground belonging to a third party C, who 
subsequently refused to sell the ground except at an exorbitant price. In an action 
claiming that A should be ordered to perform his obligation by forming the road in 
terms of his obligation. It was held, that the pursuer had no title to sue. Opinions were 
e x p r e s s e d , (204) t j j a t  "assuming the pursuer had had a title to sue, it was in the 
discretion of the court, in such a case to determine whether it would ordain specific 
implement or give decree for damages only, and that in the present case the later would 
have been the appropriate remedy". Lord S h a n d , ( 2 0 5 )  also stated that, "it must always 
be in the discretion of the court to say whether the remedy of specific performance or 
one of damages is the proper and suitable remedy in the circumstances".
Lord Watson, in Grahame v. Magistrate of Kirkcaldy.(206) jaid down that, "a 
Superior Court, having equitable jurisdiction, must also have a discretion, in certain 
exceptional cases, to withhold from parties applying for it that remedy to which, in 
ordinary circumstances, they would be entitled as a matter of course". S o ," to justify 
the exercise of such discretionary power there must be very cogent reason for depriving 
litigants of the ordinary means of enforcing their legal right".1(207) Further, Lord 
Gifford in Begg v. Jack.(2Q8) stated, "there is an equitable power vested in the court in 
virtue of which, when the exact restoration of thing to their previous conditions is either 
impossible or would be attended with unreasonable loss and expense quite 
disproportionate to the advantage it would give to the successful party, the court can 
award an equivalent".
Since hardship itself is not a ground for rescinding a contract, a court normally 
refuses specific performance and grants decree for damages if the consequences 
resulting from such a decree are of the same degree to the defendant,1(209) j e 
decree for damages causes hardship to tthe defendant". Furthermore, hardship to the
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defendant as a result of performing the contract should be balanced against that of the 
plaintiff if the order is r e f u s e d . ^  10) However, hardship will not constitute a ground 
for refusing specific performance if it is brought about by the defendant upon 
himself.^11)
In Wilson v. P o t t i n g e r . ( 2 1 2 )  ^  arranged with B to build a house in which he used 
the gable of a house belonging to B. A made the wall thicker, in order to comply with 
the Dean of Guild's requirement, but without obtaining the express consent of B. In an 
action by B to remove the gable in so far as it constituted an encroachment, it was held 
that in any event, the only remedy was a claim of damages, and that he was not entitled 
to a decree requiring the gable to be demolished.
The reason for refusing specific implement in the above case was, that the defender 
would be involved in undue hardship such as unreasonable loss and expense if he was 
ordered to demolish the gable rather than pay damages.
In Mackav v. C a m p b e l l . ( 2 1 3 )  a purchaser raised an action against a seller for 
implement of missives of sale of heritable subjects. The seller pleaded that a decree of 
specific implement should not be pronounced as it would result in special hardship to 
him. He averred that the ownership of the subject had an incalculable sentimental value 
for him. It was held that the seller's averments were irrelevant. Lord Justice-Clerk 
Grant stated,1(214) that, "the defender’s plea in law in regard to "hardship" seems to me 
to be more hopeless". The court did not accept the claim of the hardship in the above 
case.
It seems that the court enjoys a wide discretionary power to examine the claim of 
exceptional hardship arising from performing specifically, taking into account, the 
balance between the two contracting parties in ordering or refusing specific implement. 
It is Guided by equitable grounds. The court takes the responsibility of inquiring into 
the surrounding circumstances of the hardship, for it was once said,(215) that, "the 
Court of Session has inherent power to refuse the legal remedy upon equitable 
grounds". Also, "it is quite conceivable that circumstances might occur which would 
make it inconventient and unjust to enforce specific performance of contract of
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sale...."/216)
Financial hardship
The grounds of exceptional hardship are v a r i e d .  (217) Each, ground is a matter 
subject to the court’s discretion, for each case of exceptional hardship has its own 
circumstances. The court, in examining any claim raised by a contracting party 
concerning the hardship, applies its discretionary power.
Regarding the contracting partiy's financial situation effect on the result of refusing 
specific implement on the ground of exceptional hardship. Unfortunately, the court has 
not paid any attention to this issue. It might be inferred that the financial situation of the 
contracting party is taken into consideration by the court in examining the case of 
exceptional hardship. Although there is no authority to support this assumption, 
support may be found in the court’s discretionary power, to refuse specific implement 
by reason of exceptional hardship, and in the principles of equity whereby poor and 
wealthy contracting parties are not treated equally in the case of hardship.
Time of exceptional hardship
In English law, the contracting party may suffer exceptional hardship at any time 
whether at the time of entering into a contract whilist the contract is executory, or at the 
time the contract is executed. It has been said, generally that hardship should be 
judged of at the time of entry into the obligation and not at the time of 
performance,1(218) but the above statement is not supported by the a u t h o r i t i e s . ^ !  9) 
Thus, it has been s a i d ,(220) that, "it very often happens that an agreement is made 
fairly and that no questions of hardship arise at that stage but that subsequently events 
take place from which it is seen that one party has obtained a better bargain than the 
other". Nevertheless, it was held that a change for the worse in the financial situation 
of the defendant, will not be taken into consideration as a hardship, if it takes place after 
the c o n t r a c t . ( 2 2 1 )  Also, if after the date of the contract, the price of the subject-matter
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has increased substantially, the vendor is not entitled to refuse specific performance by 
claiming h a r d s h i p . ( 2 2 2 )  That has been criticised,1(223) that, "there is no reason in 
principle why a source of hardship should be ignored merely because it did not exist at 
the time when the material contract was entered into". Specific performance has been 
rejected on several occasions on ground of hardship which arose from subsequent 
events.(224)
Unfortunately, Scots authorities have not paid any attenion to this issue.' The 
reason, it is submitted, that the court has a very wide power to consider the case of 
hardship and the whole surrounding circumstances. Thus, Lord Watson did not 
mention the time of occurrence of such circumstances, but he left the case wide open 
when he said,(225), "it is quite conceivable that circumstances might occur which 
would make it inconvenient and unjust to enforce specific performance of a contract of 
sale". The Lord President, a l s o , (226) has pointed out that "in the circumstances of this 
case, I think it is within the discretion of the court to say which of these remedies the 
pursuer would be entitled to; and it appears to me that the appropriate remedy in the 
present case would be not a decree ad factum praestandum but a decree for damages 
only". Furthermore, "it must always be in the discretion of the court to say whether the 
remedy of specific implement or one of damages is the proper and suitable remedy in 
the circumstances".(227) Again, "In Scotland the legal and equitable jurisdiction have 
always been united, and the natural result of that union is that strict legal rights ought 
not to be enforced without regard to the discretion which, from the nature of the 
subject-mtter, and the interests of all those concerned in it, ought to be exercised by a 
Court of E q u i t y " . (228) it seems, that in Scots law the court has wide discretionary 
powers to consider at what time the exceptional hardship should be regarded as an 
effective factor in refusing the remedy of specific implement. Futhermore, it has wide 
discretion to consider the financial hardship and its effect on specific implement.
2-Performance "too onerous" in Iraqi civil law
/
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Article 2 4 6  ( 2 )  of Iraqi Civil Code provides, "when specific performance is too 
onerous for the debtor, he may limit performance to payment of a sum of money as 
indeminty provided that this method of performance does not seriously prejudice the 
creditor". Thus specific performance may be refused on the ground that performance is 
too onerous.
The case of "too onerous for the debtor to perform" should be considered and 
analysed under four heads, namely; what is meant by "too onerous for the debtor"? 
who must prove that performance is too onerous for the debtor, on which grounds can 
this be proved? and at what time should the application of the case of too onerous be 
considered?
The concept of performance "too onerous*' for the debtor
The definition of "too onerous" is substantially the same as that of exceptional 
h a r d s h ip ,(229) js  a little vague and ambiguous, for the Civil Code does not define 
the term "too onerous". Thus, it may be the task of the jurisprudence to define the term 
"too onerous".
The meaning of "too onerous to perform" envisages, that the contracting party 
should suffer cost and expenses excessivly. They must reach the limit which is too 
onerous for the debtor to perform, and which is unfair and unjust to enforce against 
him without m itigation.(230) Any increase of cost not amounting to this will not be 
sufficient.
It is when the difference becomes wide between what shall the contracting party 
give, on one hand, and what shall he obtain, on the other.(231) However a gross loss 
does not mean that the debtor should be mined economically.(232) it includes the fact 
that the debtor should suffer loss grossly, not just difficulty of performance or 
unprofitable consequences.(233)
The concept of too onerous is flexible and changes with the circumstances of each 
case. Thus, what is too onerous for one debtor may not be so for a n o t h e r . ( 2 3 4 )  Also, 
it is judged in relation to the particular bargain by which the contract was concluded.
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Thus, if the debtor has suffered loss in his bargain or in performing his obligation 
which is much more than a resonable loss, it is considered to be too onerous to perform 
even if such loss represents a little importance in comparison with the debtor's 
w e a l t h . ( 2 3 5 )
The court’s discretion and financial hardship
The question of whether performance is too onerous, is to be judged by the court in 
each case with reference to the particular circumstances.
In deciding whether performance of the obligation is too onerous, the court should 
examine the case under an objective criterion which reflects the influence of the 
circumstances on the contract i t s e l f . ( 2 3 6 )
The contracting parties have agreed under the contract to conclude obligations, upon 
each other,which are equal and balanced to a certain extent at the time the contract is 
made. For some reasons these obligations may become unbalanced, and it may be then 
too onerous for the debtor to perform. Therefore, the case should be considered and 
examined separately, regardless of the state of wealth or poverty that the debtor 
e n j o y s . ( 2 3 7 )  Article 2 4 6  ( 2 )  of Civil C o d e , ( 2 3 8 )  appears to impose an objective test, 
by virtue of the following reasons:
1-The above Article of Civil Code does not refer to the case of financial situation of 
the debtor.
2-It concentrates on the obligation of the debtor which has become too onerous for 
him to perform. This leaves the question of how great a loss must be before the 
contract becomes too onerous to perform.
This is done by examining the difference between the value of the goods within the 
contract before or after occurrence of the incident which renders performance of the 
obligation too onerous, always bearing in mind market fluctuation.
The court may, also, rely on a subjective test in certain circumstances,( 2 3 9 )  
because:
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1-The concept of whether performance too onerous, is a flexible concept, (240) 
and it changes with the circumstances. Thus, which is too onerous for a certain debtor 
may not be so for another, or may not be so for the same debtor in different 
circumstances/241)
2-The financial situation of the debtor should play a major role, for what is too 
onerous for the poor is not so for a wealthy d e b t o r / 2 4 2 )  Thus, it is unfair to equalize 
between who is well off and who is poor.
3-Relying on one test to solve the problem may produce unpleasant consequences, 
because, the objective test is, as it has been established, f l e x i b e / 2 4 3 )  anci it depends 
on the circmstances of each case, so it may be misleading sometimes.
4-Relying on the two criteria, i.e. "the objective and subjective tests" may minimize 
the risk of using one test, especially "the objective test", and may achieve more just 
c o n s e q u e n c e s / 2 4 4 )  for depriving the court of relying on the subjective test besides the 
objective test may lead to equalization between the rich and the poor debtor.
If performing specifically is too onerous for the debtor, but giving damages to the 
creditor causes him to suffer greater injuries and losses, the creditor, is in a favourable 
position to obtain specific performance rather than d a m a g e s / 2 4 5 )  for the following 
reasons:
1-The creditor does not abuse his right.
2-Damages are not the alternative remedy to specific performance, unless there are 
exceptional circumstances to prefer them. Thus, if the circumstances of granting 
specific performance and those of granting damages, i.e. "circumstances of granting 
and refusing specific performance", are equal, the court, will usually, grant specific 
performance, because it is the right of the aggrieved party to have what he has 
contracted for.
3-The courts, usually balance between the two conflicting interests, namely; "the 
interests of the creditor and that of the debtor". Damages then will be granted if they 
are due, to avoid the debtor’s suffering when performing specifically is too onerous.
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Where as, the creditor's negligible loss as a result of non-performance, when it is too 
onerous, will be i g n o r e d / 2 4 6 )
The debtor's right according to Article 2 4 6  ( 2 )  of Iraqi Civil Code, is a relative 
matter, but it is restricted by the creditor's interest which should not be expossed to a 
serious and excessive loss and injuries. Thus, the law has taken the debtor into 
consideration, and has given him the opportunity to avoid specific performance, but the 
creditor’s interest is not entirely a b a n d o n e d / 2 4 7 )
The court may give the debtor additional time, to perform specifically, instead of 
ordering him to pay damages as an alternative remedy, when specific performance is 
too onerous for him.
The court has inherent discretion to decide, whether giving additional time is 
substantial for performing the obligation. Thus the court may think that circumstance 
of too onerous to perform is merely temporary and it may be removed by giving the 
debtor such a period after which the obligation may be performed easily and without 
hardship, provided, this does not prejudice the creditor's right, and causes him no 
further damages or i n j u r i e s / 2 4 8 )  The reason, it is submitted, that if the debtor is 
entitled to refrain from performance, when it is too onerous, a fortiori, the court has 
the power to give him additional time for performance.
The legal base on which the debtor is entitled to refuse specific performance and to 
give damages instead, are:
1-It was s a i d / 2 4 9 )  that one abusement of right by the plaintiff, i.e., whether the 
plaintiff insistence on performance will reap little benefit compare with the loss suffered 
by the d e f e n d a n t / 2 5 0 )
2-The basis for refusing specific performance when it is too onerous to do so, is 
the principle of equity and justice, which is used by the court to balance between the 
two conflicting interests.
Time of exceptional hardship
Specific performance may become too onerous for the debtor at any time. It may
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become so whether at the time of making the obligation or whilist the contract is 
executory, or at the time of executing the obligation. The contracting party who has 
suffered hardship must at any time be able to minimize the loss.
The time at which specific performance becomes too onerous, is not considered by 
the Iraqi Civil Code. However, the problem has been considered by 
j u r i s p r u d e n c e / ^ 1 )  which has pointed out that the time at which specific performance 
becomes too onerous for the debtor, is the time of the occurrence of the events and 
circumstances which render specific performance too o n e r o u s / ^ 5 2 )  Thus, if there is a 
future obligation, and the debtor has suffered gross loss, he is entitled to ask the court 
to minimize his loss to a reasonable limit, provided that he has not performed the 
obligation y e t / ^ 5 3 )  whereas in the case of continuing contracts such as, the contract 
to supply goods, the contracting party whoes obligation becomes too onerous, may 
seek removal of the hardship at the time of its occurrence, in respect of what has not 
been p e r f o r m e d / ^ )  j f  the obligation has been performed before occurrence of the 
exceptional hardship, the contracting party cannot seek to reduce the loss that he has 
suffered, for what had been performed before such events, it is deemed to have been 
performed in a normal c i r c u m s t a n c e s / ^ )  However, i t  has been suggested, that the 
contracting party may seek to reduce his loss even after performing his obligation, for 
the following reasons: 1
1-Reducing a loss which results from performing specifically, when it is too 
onerous, is based on the principles of equity and justice. It is inequitable and unjust to 
refuse relief to the innocent party whilst allowing it to the party in b r e a c h / 2 5 6 )
2-The Iraqi Civil Code gives the court discretionary power to reduce loss to a 
reasonable limit, when performing specifically is too onerous for the debtor. Doing so 
should be possible at any time whether during performance of the obligation or even 
after the obligation is f u l f i l l e d / ^ ? )
Comment
1-Exceptional hardship is a flexible concept in both systems. It relies, on two
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circumstances; 1- the disputed case and, 2- the discretionary power of the court and its 
satisfaction towards the state of hardship.
2-The court’s discretionary power in Scots law towards exceptional hardship is 
wide and dominant. To consider whether there is exceptional hardship, the court takes 
into account all circumstances, such as, the financial situation of the contracting party 
and the time when the hardship occurrs.
3-The court’s discretionary power in Iraqi civil law is also wide. However, it is 
guided by the suggestion of the jurisprudence to rely on two tests which are objective 
and subjective tests to examine the case.
4-The time, at which exceptional hardship should be considered in Scots law is 
subject to the court discretion. While in Iraqi civil law the case has not been settled yet, 
and it would be wise if that case was left to the court discretion.
5-Scots Courts concur with Iraqi Courts in examining the case of exceptional 
hardship and the case of whether specific performance is too onerous for the debtor, 
under different tests. Scots and Iraqi courts refuse specific implement on the ground of 
hardship under the court's discretion.
Sub-section 3: Breach of contract bv the purchaser
A sale of goods contract gives rise to many obligations between the contracting 
parties. If the purchaser has breached one of these obligations, the other party may sue 
him for breach of the obligation and may insist on him performing his contract. He is 
held liable towards the seller in such circumstances. Breach of contract by the 
purchaser will be considered as follows:
1-Breach of contract by the purchaser in Scots law.
2-Breach of contract by the purchaser in Iraqi civil law.
1-Breach of the contract bv the purchaser in Scots law
Breach of contract occurrs when either contracting party refuses or fails to perform
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any of the things which he is required to perform by virtue of the contractors) The 
other party may seek damages and may be entitled to treat the contract as 
d i s c h a r g e d . There upon, "No party in mutual contract, where the obligation on 
the parties are the causes of one an other, can demand performance from the other, if he 
himself either cannot or will not perform the counterpart, for the mutual obligation are 
considered as conditional" @60)
In Barclay v. Anderson Foundry Co..(261) Lor(j Cowan stated that, "where there 
is a clear failure by one of the parties to a mutual contract to fulfil, in an essential 
respect, his part of it, I cannot hold that notice is necessary by the other party ere he can 
regard himself free of his obligation under it, and entitled to act on that footing. There 
may, indeed, be room for saying, that when the neglect or failure to perform is but 
trifling in extent, or has arisen from inadvertence, or permits of satisfactory 
explanation, the contract cannot, in such a state of matters, be held to have become 
void". Furthermore, in Turnbull v. M'lean & Co..(262) ^  contracted with B to supply 
him with a quantity of coals in monthly instalments, the price to be paid monthly. B, 
"the purchaser", having refused to pay for the coal of a past month, or even to make a 
payment to account, until certain counter claims of far less amount were settled, but 
involving a principle, found to be unsound, which would have been applicable to the 
remainder of the contract. It was held that rescission of the contract by the seller A 
was justified.
Lord Justice-Clerk M o n c r i e f , ( 2 6 3 )  explained the principle by stating, "1st, that the 
stipulations on either side are the counterparts and the consideration given for each 
other; 2nd, that a failure to perform any materail or substantial part of the contract on 
the part of one will prevent him from suing the other for performance; and, 3rd, that 
where one party has refused or failed to perform his part of the contract in any materail 
respect the other is entitled either to insist for implement, claiming damages for the 
breach, or to rescind the contract altogether, except so far as it has been performed". 
The well established mle in Scots law is that the obligations undertaken by one party 
are the counterparts of, and therefore dependant upon the other contracting party's
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o b l i g a t i o n s . (264) The above statment explains the general rule of Scots law. Thus, 
performance by one party of his obligations, is dependant on the other party’s
p e r f o r m a n c e .( 2 6 5 )  was 0nce, that "both are bound or n e ith e r " .(26$)
In order to apply the above rules on the case of the seller and the buyer, where the 
buyer is in breach of his obligation, but he still insists on having his contract 
specifically performed, two questiones arise, namely; in which circumstances is the 
buyer regarded in breach of his obligation, and if the purchaser is in breach, is he 
entitled to have specific implement against the seller?
The buyer is obliged according to the sale of goods contract, to perform substantial 
obligations, namely;
-To pay the price.
-Taking delivery of the goods
1.1-The duty of the buver to pav the price 
It is the buyer's duty to pay for the goods he has bought and, "the cardinal rule 
applicable to payment of the price as an obligation of the buyer is that it is a condition 
suspensive of the seller's obligation to surrender to him possession of the goods".1(267) 
Therefore, unless there is an agreement to the contrary, the buyer is not entitled to take 
possession of the goods, if he has not paid the price in accordance with the 
contract.(268) So far, it seems that the buyer, who refuses to pay the price without any 
legal excuse or an agreement, is not entitled to seek specific implement against the
seller, because "the law of Scotland in regard to a mutual contracts,   first, that the
stipulations on either side are the counterparts and the consideration given for each 
other; second, that a failure to perform any material or substantial part of the contract of 
one will prevent him from suing the other for performance; and third that where one 
party has refused or failed to perform his part of the contract in any material respect the 
other is entitled either to insist for implement, claiming damages for the
breach, ".(269) However, what if the buyer has delayed paying the price? Can he
insist on having the goods delivered to him?
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If no provision is made by the contracting parties for a time to perform their 
obligations, it is inferred that each contracting party will perform his part of the contract 
within a period of time which is reasonable in all the circumstances of the case.(270) 
Thus unless a different intention appears, time of payment of the price is not a material 
term of the contract.^? 1) Nevertheless, a mere failure by the purchaser to pay at the 
time agreed upon by the contracting parties does not mean that the seller is entitled to 
treat the contract as repudiated and immediately, resell the goods,1(272) for> L0rcj 
Cowan,'(273) said once "there may, indeed be room for saying, that when the neglect 
or failure to perform is but trifling in extent, or has arisen from inadvertence, or permits 
of satisfactory explanation, the contract cannot, in such a state of matters, be held to 
have become void". The seller is not obliged to perform his obligation by delivering 
the goods,'(274) for jje still has the right to retain the goods sold. Moreover, if the 
purchaser does not pay the money price, the seller is entitled to money damages for 
delay.( 2 7 5 )  Further, under Sec. 2 8  of Sale of Goods Act 1 9 7 9 ,  "Unless otherwise 
agreed, delivery of the goods and payment of the price are concurrent conditions, that is 
to say, the seller must be ready and willing to give possession of the goods to the buyer 
in exchange for the price and the buyer must be ready and willing to pay the price in 
exchange for possession of the goods".
Consequently, it seems that specific implement cannot be ordered against the seller, 
where the buyer has delayed in paying the price, because the seller has the right to insist 
that the buyer performs his obligation. Nevertheless, in Linn v. S h i e l d s . ( 2 7 6 )  twelve 
stacks of com were sold to be delivered as required, without any express provision as 
to time of payment. It was held, that the buyer’s obligation was to pay the price on 
delivery of each stack, but his failure to do so was not a breach of contract of sale to 
justify the seller in repudiating his obligation to deliver the remainder of the stacks of 
com. Thus, the seller cannot repudaite the contract in such circumstances, but, on the 
other hand, he cannot be enforced to deliver the goods. He may refrain from delivering 
the goods until payment, for there is no ground or justification behind ordering the
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seller to perform specifically, while the buyer refrains from fulfilling his part of the 
obligation. The matter is entirely different when a buyer is not prepared to pay the price 
at a fixed time. The seller, in such a case, is not bound to wait for him 
indefinitely.1(277) Therefore, the buyer is not entitled to claim specific implement. In a 
case, where a dispute regarding a contract for the sale of a number of pieces of cloth, 
by which the purchaser should have three months to pay for what he has received, the 
purchaser cannot claim delivery of what remained, without tendering payment,.1@78) 
Payment of the price could be agreed in either cash or by bill of exchange or other 
negotiable i n s t r u m e n t / 2 7 9 )  has been said that, "Action is only completed if the price 
as money debt is presently due and payable under the c o n t r a c t " / 2 8 0 )  in such a case 
the buyer cannot claim specific implement because he is under the obligation to pay and 
to perform his part of the contract. However, the seller is deemed to have been paid 
between the time of taking the instrument and the time of its dishonour, unless he 
makes its acceptance further conditional upon its being m e t / 2 8 1 )  Also, if the buyer 
makes proper tender which the seller wrongfully refuses, the seller is no longer 
u n p a id /^ )  cannot refuse specific implement.
2-The duty of the purchaser to take delivery of the goods
The buyer is obliged to take delivery of the goods s o l d / 2 8 3 )  j f  he refuses he is 
liable to the seller for loss occasioned by his refusal. He is, also, liable for a reasonable 
charge for the custody of the goods, without prejudice to the right of the seller where 
the neglect or refusal to take delivery amounts to a repudiation of the c o n t r a c t / 2 8 4 )  
Thus, "if the goods are conform to contract, theoretically, whatever he does in fact 
the buyer is bound to accept t h e m " / 2 8 5 )
There are two obligations on the buyer towards the goods, namely; the duty to take 
delivery, ( 2 8 6 )  ^  the duty to accept t h e m / 2 8 7 )  ^ny unjustified breach of one of 
these obligations by the buyer deprives him of the right to reject the g o o d s / 2 8 8 )  xhe 
same effect results if the purchaser has intimated rejection continues using the goods 
sold. It was established in Electric Constmction Co. v. Hurrv & Y o u n g / 2 8 9 )  that the
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buyer lost not only the right of rejection but the right to claim damages as well. 
Further, if the buyer has already accepted the goods, in such a case he cannot reject 
t h e m . ( 2 9 0 )  Rejection of the goods should occur within a reasonable t i m e , ( 2 9 1 )  which 
is a question of f a c t , ( 2 9 2 )  otherwise the right to reject the goods is l o s t . ( 2 9 3 )  The 
buyer within all the above cases, or who has otherwise acted in a way to give the seller 
any claim against him, is not entitled to insist on specific implement, because as has 
already been m e n t i o n e d , ( 2 9 4 )  each party should perform his side of the contract, to 
insist on having the contract performed. Also, where there is a refusal to perform, by 
one party, the other contracting party is entitled to consider the contract as repudiated, 
although he is entitled to claim d a m a g e s . ( 2 9 5 )  r  has been established by many English 
authorities that the plaintiff who claims specific performance must show that he has 
fulfilled all his contractual obligations to the date of claim and is ready to fulfil his 
future obligations under the c o n t r a c t . ( 2 9 6 )
2-Breach of contract bv the purchaser in Iraqi civil law
Sale of goods contract is a bilateral contract. Therefore the obligations of such 
contract are mutual, i.e."there is strong connection between them".1( 2 9 7 )  Thus, if one 
contracting party refuses to perform, he cannot compel the other party to perform his 
o b l i g a t i o n . ( 2 9 8 )  Nevertheless, if one of the contracting parties to a bilateral obligation 
has failed to perform what he has undertaken to do, the other party can either insist on 
having specific performance or damages, and may ask for the contract to be 
r e s c i n d e d . ( 2 9 9 )  He may claim damages as well as rescinding the contraction)
Article 177 of Civil Code, has established the above rules by providing that, "In 
bilateral contracts if one of the contracting parties does not perform what he has 
undertaken by virtue of contract, the other party may after serving a formal summons 
demand rescission with damages if due".
Rescission may arise from defective performance or even partial performance, but 
the court has discretionary power in such a case to consider the contract as rescinded or
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to give the debtor additional time for p e r f o r m a n c e . ^ ^ )
The innocent party must show he is willing to perform his side of the bargain 
before rescission will be g r a n t e d . ( 3 0 2 )  jf he fails to do so, he will be deemed to be in 
breach, and both parties will be treated equally.
Where the buyer is in breach, the seller may have the right to require performance 
of the following obligations:
-Payment of the price.
-Taking delivery of the goods.
2.1-Payment of the price
The purchaser's obligation to pay the price of the goods sold is one of the 
substantial obligations by virtue of the c o n t r a c t P 0 3 )  payment of the price is governed 
by Article 5 7 1  ( 1 )  of Iraqi Civil Code which provides; "The purchaser is obliged to pay 
the price agreed upon according to the conditions those are concluded by the contract, 
and he who bears the expenses of payment".
The seller's right to obtain the price of the goods sold is secured by two means; 
first; the seller has right to obtain specific performance against the refusing buyer,'(304) 
secondly; he has the right of retention of the goods/305) xhe main issue however, is, 
that the buyer will lose his right of specific performance against the seller, and the seller 
may claim specific performance against him. The seller, may apply to exercise his right 
of retention,^ 06) as the purchaser becomes the owner of the goods sold after the 
contract is concluded, and thereupon, the law has conferred the seller a privilege on 
these goods, according to Article 1 3 7 6  ( 1 )  of Civil Code, which provides, "Sums due 
to the seller of movables for price and accessories are secured by a privilege over the 
movables sold. This privilege is enforceable, as long as the movable sold preserves its 
identity, subject to the rights acquired in good faith by third parties and subject to the 
special provisions applicable in commercial matters". Therefore, the seller is entitled to 
hold the goods sold temporarily if the purchaser has refrained from paying the price 
im m ediately.^^) Nevertheless, the seller's right of retention may be prevented if the
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price of the goods is not presently due, unless the purchaser has weakened the 
securities, which he already has offered to guarantee payment of the price,1(308) or 
become insolvent,*(309) or he died bankrupt.^ *0)
The seller's right of retention will be lost if the seller waives his l ig h te n )  or if the 
buyer pays the price for the goods plus their interest.^ *2) jn such cases, the seller 
cannot refrain from delivering the goods to the buyer. The buyer, therefore is prima 
facie  entitled to obtain specific performance. The purchaser's right of specific 
performance is refused while the seller has the right of retention against the goods sold, 
by virtue of the following reasons:
1-It is illogical to say that, at the same time, the seller has the right of retention and 
the buyer has the right to insist on delivery of the goods sold, because raising and 
applying for one right, prevents the other from being raised and applied for.
2-In bilateral contracts, mutual obligations must be performed. Therefore, either 
party to the contract may abstain from performance, if the other party to it does not 
comply with his obligation.^ *3)
Despite the purchaser's obligation to pay the price, he has the right of retention of 
such a price, in accordance with Article 576 of Iraqi Civil Code, where the purchaser's 
reasonable apprehension that the goods sold are dispossessed or his enjoyment in the 
goods will be disturbed.^ If the buyer discovers that the goods sold are defective, 
he may claim either rescission of the contract or a reduction in the priceP15)
If the purchaser legally retains the price, the question arises whether he may insist 
on specific performance by the seller.^ *6) It is suggested that he may insist on 
specific performance for the following reasons:
1-So long as, the purchaser is willing to perform his obligation he is entitled to 
require the seller to perform his obligation specifically. He has the right of either 
specific performance or rescission of the contract with damages if due.(317)
2-This case falls within the court's discretionary power, either to grant the relief 
sought or to give the seller additional time for p e r f o r m a n c e ,^  18) unless, the contract is 
regarded as rescinded a u t o m a t i c a l l y . (319)
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3- The seller cannot apply the rule of "Exceptio non adimpleti contractus ",(320) 
because, the purchaser holds the price legally and he intends to perform his obligation.
The purchaser's obligation to pay the price arise at the time agreed upon by the 
contracting parties.
It is questionable whether the purchaser's right to specific performance remains 
against the seller, if he delays paying the price.
Unless the contracting parties agree otherwise, delay in payment permits the seller 
to retain the goods and to claim that the purchaser is in breach of his contract which 
entitles him either to rescind the contract or to insist on having specific 
p e r f o r m a n c e / ^  1) The case also, falls within the court's discretionary power to 
examine the surrounding circumstances.1(322) jf the delay is not based on any legal 
ground, specific performance will be refused.
2.2-Taking delivery of the goods sold
The purchaser is obliged to take delivery of the goods sold at the time and in the 
place agreed upon by the contracting p a r t i e s / 3 2 3 )  If the purchaser refuses to take 
delivery, he is deemed to have committed a breach to his contract. Therefore, the seller 
is entitled in such a case to require the buyer to take delivery of the goods or to rescind 
the contract and claims d a m a g e s / 3 2 4 )  Thus, where a purchaser is in breach, right of 
specific performance occurres to the seller according to the general rule of bilateral 
obligations.^^) The seller may seek to require the buyer to take delivery of goods 
and he is entitled to ask for a penalty, i.e. (threatened penalty), for each day that the 
buyer delays in taking delivery, in order to compel him to fulfil his o b l i g a t i o n / 3 2 6 )  
The seller is also, entitled to deposit the goods sold in another place other than his 
warehouse or store, on the purchaser's liability and at his e x p e n s e / 3 2 7 )
If the goods are of perishable, or keeping them is unduly expensive, the seller on 
the order of the court may sell the goods and deposit the price for the buyer in the 
court/328)
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It is inconceiveable, that the purchaser has the right to insist on having the goods 
delivered to him in the above cases, because he is in breach of his obligation.
When the purchaser has taken delivery of the item sold, he must ascertain its 
condition as soon as he is able to do so, to see that it conforms with the c o n t r a c t . ^ 2 9 )  
If he discovers a defect for which the seller is liable, he must give notice to the seller as 
soon as possible,(330) faiiing which he will be deemed to have accepted the thing 
sold/331) if the purchaser has informed the seller of the defect within a reasonable 
time, he is entitled either to reject the goods and to treat the contract as discharged, or to 
accept the goods at the contract price, according to Article 558 of Iraqi Civil Code.(332) 
However, if he delays informing the seller of the defect, or fails to inform the seller at 
all, he is not entitled to specific performance, in the form of ordering the seller to repair 
the defect if it is repairable or to change the defective thing for a new one at the seller's 
expense. In addition, the buyer is not entitled to reject the goods and ask for specific 
performance in many cases, such as, if the defect has taken place after the purchaser 
has taken delivery of the goods,'(333) or jf the buyer has disposed of the goods sold 
before knowing that there is d e f e c t . ^  3 4 )
Comment
1-The seller is entitled, in Scots law and in Iraqi civil law, to rescind the contract 
with damages where there is a breach of contract for sale of goods by the purchaser. 
However if the breach of the contract is but trifling within the circumstances of the case 
and in accordance with the court discretion, the contract may not be repudiated, and the 
remedy for such a breach is either specific implement or damages.
2-The seller in Iraqi civil law is entitled to insist on having specific performance 
against the failure purchaser who has breached his obligation, whereas the seller in 
Scotland is deprived of this remedy.
3-If the buyer has committed a breach to his obligation of payment or taking 
delivery, his right of specific implement will be refused, and the seller then may have
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the opportunity to claim specific implement. Although, in Scotland the seller does not 
have such an opportunity, he is entitled to have an action against the purchaser for the 
price under Sec. 49 (1) of Sale of Goods Act 1979, but this is not a remedy of specific 
implement.
4-Both Scots and Iraqi systems concur, that breach of the obligation of payment by 
the buyer, gives the seller the right of retention, and subsequently the buyer's right of
the remedy of specific implement will be denied.
5-Both systems concur that refusal or failure by the buyer to perform his part of the 
sale contract prevents him from insisting on the seller to perform, by virtue of the 
principle of, "Exceptio non adimpleti contractus".
Sub-Section 4: Breach of contract bv the seller
Breach of contract by the seller in Scots law does not affect specific implement, as 
he does not have the remedy in any case, on the contrary to the seller in Iraqi civil law. 
The problem will be considered under both systems, viz:
1-Breach of contract of sale by the seller in scots law.
2-Breach of contract of sale by the seller in Iraqi civil law.
1-Breach of the contract bv the seller in Scots Law
"A contract for the sale of goods contemplates its consummation and extinction 
upon the performance by each party of all his obligations thereunder".'C 3 3 5 )  xhus, any 
refusal to perform will lead to breach of contract. The obligations are to confer a good 
title to the b u y e r , ( 3 3 6 )  t0 deliver the goods s o l d . ( 3 3 7 )  an(j t0 perform the contract 
according to its terms. According to Sec. 11 (2) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979, "In 
Scotland, failure by the seller to perform any material part of a contract of sale is a 
breach of contract which entitles the buyer either within a reasonable time after delivery 
to reject the goods and treat the contract as repudiated, or to retain the goods and treat 
the failure to perform such material part as a breach which may give rise to claim for 
compensation or damages".
Refusing the remedy of specific implement on the ground of the seller breach to his
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obligation, has no legal basis in Scots law, for the seller is not entitled to have the 
remedy. In addition, breach of his obligations may give the purchaser the right to insist 
on having specific performance, especially in the case of refusal to deliver the goods 
s o l d . ( 3 3 8 )  However, the seller cannot insist on the buyer taking delivery of the goods 
s o l d ,(339) or performing specifically any other obligation. The seller may not insist on 
the buyer to perform specifically not because of he is in breach of his obligations, but 
because his action is a sum of money, which cannot be ordered by a decree of specific
i m p l e m e n t .  ( 3  4 0 )
2- Breach of contract bv the seller in Iraqi civil law
Any breach of obligation by the seller will deprive him of his right to specific 
performance, and give the buyer the right to seek specific performance, and rescind the 
contract with damages. Considering whether the seller's right of specific performance 
is refused requires to follow his performance to the obligations he has undertaken; 
namely:
-Transfer of ownership of the thing sold.
-Delivery of the thing sold to the purchaser in accordance with the contract
conditions.
-Warranty against dispossession and disturbance of the buyer in his enjoyment.
-Warranty against defects in the goods sold.
Studying every obligation in detail is beyond the scope of this work. However, the 
study will concentrate on the breach of these obligations in so far as they affect specific 
performance.
2.1-Transfer of ownership of the goods sold
Transference of ownership can only occur, where the thing is specifically 
i d e n t i f i e d , ( 3 4 1 )  or is described only as specie but becomes specific by 
individualisation. ( 3 4 2 )
First:-If the thing sold is specifically identified, its ownership is transferred as
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soon as the contract is concluded, by virtue of the law, in Articles 2 4 7 ,  5 3 1 ,  1 1 2 6  ( 1 )  
of Iraqi Civil Code, (providing the thing is owned by the s e l l e r ) . ( 3 4 3 )  j f  thing is 
not owned by the seller at the time of making the contract, no contract is concluded, but 
it is regarded suspended, until it is ratified by the owner of the thing sold.^44) jf  the 
owner of the thing sold does not ratify the sale, there is no contract of sale at all, and 
the parties are subject to the rule of "restitutio in integrum"' .( 3 4 5 )  j n  such a case the 
only thing which can be done, is to grant the aggrieved buyer damages if they are 
due.^46) Furthermore, the seller must refrain from doing any thing which may render 
transference of ownership impossible or difficult, for Article 5 3 5  of Iraqi Civil Code 
provides, that "The seller is bound to perform every thing necessary to transfer 
ownership of the thing sold to the buyer and to abstain from all acts those might render 
transference impossible or d i f f i c u l t " .^ 4 7 )
The seller’s right of specific performance is dependant on fulfilling his obligation in 
transferring the title of the thing sold to the buyer even if the contracting parties agreed 
to postpone delivery or to delay payment of the price.^48) Also, the transfer of 
ownership is subject to the terms of the co n trac t/^ )
Secondlv:-If the thing sold is described as specie its ownership is not transferred, 
unless the object is identified by in d iv i d u a l i s a t i o n ,(350) (for the thing sold before 
individualisation is not identified specifically and therefore its ownership is not 
transferred in accordance with Article 5 3 1  of Iraqi Civil Code). When the seller refuses 
to fulfil his obligation, in identifing the goods, he is deemed to have breached his 
contract and he is regarded as refusing to transfer o w n e r s h i p . ^  1) Such a breach leads 
to the following consequences:
1-It deprives the seller of specific performance, namely, "the purchaser will not be 
compelled to fulfil his obligations".
2-It gives the purchaser two c h o i c e s , ( 3 5 2 )  either to buy movables of the same kind 
at the seller's expense, or to ask the seller to repay the price if it has already been paid, 
when the buyer thinks that there is no point or justification to buy other goods.
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3-The buyer is entitled to damages if he has suffered l o s s . ( 3 5 3 )
2.2-Delivery of the goods sold
The seller's other substantial obligation is to deliver the goods sold to the 
p u r c h a s e r  ( 3 5 4 )  a  breach of this obligation will render the seller liabile to performance, 
and deprive him of his right of specific performance against the purchaser. This will 
follow whether the delivery is actual or c o n s t r u c t i v e , ( 3 5 5 )  or symbolic,1( 3 5 6 )  o r >  j f  the 
seller has intended to deliver the goods in a different place from which the contracting 
parties agreed u p o n , (3 5 7 )  otherwise the goods should be delivered in the place where 
they exist at the time of making the c o n t r a c t . ( 3 5 8 )  Furthermore, when the seller delays 
delivery of the goods, unless otherwise agree, he is deemed to have committed a breach 
to his o b l i g a t i o n . ( 3 5 9 )  jn addition, if he has delivered goods in a different condition 
from which they were at the time of making the contract,(350) the seller is in breach of 
his obligation. Therefore, the buyer after serving a formal summons on the seller, is 
entitled either to insist on having specific performance in addition to damages, or he 
may apply for rescission of the contract with damages, if he has suffered loss.(351)
The seller in such a case cannot seek specific performance for the following 
reasons:
1-The rule of "Exceptio non adimpleti contractus" stands against granting him 
specific performance as long as, the buyer is ready and willing to perform his part of
the contract.(3 52)
2-To give the seller in breach the right of specific performance against the party 
who has performed his obligation, or who is willing to do so, is unjust. It is a general 
rule of bilateral obligations only to allow a party to have specific performance if  he has 
performed what he undertook to do.
3-Although, there is no specific provision in the Civil Code, it is submitted that, 
such a case is subject to the general rule of the theory of obligation, and it is supported 
by Articles 177,246 of Iraqi Civil Code.
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2.3-Warrantv against disturbance and dispossession
The seller undertakes:
1-to a warrant against disturbance of the buyer in his enjoyment of the thing sold.
2-to a warrant against dispossession.
2.3.1-Warranty against disturbance of the buver in his enjoyment
Such a disturbance may take place either by the seller himself or by a third party:
2.3.1.1-Disturbance of the buver bv the seller himself
Disturbance,1(363) may be material,(364) or l e g a l ,(365) direct or i n d ir e c t .(366)
To be liable to the purchaser, disturbance must cause loss to h i m . ( 3 6 7 )  Disturbance 
alone is not sufficient. Where damage ensues, the purchaser may obtain an order 
against the seller to stop the disturbance, or claim d a m a g e s . ( 3 6 8 )  The purchaser, also, 
may ask for rescission of the contract with d a m a g e s . ( 3 6 9 )  The seller's right to specific 
performance is subject to number of considerations.
The seller cannot insist on having specific performance against the buyer, where the 
buyer has not paid the price, or has not taken delivery of the goods, (although he is 
willing and ready to do so, or there is stipulation concerning the time of payment and 
taking delivery at a later stage).
2.3.1.2-Disturbance bv a third party
The buyer’s right against disturbance by a third party may be found as follows:
1-The third party has a legal right which is enforceable against the purchaser.
This refers to a legal right arising from the purchaser's default.(370) Disturbance
does not include illegal acts such as theft or criminal damage,(371) as the purchaser
is given a legal remedy against the perpetrator of such a c t s . ( 3 7 2 )
2-Actual occurrence of the d i s t u r b a n c e : ( 3 7 3 )
A mere fear of disturbance is not s u f f i c i e n t , (374) nor is the mere existence of a right 
which is not e x e r c i s e d . ( 3 7 5 )
3-The right must exist at the time the contract is made,'(376) according to Article 
549 (1) of the Iraqi Civil Code. The purchaser who has been disturbed, is entitled to
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the remedy of specific performance.
Is the seller's right of specific performance refused or granted under the above 
circumstances?
First of all, one should presume, that the purchaser's refusal to pay the price or to 
take delivery of the goods is not a breach of obligation, but as is done under the 
condition of the contract, for if the buyer has fulfilled all his obligations, there is 
nothing for the seller to insist on him "the purchaser" to perform specifically. The 
purchaser who has been disturbed, has the right to retain the price, and thus the seller 
cannot oblige him to pay it. This is supported by the general rules of the theory of 
obligation in Articles 246 (1,2), 177 of Iraqi Civil Code. Further, under the principle 
of "Exceptio non adimpleti contractus" cannot insist on having specific performance 
against the buyer, as long as, he is in breach of one of his obligations. The seller who 
should perform that obligation specifically by standing against the third party's claim. 
If the seller's warranty is broken and the thing sold has been dispossessed whether 
partially or totally thereafter, he must pay damages to the buyer for loss caused. 
Obtaining a decree confirming the right of the third party over the thing sold makes 
performance of the seller to his obligation impossible. Damages then will be granted as 
an alternative remedy (377)
2.3.2-Warranty against dispossession
If the purchaser is disturbed by a third party under a legal right, he is deemed to 
have been deprived of his right of possession, for the thing is considered to have been 
p o s se s se d /^ )  Dispossession of the thing sold can be partial,'(379) or total,'(380) 
whether the seller is bona f id e s p * ^  or mala fides.(382) where dispossession is 
total, and the seller is bona fides, he is obliged to refund the price to the purchaser, 
regardless of the value of the thing at the time of d i s p o s s e s s i o n / ^ )  The purchaser 
may also claim the profits which would accrued to him from the goods but for the 
dispossession,'(384) Also, any sums spent by the purchaser to enhance the value of the
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goods/385) may be claimed. If the seller is mala fides, the buyer is entitled to claim 
any increase in the value of the thing s o l d / 3 8 6 )  He may claim compensation for loss 
sustained and profit missed as a result of the d i s p o s s e s s i o n / 3 8 7 )
If dispossession is partial, or the thing is encumbered with a charge without the 
purchaser's knowledge at the time of the contract, the purchaser is entitled to rescind 
the c o n t r a c t / 3 8 8 )  However, if the purchaser has chosen to keep the thing sold , he is 
entitled to claim damages in respect of loss he has sustained as a result of 
dispossession/38 9 )
It is questionable whether specific performance can be granted, if the seller has 
committed a breach to his obligation of warranty against dispossession. The seller has 
no right to raise any claim against the aggrieved purchaser. On the contrary, it is the 
purchaser who has the right to claim against the seller for breach of w a r r a n t y / 3 9 0 )  o r  
to oppose the third party in his claim to the thing s o l d / 3 9 1 )  The seller is bound to take 
action to oppose the third party's claim and if he fails he will be deemed to be in breach 
of contract to the purchaser,who is entitled either to rescind the c o n t r a c t / 3 9 2 )  o r  t 0  
keep the remaining of the goods and claim d a m a g e s / 3 9 3 )
The seller has no right to insist that the buyer performs his obligations, by virtue of 
the concept of the principle of "Exceptio non adimpleti contractus".
There are cases of disspossession to which the warranty does not apply. For 
instance, where the seller is not informed by the buyer that there is action of 
dispossession against the goods sold by a third p a r t y / 3 9 4 )  or where the buyer has 
delivered the goods sold to the third party without raising any action of dispossession 
against h i m / 3 9 5 )  or dispossession has been proved by recognition of the buyer 
h i m s e l f / 3 9 6 ) or> when the seller manages to prove, that dispossession of the thing sold 
by reason of the buyer's recognition, is invalid, even if the seller has been informed by 
the buyer to stand with him in his a c t i o n / 3 9 7 )  or #  the sener h a s  proved that 
dispossession of the thing sold by athird party has taken place as a result of the buyer 
gross default, or fraudulent m is r e p r e s e n t a t i o n / 3 9 8 )
In such cases the seller retain the full right of specific performance against the
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purchaser.
2.4-Warrantv against defects
To pursue a claim for a defect in the goods the purchaser must inform the seller of 
the defect within a reasonable time of inspecting the goods/399) The purchaser may 
then seek rescission, or retain the goods and claim damages in accordance with Article 
558 (1) of the Iraqi Civil Code/400)
Further questions may arise, First; is the purchaser entitled, to require the seller to 
repair the defective goods, and where he refuses to do so repair or change them at the 
seller's expenses? Secondly; is the seller entitled to the remedy of specific performance, 
where he has delivered defective goods?
On the first issue, the opinion of Iraqi scholars differ. On the one hand, the 
purchaser is entitled to do so according to the general rules of the theory of 
obligation/401) On the other hand, the purchaser cannot oblige the seller to repair or 
to change the defective part at his e x p e n s e / 4 0 2 )
Nevertheless, it is thought, that the buyer is entitled to order the seller to repair or to 
change the defective part of the thing sold for the following reasons:
1-According to the general rule of specific performance in Article 246 (1) of Iraqi 
Civil Code, the seller must perform his obligation specifically if such performance is 
possible. Thus, if repairing or changing the defective part is possible, the seller must 
do so.
2-If the seller refuses to perform such an obligation, Article 250 of Iraqi Civil 
Code, permits the buyer to do so at the seller's expenses, with or without the court's 
permission.
3-To say that the seller is not obliged to do so, conflicts with the general rule of 
Iraqi civil law, which considers performing the obligation specifically by the debtor is 
the main and primary remedy.
On the second issue, the seller is deprived of his right to the remedy if he has
124
delivered defective goods, as he is in breach of his obligation.
Comment
1-The seller has no right to specific performance in Iraqi civil law if he commits a 
breach to one of his obligations. He may be obliged to perform specifically.
2-The seller in Iraqi civil law may face the rule of "Exceptio non aimpleti 
contractus" if he breaches his obligation, and claims specific performance thereafter. 
He cannot obtain specific performance in such a case against the purchaser.
3-In Scots law, the seller is not entitled to the remedy of specific implement, in any 
case, even if the buyer's refusal to take delivery of the goods sold is not legally 
justified.
CONCLUSION
1-Granting specific implement in both systems is a legal remedy subject to certain 
conditions. The remedy is granted by virtue of law, therefore, the circumstances of 
pretium affectionis and uniqueness should not play any role in Scots law and, 
afortiori, in Iraqi civil law. These two matters must be ignored, as they are alien to the 
nature and the concept of specific implement in Scots law.
2-Refusing the remedy of specific implement in both systems depends on the 
court's discretion towards examining the defenses and the equitable grounds as well as 
the grounds in law. Thus, to refuse the remedy of specific implement the court must 
examine, by using its wide discretionary power, the surrounding circumstances of 
impossibility, hardship, breach of contract by the contracting party, and 
unenforceability of a decree of specific implement in every single case.
3-Breach of contract by one contracting party is a bar to specific implement in both 
systems. Furthermore, breach by one party gives the other party the right to insist on 
the remedy, except the case of the seller in Scots law, for whom the remedy does not 
exist.
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CHAPTER THREE 
BY OR AGAINST WHOM SPECIFIC IMPLEMENT IS
GRANTED
Introduction
A claim for the remedy of specific implement is raised against the party in breach. 
Each contracting party is supposed to perform his obligation towards the other. If  he 
refuses to do so, he may be compelled to perform specifically what he has undertaken. 
However, the case is not always as simple as that, for the seller or the purchaser may, 
sometimes, become insolvent or bankrupt, or he may assign his right to another 
person. Thus, to consider the possibility of granting the remedy of specific implement 
by or against the contracting party, certain categories of persons will be considered, 
namely:
1-The purchaser.
2-The seller.
3-The bankrupt or insolvent.
4-The assignor and assignee.
Section OnerGranting specific implement bv or against the purchaser
A purchaser to a contract for sale of goods is subject to perform his obligations 
towards the seller to obtain what he has contracted for. The remedy is restricted, in that 
it is granted only to the purchaser. Furthermore, the purchaser’s remedy of specific 
implement in Scots law is restricted to the case when the seller has refused to deliver the 
goods.
In Iraqi civil law the remedy is open to the seller and the buyer whenever the 
contracting party is in breach to his obligation. Therefore, granting the remedy of 
specific implement by or against the purchaser will be dealt with in Scots and Iraqi 
systems respectively as follows:
Sub-Section: 1-The purchaser in Scots law
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Generally, the purchaser's remedies depend on the nature of the seller's failure to 
perform his ob liga tion /*) Damages can cover the whole area of the purchaser's 
remedies, whether the seller has failed to provide goods to the buyer,(2)or has 
delivered them but they are disconform to the contract/^) To what extent, is specific 
implement granted by or against the refusing purchaser?
The purchaser may insist on having the obligation specifically performed under 
Sec. 52 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979, when certain grounds e x i s t , p r o v i d i n g  no 
exceptional circumstances or equitable grounds or grounds of law stand against 
granting the rem edy/^) The purchaser has the right to specific implement,(^) but on 
assumption that he has fulfilled his whole obligations towards the seller, for fulfilment 
by one contracting party to his undertaking is dependant upon fulfilment by the 
other,'(7) and it has been noticed that "the duty to begin lies with the b u y e r " . T h u s ,  
"Fulfilment by the buyer of his undertaking to tender the price is a condition suspensive 
of the seller's undertaking to let him into possession".(9) Erskine laid down,(10) that 
"No party in a mutual contract, where the obligation of the parties are the causes of one 
another, can demand performance from the other if he himself either cannot or will not 
perform the counterparts, for the mutual obligations are considered as conditional".
In Turnbull v. Mclean & co.(H ) when The Lord Justice-Clerk declared that 
"1st,that the stipulation on either side are the counterparts and the consideration given 
for each other; 2nd, that a failure to perform any material or substantial part of the 
contract on the part of one will prevent him from suing the other for performance ; 3rd; 
that, where one party has refused or failed to perform his part of the contract in any 
material respect the other is entitled either to insist for implement, claiming damages for 
the breach or to rescind the contract altogether, except so far as it has been performed
 all the conditions of a mutual contract are dependent on their counterparts, as a
general rule, when they are of the substance of or material to the subject-matter of the 
contract itself'.
Furthermore, Lord B e n h o l m e / ^ )  has pointed out, that the defaulter cannot refuse
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to fulfil his part of the contract and insist on the other party performing his part. If  the 
purchaser intends to have his contract specifically performed, he must give the seller no 
opportunity to raise any claim against him. Thus, the purchaser is not entitled to insist 
on specific implement, if he has caused the delay of delivery by refusing without any 
legal reason to pay the price, as the seller is entitled to retain the goods, unless the 
obligation of payment has been fulfiled by the b u y e r / ^ )
When the seller fails to deliver goods conforming with the contract of sale, the 
purchaser is entitled to reject th em /^ ) There is no right in Scots law for the buyer to 
reject the goods and apply to the court to obtain goods which conform to the contract. 
Nevertheless, examining the case may lead to the conclusion that the buyer's right to 
specific implement is limited to the case of failure to deliver the goods according to Sec. 
52 of Sale of Goods Act 1979. Any other breach by the seller to one of his other 
obligations, does not give the purchaser the right of specific implement. It gives him 
the right to reject the g o o d s / ^ )  or to rescind the c o n t r a c t / ^ )  or repetition of the price 
if p a i d / 17) He is, also, entitled to claim d a m a g e s /^ )  Furthermore, the purchaser is 
not deprived of the remedy of retaining the goods and claiming damages if he has tried 
to reject them by an abortive a t t e m p t / ^ )  The other reason for not allowing the buyer 
to insist on specific implement when rejecting the goods which disconform to the 
contract is that, transferring of the property requires that the goods must be specific or 
ascertained. Thus, to give the buyer alternative goods, means another contract is 
concluded, i.e. "another agreement upon the goods which represent the subject-matter 
of the contract". The goods cannot be substituted by another, unless the two 
contracting parties agreed upon them even if the goods are of the same nature and of the 
same quality.
To take another case, suppose the seller who contracts to sell goods to a purchaser, 
but before completion of the contract, the seller transfers the property of those goods to 
another purchaser who is "bona fid e " /^O) Who is entitled to compel the seller, in 
such a case and to perform his obligation of delivery, i.e. "specific implement"?
The seller, according to the Common law is obliged to deliver the goods to the
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purchaser and is bound not to involve the goods in any right which a third party may 
claim. (21) He is also obliged to warranty against eviction, whether totally or 
partially.(22) Nevertheless, the purchaser "in rapid intercourse of trade", "is not 
allowed to stop the bargain on pretence of want of title or on more doubt as to the 
possibility of challenge".'(23) He "the buyer" on the other hand, "cannot be obliged to 
accept and pay for goods concerning the title to which there is dispute ".(24) "He has 
not contracted to buy a litigation and the buyer is entitled to retain the price until either 
the seller clears the title or by his failure so to do justifies the buyer in holding the 
contract as repudiated".(25) Once the action is raised against the purchaser,(26) no 
litigation is needed, but the buyer in this case is not compelled to leave the decision to 
defend the seller's whim and the buyer's action for relief may be brought instantly .(22) 
In addition, Sec. 12 (3) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979, provides for, "an implied 
warranty that the goods shall be free from any charge or encumbrances in favour of any 
third party, not declared or known to the buyer before or at the time when the contract 
is made". So, a breach of such a warranty gives the buyer two options, either to 
repudiate the contract or to claim damages. Consequently, in the said question, it is 
thought, that one of the two purchasers has the right to specific implement against the 
seller, and the remedy should be given to the former contracting buyer, i.e. "whose 
contract concluded first". While the later is entitled to be refunded his money at the 
price which he already has paid, and to damages. If, however, the charge or 
encumbrance is not discovered until after possessing and using goods, the buyer's 
remedy is restricted to damages.(28)
The other issue is whether specific implement is ordered against the purchaser to 
perform his obligation towards the aggrieved seller. It seems that there is no 
opportunity for the seller to order the refusing purchaser to perform his obligation 
s p e c i f i c a l l y . ^ )  i f  the purchaser delayed taking delivery of the goods sold without 
legal justification, or he has refused to take delivery or has refrained from paying the 
price, he is deemed to have committed breach of his contract. He may be ordered to
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pay damages to the aggrieved seller, but cannot be ordered to perform his obligation 
specifically for the following reasons:
1-Specific implement is confined to the purchaser alone.^O) However, the seller, 
according to Sec. 49 (1) of Sale of Goods Act 1979 may have an action for money 
price against the refusing purchaser, but not specific implement.
2-The seller's right is restricted to in damages, or in rescinding the contract or 
retaining the goods, in addition to his right to raise an action for the price of the goods 
whenever the purchaser is in breach to his obligations.
3-The seller cannot compel the purchaser to perform his obligation specifically, 
because the obligation is to pay money and such an obligation has special consideration 
in Scots law P l)
Finally, whatever is the purchaser's failure to perform his obligation towards the 
seller, the seller is not given the right to compel him to perform that obligation 
specifically.
Sub-Section:2:The purchaser in Iraqi civil law
The buyer in Iraqi civil law has the right to enforce specific performance against the 
seller whenever it is possible, according to Article 246 (1) of Iraqi Civil Code. Thus, 
when the seller fails short of fulfilling his obligations, such as, non-delivery of the 
goods sold, or delivery has been fulfilled but in a different place,1(32) 0r the goods have 
been delivered but in a different condition,1@3) he " the seller1' is considered to be in 
breach of his obligations towards the purchaser. The purchaser can ask either for 
specific performance if it is possible, or rescission of the contract with d a m a g e s . ^ )
The purchaser who insists on having the contract specifically performed, should 
and must perform his obligation and should not give the seller the opportunity to raise 
any claim or defense against him.
The purchaser has the right to compel the seller to perform his obligation 
specifically whenever the seller commits a breach of his obligations. Thus, the
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purchaser is entitled to enforce the seller performing his obligation specifically, when 
the seller delivers the goods at the time agreed upon and in a fixed place, although the 
goods are d e f e c t i v e , ^ )  or the purchaser has been disturbed whether legally,1@6) or 
materially,'@7) by the seller h i m s e l f , ^  8 )  or by a third party.'( 3 9 )  Furthermore when 
the seller commits a breach to his obligation of warranty against dispossession, the 
purchaser's first act is to claim that the seller has committed a breach to his obligation, 
i.e."the obligation of refraining from doing something".1(40) His "the seller's" claim 
should be rejected. Thus, the obligation of "refraining from disturbing the buyer" must 
be performed specifically in such a c a s e . (41) In addition the seller must warrant the 
buyer in situation in which disturbance has occurred because of the action of a third 
party, according to Article (549) of Civil Code. The seller's obligation in such a case is 
to do something, which is to protect the purchaser against any disturbance of that kind. 
If, for instance, the third party has claimed that he has a right over the goods, or if the 
thing sold is still in the third party's possession, or the third party claims title over the 
goods, the seller must join the purchaser in his action of revendication, as a co- 
d e f e n d a n t . ^ )  if the seller has obtained a judgment in favour of the purchaser, he is 
deemed to have fulfilled his obligation s p e c i f i c a l l y . ^ )  However, if the third party has 
proved his claim over the thing sold and succeeded to obtain a court's decision 
confirming his claim, the seller is no longer able to comply with his obligation, because 
it becomes impossible, and the only remedy that the buyer can obtain, is dam ages.^) 
Nevertheless, the purchaser’s right to specific performance against the seller who is in 
breach to his obligation of warranty against dispossession may fail, by virtue of certain 
circumstances.^)
The seller, may deliver goods disconform to the contract. Nevertheless, it is 
questionable whether the purchaser is entitled to force the seller to specific 
performance, or to substitute other goods for the defective ones, or to repair the defect, 
or to be confined only to damages.
The seller, on one hand, is under obligation of warranty against d e f e c t s . ^ )  The 
purchaser, on the other hand, is obliged to give notice to the seller upon discovery of
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the defects.1(^7) He may then raise an action of warranty against defects by which the 
buyer has the option either of rescinding the contract and recovering the price, or 
keeping the defective g o o d s , (48) without reducing the price. The purchaser, as has 
already been considered,1(49) has the right to insist on repairing the defective goods at 
the seller's expense. What is the solution if the buyer insists on a substitution for the 
defective goods? As long as the purchaser is entitled to compel the seller to do so at 
his expense, it may be argued that, substitution of part of the goods is permissible and 
the seller should be compelled to do so. It seems doubtful, however, that a substitution 
of the whole goods may be made, because the goods sold are agreed upon by the 
contracting parties as an object to the sale contract. Thus, to substitute these goods by 
others needs to be agreed upon, and that obviously means concluding another contract 
of sale with a different object (goods) and by different agreement. The above two 
outcomes can be achieved if the contracting parties have agreed upon them.(50) 
Subsequently, without an agreement by the two contracting parties, the buyer is not 
entitled to substitute the defective goods as a whole, for the purchaser may find the 
solution in the option that has been given to him under Article 558 (1) of the Civil Code
The seller should transfer the title of the goods sold to the purchaser, but what if the 
seller has transferred the title to a third party? Who has the right to insist on the seller 
transferring the title and delivering the goods thereafter?
It has been established that the first purchaser is preferable and has a prior claim to 
the title of the goods sold, even if they have not yet been delivered to him .(51) 
However, there is an exceptional rule. It says that "who buys in a good faith a specific 
or ascertained movable, and has taken delivery of it, becomes the owner of that 
m o v a b l e " . ^ )  Thus, if the goods have been delivered to the third party who is bona  
f id e , he is then deemed to have obtained legal possession to the goods. Therefore no 
action can be brought against him. However, if  he has not yet taken delivery of the 
goods, the first purchaser is the contracting party who may insist on having the goods 
delivered to him, for any action is brought against the seller or any claim against the
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thing sold, renders the third party as mala fid e  party. The third party may insist on 
specific performance, as long as, he is bona fid e . The moment he knows that the 
goods are involved in another contract he is no longer bona fid e  third party, and he 
cannot enjoy the protection of the said rule. Consequently, the first purchaser has the 
right of specific performance against the seller, so long as the goods have not been 
delivered to the bona fid e  third party. Otherwise he cannot insist on having specific 
performance. He may have damages if they are due.
The purchaser is entitled to have the remedy of specific performance, unless he has 
contributed by his own fault to the breach of the contract,'(53) or he himself is the 
reason for such a breach by refusing to perform, for instance, one of his obligations 
towards the seller. The purchaser in such a case may be subject to be enforced to
specific perform ance.^)
The purchaser is thus required to perform his obligation specifically whenever 
granting specific performance is feasible, to the same degree as the seller is subject to 
perform his obligation specifically. The purchaser is a debtor as regards his obligations 
towards the seller, and he may be compelled to perform specifically in accordance with 
Article 246 (1) of Iraqi Civil Code.
Thus the Iraqi Civil Code treats sellers and purchasers alike as entitled to specific 
performance, and is not restricted to the purchaser.
Comment
1-The purchaser’s right of specific implement in Scots law is restricted to the case 
of non-delivery of specific or ascertained goods. He is not entitled to obtain specific 
implement where there is another breach to the contract, such as delivery of defective 
goods, or warranty against disturbance or dispossession of the goods sold etc.
In Iraqi civil law the case of specific performance is different and it is much widder, 
for the purchaser is entitled to the remedy of specific performance whenever the seller is 
in breach of his obligations towards the purchaser. It is a more available remedy, for
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specific performance is granted whenever performance of the obligation is possible. 
Specific performance is applicable even if the seller is obliged to refrain from doing 
something such as warranty against enjoyment or dispossesssion.
2-The laws of both countries are at one on the point that each purchaser should 
perform all his obligations, under the contract before claiming specific implement, or at 
least he should show his readiness and willingness to perform, for if the seller has the 
chance to raise any claim against the buyer, he, "the buyer", is not entitled to have 
specific implement, unless he responds to the seller's claim, in accordance with the mle 
of "Exceptio non adimpleti contractus"
3-In Scots law the purchaser, where the goods are defective, is entitled either to 
reiject them with damages or to retain them and claim damages. Also, the repair of the 
goods may be ordered, without prejudice to the purchaser's right of damages.
The same remedy is available in Iraqi civil law, although, to oblige the seller to 
repair the goods at his expense, is regarded as specific performance because he is 
deemed to have committed breach to his ibligation of warranty against defects. To 
substitute the goods however, is not to be considered as one of the consequences of the 
obligation of delivering goods conform to the contract.
4-Granting a purchaser the remedy of specific implement in Scotland does not 
reflect the fact of the principles of mutual obligations, i.e., "does not give rise to the 
equality between the two contracting parties "the seller and purchaser" in the positive 
side of the mutual obligations mles. It does give rise to the equality between the seller 
and the buyer in the negative side, for instance, "if the purchaser refuses to pay the 
price the seller will not deliver the goods to him, but, the purchaser is entitled to enforce 
the seller to deliver him the goods when he performs all his obligations towards the 
seller, however the seller is not entitled to oblige him to take delivery". That is an 
unjust and unfair solution. It seems that the purchaser is superior to the seller although 
the law treats the remedy of specific implement as an ordinary legal remedy to the 
aggrieved p a r ty ,(55) and it is a matter of right to him.(56)
In Iraqi civil law the case is different. The seller and the purchaser are treated
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equally towards granting specific performance by or against each other. The purchaser 
is entitled to have his right specifically performed. In turn he is enforced to do so when 
he is in breach of his obligation.
Section Two: Granting specific implement bv or against the seller
Specific implement may be granted against the seller, but not in his favour in Scots 
law, unlike the seller in Iraqi civil law, who enjoys full right to the remedy of specific 
performance. The Scots seller of goods is deprived of the remedy of specific 
implement whatever the breach of the contract by the purchaser. Thus, the seller’s case 
is not recognised as important case, unlike the case in Iraqi civil law. However, the 
seller's case will be considered in Scots and Iraqi laws respectively as follows:
Sub-Section 1: The seller in Scots law
Specific implement is a remedy granted to the aggrieved party.(67) it is an ordinary 
legal remedy.(58) However, in the sale of goods contract, it is open to one particular 
party, which is the p u r c h a s e r . ^ )  The seller, has no right to claim such a remedy 
whatever his problem is, however controversial the case may be. The seller's remedy 
arises where there is wrongful refusal by the the purchaser to accept the goods,(60) or 
when he fails to pay the price of the goods sold.(61) The seller may maintain an action 
of d a m a g e s . ( 6 2 )  Also, repudiation would be justified, then resale of the article 
"preferably under a warrant from the Sheriff" .(6 3 )  ft remains as unsolved, why the 
seller cannot compel the purchaser who has wrongfully refused to take delivery of the 
goods sold which are conform to the contract of sale. Nevertheless, a Scots scholars 
stated once that, "If the goods are conform to contract, theoretically whatever he does, 
in fact the buyer is bound to accept them".(64) in practice, however, it is submitted 
that, the purchaser is not bound to do so, for the following reasons:
1-Section 50 of Sale of Goods Act 1979, provides; that an action for damages may 
be maintained.
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2-Enforcing the buyer to accept the goods means ordering him to perform 
specifically his obligation in favour of the seller, and there is no support among the 
Scots scholars so far for the argument that the seller is entitled to the remedy of specific 
implement. The seller, unless barred by his fault, is entitled to maintain an action 
against the purchaser for the price .(65) Furthermore, if the buyer fails to pay the 
money price where the property has passed and the goods have been accepted, the 
seller's remedy is an action for the price by virtue of Sec. 49 (1) of Sale of Goods Act 
1979. Also, he may claim interest under Sec. 49 (3) of Sale of Goods Act 1979.
It is questionable whether such an action against the buyer to perform his obligation 
of payment, is specific implement. It was stated,(66) that "Because the buyer’s 
obligation is to pay money it is seldom the seller will be entitled to adecree ad factum 
prestandum, as a rule the sole remedy of a creditor in money obligation is to enforce 
payment by diligence". Also, in White & Carter v. Me Gregor.(67) Lord Keith of 
Avonholm stated, "They , the courts, will merely give damages for failure to take 
delivery. Nor will they give a decree ad factum praestandum of payment of money". 
Further, the action for specific implement is restricted to the case of refusing to deliver 
specific or ascertained goods, and therefore no other case can be included even if the 
obligation is to pay money price. Nevertheless, the order of payment might be a 
decree ad factum praestandum "if the buyer avails himself of his alternative remedy 
under Sec. 11 (2) of Sale of Goods Act 1979, by retaining the goods and claiming an 
abatement of the price by way of compensation and the seller brings an action for the 
price, the court may order the buyer to consign the price. Such an order is a decree ad 
factum praestandum enforceable by imprisonment".^)
The seller's right to specific implement is inapplicable, because money debt is 
enforceable by d i l i g e n c e . ( 6 9 )  Nevertheless, if the debtor's obligation is to do a specific 
act, such as to execute deed or to consign money, the court, it was said, "will decern 
for specific implement and this may be enforced by imprisonment".^) Nevertheless, 
a decree for payment of the debt itself cannot be followed by imprisonment of the
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debtor.^1) it is true that the result of the decision of Mackenzie v. Balemo paper Co. 
,(72) »was not a decree for payment, but an order to lodge the money in court until it 
was seen if any debt was due and was therefore a decree ad factum praestandum". 
Consequently, it submitted that there are many reasons behind depriving the seller of 
specific implement, namely:
1-According to the Sale of Goods Act 1979, Sec. 52 provides, that,"In any action
for breach of contract to deliver specific or ascertained goods ". Thus, the Act
support the buyer in maintaining an action if the seller fails to deliver the goods.
2-Possibly, the main reason for preventing the seller of his right of specific 
implement is that the seller's right in obtaining the money price as a debt, is secured by 
diligence. Therefore he does not need to raise an action for specific implement because 
the same result will be reached.
3-According to Sec. 49 (1) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 the seller has the 
alternative to specific implement which is maintaining an action,1(^ a g a in s t the 
purchaser for the price of the goods sold, because "where the goods have been already 
delivered, the seller may have a personal action or may claim as a personal creditor for 
the price, and take his dividend along with the other creditors".^) Such an action it 
was said, "is only competent if the price as money debt is persently due and payable
under the contract".^)
4-Despite Sec. 52 (4) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979, which gives specific 
implement flexibility and freedom to avoid the influence of English law of specific 
performance, it seems that Scots law of specific implement remains under the English 
influence, for the seller's position is affected by English law of specific performance. 
It is doubtful whether depriving the seller of the right of specific implement in the case 
of a wrongfully refusing buyer to accept the goods sold or to take delivery of them is 
justified in a law grants specific implement as a matter of legal right to the aggrieved 
party.
It must be submitted that in this respect Scots law is inconsistent with the concept 
and the nature of the specific implement, for the following reasons:
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1-To say that the remedy of specific implement is granted as a matter of legal right 
to the aggrieved party, then to deprive the seller who is considered an aggrieved party 
in many circumstacnes, conflicts with the definition and the nature of the remedy.
2-Every contracting party should have the benefit of using the remedy against the 
party in breach within the circumstances, since the aggrieved party has a legal right to 
apply for it.(76)
3-Depriving the seller of the right to specific implement in the case of payment of 
the price may be justified by the fact that the seller's right is secured by diligence. 
However, what if the obligation, is to accept the goods or to take delivery of them?
Granting damages to the seller in such a case is not a fair solution. He should be 
permitted to have the right to compel the refusing buyer to perform his obligation 
specifically by accepting the goods.
Sub-Section 2: The seller in Iraqi civil law
The seller's right of specific performance is secured by the law in Article 246 (1) of 
Civil Code, for the contract of sale arranges mutual obligations upon the contracting 
parties. Where the purchaser refuses to pay the price the seller is empowered to obtain 
his right by using many legal methods in accordance with the civil law.(77) One of 
these methods is specific performance. The seller has the right to enforce the purchaser 
to perform his obligation of payment of the price specifically by raising an action 
against him to obtain judgment, ordering him, "the buyer", to pay the price.^8) The 
same can be done in the case of refusing to take delivery of the goods sold without any 
legal r e a s o n . (79) The seller, who intends to obtain specific performance, should 
perform all his obligations, and must not give the buyer any opportunity to raise any 
claim or defense against him, for that gives the buyer the right to have specific 
performance against him, or to rescind the contract.^®)
The seller is entitled to enforce the purchaser performing his obligation of payment 
of the price specifically, unless there are certain circumstances stand against such
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performance, namely:
First:-Legal Constraints
1-If the price is not payable/** 1) the seller cannot claim rescission of the 
c o n t r a c t / 8 2 )  and, a fortiori, cannot insist on having specific performance.
2-Unless the seller fulfils his part of the contract, he cannot insist on the purchaer 
to perform specifically, according to the principle of "Exceptionon adimpleti 
contractus"
3-When the thing sold was destroyed by reason of the seller's fault before delivery, 
the purchaser has the right to demand damages for losses he has s u f f e r e d / 8 3 )  The 
seller is not entitled to the right of specific performance, for he should be held liable to 
compensate the aggrieved purchaser.
4-Refusing to transfer the title of the thing sold, where the object is described only 
as specie, gives the buyer the right to insist on the seller to individualize the thing
so ld /8^ )
5-Where a claim is brought by a third party against the thing sold.
All the above circumstances can be regarded as a breach by the seller to one of the 
obligations, unless the price is not payable, and as has already been e x a m i n e d / 8 5 )  that 
may do two things, first: it may deprive him of insisting on having specific 
performance. And; secondly: it may give the purchaser the right to enforce the seller to 
perform his obligation specifically.
The seller's right of specific performance to obtain the price is secured, by virtue of 
the law, providing there are no legal constraints against it. When the purchaser 
becomes the owner of the thing sold, the seller enjoys a privilege over the sold article, 
where by he can obtain his right prior to the purchaser's other c r e d i t o r s / 8 6 )  according 
to Article 1 3 7  ( 1 )  of Iraqi Civil Code which provides; ’’Sums due to the seller of a 
movable for a price and accessories are secured by a privilege over the movable sold. 
This privilege is enforcable as long as the movable sold preserves its identity, subject to
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the rights acquired in good faith by a third party and subject to the special provisions 
applicabble in commercial matters".
Secondlv:Phvsical Constraints: (reasons bevond the seller’s control).
1 -Force maieure:when the thing sold is partially destroyed before delivery, by 
force majeure, the buyer has the option either to rescind the contract or to uphold the 
sale at a reduced p r i c e / 8 7 )  Neither specific performance nor damages can be claimed 
by the buyer, for destruction of the goods does not occur by the seller's fault.
Specific performance can be ordered, where the purchaser chooses to uphold the 
sale at a reduced price. Thus, every party should perform the obligations he has 
undertaken towards the other party. If the buyer has chosen to rescind the contract, 
specific performance no longer can be granted.
If the sold thing is entirely destroyed before delivery by force majeure, the seller is 
held liable. The sale will be revoked and the buyer will recover the price which he has 
already p a i d / 8 8 )  Subsequently, no specific performance can be ordered, because 
performance has become impossible. Nevertheless, specific performance may be 
granted in favour of the seller despite the destruction of the goods by force majeure 
whether totally or partially in the following cases
1-If the seller served formal summons on the purchaser to take delivery of the 
goods sold, but he has refused to do so. He, "the buyer", is liable for any destruction 
to the thing s o l d / 8 9 )  He is subject to be ordered to pay the price to the seller.
2-The two contracting parties may agree that, the risk lies with the p u r c h a s e r / 9 0 )
3-If the purchaser refuses to pay the price, the seller is entitled to retain the thing 
sold. Any destruction to the thing sold during the time of retention, lies with the buyer, 
unless of course the destruction has occurred by reason of the seller’s f a u l t / 9 1 )
4-If the purchaser has taken delivery of the goods before payment of the price, 
without the seller's permission, any destruction which occurs lies with the b u y e r / 9 2 )  
The seller in such a case is not deprived of his right to enforce the buyer to pay the price 
of the thing sold.
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2-Impossibilitv of performing the obligation
As has already been c o n s i d e r e d , ^ )  impossibility of performing any obligation 
stands as a bar, against granting specific performance. It is one of the substantial 
exceptional grounds for refusing the remedy of specific performance. An obligation is 
extinguished if the debtor proves that its performance has become impossible by reason 
beyond his conrtrol.^^ Nevertheless, the obligation to pay money price cannot be 
rendered impossible.1(95) Thus, the purchaser is always subject to perform his 
obligation specifically.1(96) The purchaser's other obligation is to take delivery of the 
goods sold at the time and in the place agreed u p o n . ( 9 7 )
The buyer may refrain from taking delivery of the goods sold. To what extent can 
the seller enforce him to take delivery of the goods?
The seller as every other creditor in Iraqi civil law, has the option of either insisting 
on specific performance, or asking for rescission of the contract under the general 
principles of obligations. He is also entitled to obtain damages. Thus, the seller is 
entitled to apply to the court to force the purchaser to take delivery of the goods sold. 
He may then deposit the thing sold in a certain place at the purchaser's expense and 
under his liability, providing the purchaser should be notified, according to Article 385 
(1) of Civil Code. Deposit of the goods in such a case is regarded as equivalent to 
delivery itself when the court decides that deposit is a valid act, in accordance with 
Article 386 (1) of Civil Code.
The seller sometimes puts the thing sold under the buyer's control, so he can have it 
delivered easily. Thereupon, the seller is entitled to have the price paid regardless of, 
whether the purchaser has or has not taken delivery of the thing sold, for the seller is 
deemed to have performed his obligation by enabling the buyer to take delivery. In 
addition, the seller may ask the court to enforce the purchaser to perform his obligation 
specifically. If he refuses to do so, he is subject to pay penalties for every hour or day 
or week he delays taking delivery, in accordance with Article 253 of Civil Code.
The seller has the right of specific performance to the same degree that the
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purchaser has. His right to the remedy is governed by the general theory of the 
o b l i g a t i o n . ^ )  xhe seller must perform all his obligations. Otherwise the rule of 
"Exceptio non adimpleti contractus" will stand against him.
Comment
1-In Scotland, the seller is deprived of having the remedy of specific implement. 
There is no explanation justifying why the seller is not entitled to have such a remedy. 
The seller should be treated equally to the purchaser in having the right of spcific 
implement, where such a remedy is regarded as an ordinary legal remedy. It is 
submitted, that the only main reason for such consequences in Scots law is that Scots 
courts are influenced by the English law's concept of specific performance. It may be 
argued that the seller should be freed from this restriction and should be given the right 
to specific implement, for depriving him of such a remedy reflects inequitable and 
unfair consequences, and makes the buyer superior sometimes, especially in the case of 
refusal to take delivery or refusal to accept the goods wrongfully and without any 
justified reason.
It is true that the seller may insist on damages or he may obtain the money price by 
diligence. He should be entitled to compel a refusing purchaser.to perform his 
obligation. Sec.52(4) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979, encourages and induces the idea 
of treating the seller equally to the buyer, when it provides that "the provision of this 
Section shall be deemed to be supplementary to, and not in derogation of, the right of 
specific implement in Scotland". Why is it then that such a special treatment of specific 
implement in Scotland has not been taken into consideration? Scholars and judges in 
Scotland have treated the seller similarily to the seller in English law, who is deprived 
also of having such a remedy. There no comment can be drawn on the seller in English 
law because it is a natural consequence to the nature of the remedy of specific 
performance, which in England is equitable, exceptional, and discretionary remedy. In 
Scotland, by contrast it is an ordinary legal remedy, and a matter of legal right to the
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aggrieved party. How then can depriving the seller of that remedy comply with the 
rules and principles of that nature? It is inconsistent with the nature of the remedy in 
Scots law. It is submitted, however, that specific implement in general and the position 
of the seller in particular in Scots law should be isolated from the influence of the 
English law of specific performance.
2-The seller in Iraqi civil law is entirely different. The remedy of specific 
performance is connected with the breach of the obligation by the debtor. Granting 
specific performance to the seller is governed by the principle of mutual obligations. 
He is entitled to the remedy providing he has performed all his undertakings towards 
the p u r c h a s e r , ^ )  or he is ready and willing to do so.
3-Specific performance is granted by or against any party to the contract. It is 
guided by the Iraqi Civil Code provision which says the debtor is obliged to perform 
his obligation specifically, when it is possible to do so .( l^ )  The seller may act as a 
creditor and as a debtor at the same time, and he may be subject to perform his 
obligation specifically where there is no legal or equitable bars against ordering him 
doing so. It seems that the grant of specific implement by or against the seller, is much 
wider in Iraqi civil law than in Scots law.
Section Three: Bankruptcy. ,,Insolvencv,,
In Scots law the insolvent debtor generally is not entitled to conclude any 
contractual relationship, because his property vests in his trustee. The trustee holds 
such a power. In Iraqi civil law, insolvency has been considered differentely. The 
insolvent debtor is empowered sometimes to act as a custodian, who may obtain 
specific performance, or may be ordered to do so. Also, the liquidated company may 
be subject to specific implement. The liquidator, is in charge of performing its 
obligations. He has the power to contract and specific implement may be granted by or 
against him. Bankruptcy and liquidation will be examined in Scots and Iraqi laws 
respectively as follows:
Sub-Section l:Bankruptcv in Scots law
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1.1-The Bankrupt
If a party has been adjudicated bankrupt, his property vests in his trustee in 
bankruptcy/!^!) If a debtor is aware of his insolvency, but acts and confers a 
preference on favourite creditors after his funds become inadequate to cover all his 
debts, his act, is fraud.(102)
Insolvency itself, as a general rule, does not end the contractual relationship 
between the insolvent party and the other contracting p a r t y / i t ,  per se, is not 
considered as a breach of contract, nor does it forbid the insolvent party to engage in a 
contractual r e l a t i o n s h i p / uniess it is notorious and refers to abandon the estate to 
creditors intentionally/!^) insolvency of a contracting party is not equivalent to a 
refusal to perform ones obligation. Thus, it does not give the other party to the 
contract the right to rescind it/*06) Nevertheless, insolvency of one contracting party 
may entitle the other to refrain from or to delay, performing the c o n t r a c t /^07)
The other contracting party, in case of insolvency, is entitled to exercise a right of 
r e t e n t i o n / ^08) where a seller has been given a notice by an insolvent purchaser, as 
regards his state of affairs amounting to a declaring of his inability or unwillingness to 
fulfil his part of the obligation/!^) that might be treated as repudiation of the contract 
by the seller, and he then may claim damages, unless the trustee elects to fulfil such 
obligation, within a reasonable time by payment of the price in cash, for instance/! !^) 
It is questionable, whether specific implement is granted by or against the bankrupt 
debtor.
Generally, the insolvent party is not entitled to obtain the remedy of specific 
implement, or to be ordered to perform specifically for following reasons:
1-As soon as an award of sequestration has been made, a trustee is appointed. So, 
during the period between the statutory meeting and the awareness of sequestration, the 
interim trustee has the power to require the debtor to deliver up to him any valuables, 
money, documents, regarding his financial affairs or busines, to deliver up any 
perishable goods, in order to arrange to sell them, and to require the insolvent debtor to
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fulfil any transaction entered into by h im /m )  Subsequently, all transactions and 
business are subject to the interim trustee's supervision. Nevertheless, the insolvent 
debtor may have the right of specific implement or may be ordered to do so, but it 
should be under the approval and the supervision of the trustee.
2-The debtor must follow the instructions and requirements of the interim trustee. 
If he fails to comply with them without any reasonable reason, he is deemed to have 
committed an offence/* Thus, specific implement is applicable, although it must be 
granted under the trustee's approval.
3-Accordingto the general principles of the Common law, the debtor at the moment 
of his insolvency is bound to act with regard to his creditors' i n t e r e s t / * ^ )  Thus 
granting the remedy of specific implement against the insolvent debtor is not for his 
creditors' interest.
4-According to the Bankruptcy Act/1 *4) the whole estate of the debtor vests at the 
date of sequestration in the trustee for the benefit of the creditors. So that, no 
transaction or bargain or act can be made by the insolvent without being approved and 
supervised by the trustee.
As soon as the trustee is appointed, he takes possession of the debtor's estate/*
He is then entitled to take delivery of any title, deeds, or any other documents which 
belong to the debtor/* *6) He is also entitled to carry on any business of the debtor if 
he considers that would be beneficial to do so/**^) In addition, the trustee is 
empowered^ 1 ^  to adopt any contract entered into by the debtor before the date of 
sequestration, if he considers that it would be beneficial to do so, except where there is 
an express or even implied term of the contract precluding him from doing so. It seems 
that the trustee is entitled to insist on having specific implement, as long as the contract 
is entered into by the debtor before the date of sequestration. Further, if the contract for 
the sale was made before commencement of the bankruptcy, the trustee is entitled to the 
remedy of specific implement provided that performance of such an obligation does not 
need the exercise of any skill or discretion which is personal to the bankrupt party
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himself/* *^) If the obligation needs skill which is personal to the bankrupt party, the 
trustee in such a case cannot obtain specific implement by offering to perform the 
obligation by a third party or even by himself/*^0) What if the interest of the creditors 
is to let the debtor perform specifically? i.e., (when the debtor performs the obligation 
specifically they may gain benefit, which strengthens their finaincial situtations). The 
bankrupt party cannot perform his obligation unless the trustee approves it. However, 
it is suggested that the bankrupt is entitled to perform and to insist on having specific 
implement as long as performance of the obligation is in his interest, and the trustee will 
not oppose such performance, for he has the right to adopt voluntary obligations, and 
contracts filtered into by the debtor, provided that he is not barred by the element of 
"delectuspersonsae" /*2*) The trustee may enter into any contract if it is a profitable 
one for the administration of the debtor's estate/*^) Thus, the other contracting party 
is entitled to enfore specific implement against the trustee who is deemed to have 
adopted the contract/*^) if the trustee is deemed to have refrained from adopting the 
contract, it is believed that the specific implement can no longer be enforced against the 
trustee. Thus, he cannot insist on having specific implement, for he has refrained from 
adopting the contract.
The trustee is entitled to deal with the bankrupt's action. Thus, he may raise any 
action on behalf of the bankrupt debtor except actions for personal matters. He may 
raise an action for breach of contract, since the result of winning the case would be to 
enlarge or preserve the bankrupt’s property in favour of the creditors /*24) specific 
implement may be granted if the action is for breach of contract for sale of goods, for 
instance, against the seller who has refused to deliver goods. The trustee, not the 
bankrupt purchaser, should raise the action, for the trustee has the power to deal with 
the bankrupt's estate and action.
Performance of the obligation by one party must be met by the other party's 
performance. The purchaser should pay the price to the seller, who has fulfilled his 
obligation. However, he cannot do so if he is a bankrupt purchaser, for his property 
vests in his trustee. The trustee must pay the price in order to obtain performance of the
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contract.
1.2-The liquidator
The function of a liquidator and of a trustee, is similar, (125) although, there are 
differences between them, for instance, the property of the company in case of 
liquidation is not vested in the liquidator, while the bankrupt's assets and properties 
vest in the permanent trustee/126)
Generally, the liquidator has the power in winding up according to Schedule (4) of 
Insolvency Act 1986. He is subject to the court's supervision in exercising his power, 
such as to pay to the creditors or to make any compromise or arrangment with the 
creditors.(127) it is questionable whether specific implement can be granted by or 
against a liquidator or "a company in liquidation".
No specific implement can be granted by or agianst the company if the contract was 
made after commencement of winding up without the leave of the court. However, if 
the company entered into a contract in good faith in the ordinary course of business, 
can specific implement be granted by or against it.?
It was laid down, that if title has passed to the buyer between the presentation of 
petition and the order of making of winding up, the court shall direct to complete the 
contract by the company, where as the buyer shall be left to damages if no title has 
passed to him/128) Further, in Mersev steel & Iron Co. v. Navlor. Benzon 
&Co..(129) it was held, that if the company entered into a contract, then went into a 
liquidation, such a contract is not determind by the liquidation's commencement, and 
such an obligation remains enforceable by or against the com pany/-^0) The 
liquidator may by an order of the court be able to exercise the following powers, 
provided that, there is no liquidation committee; such as, bring or defend any action in 
the name and on behalf of the c o m p a n y / ^  1) Thus, that action might be an action for 
claiming the remedy of specific implement. However, any disposition of property of 
the company made after commencement of the winding up, is void, unless the court
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decides otherwise. It seems, that the liquidator is entitled to specific implement, but 
only under supervision and leave of the court. He may be ordered to perform the 
obligation specifically on behalf of the company. Granting specific implement by or 
against the company in the case of winding up by the court's order is doubtful without 
leave of the court.
In voluntary winding up, the company should cease of carrying on its business 
since commencement of winding up, except that which may be required for the 
company beneficial winding up/132) Thus, after winding up, any transfer of shares 
without the liquidator permission, is v o i d / 1 3 3 )  Furthermore, the liquidator's power is 
subject to either the court’s sanction or the liquidation committee/1 34) or ^  
extraordinary resolution of the company.1(135) Thus, the liquidator should obtain the 
consent of the above structures when he acts. It is thought therefore, that specific 
implement can be granted by or against the company without the above structures' 
permission, although the liquidator has power to sell any of the company's property 
and to transfer i t  to any person,1(136) without the court's s a n c t i o n / 1 3 7 )  Furthermore, 
he has power to do all acts and execute all d e e d s / 1 3 8 )  without sanction. It can be 
concluded, that the liquidator is entitled to the remedy of specific implement, since he 
has all these powers, especially to sell any of the company's property by public auction 
or private contract.
The liquidator has power to bring or defend any action in the company's name and 
on its behalf/139) so that he may bring an action for specific implement, or he may be 
compelled to do so, bearing in mind the seller cannot insist on having the contract 
specifically performed/140)
1.3-The receiver
The receiver is given powers relating to the company property, by the Insolvency 
Act 1986/1^1) These include the power to sell, feu, hireout, to dispose of the property 
by public roup or private b a r g a i n / 142) in addition, he enjoys the power to bring or
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defend any action on the company's behalf and in its name/143) Furthermore, he has 
the power to contract and to sue or to be sued, for "he is deemed to be an agent of the 
company in relation to its p r o p e r t y " / 1 4 4 )  it is questionable whether specific 
implement can be decreed by or against the company.
In the light of the receiver’s power, it is submitted that specific implement is 
granted. He may be ordered to perform specifically since he has the power to contract 
and to bring or defend actions on behalf of the company and in its name. If a receiver, 
for instance, has bought 100 tons of rice on behalf of the company, but the seller has 
refused to deliver the goods, the reciever, as a contractor or as an agent has certain 
powers, and may bring action on behalf of the company and in its name. He may be 
granted the rermedy of specific implement. If the company is a seller, specific 
implement may be decreed against it, for in Freevale Ltd. v. Metrostore (Holdings) 
Ltd./145) it was stated that the purchaser's right in performing his obligation 
specifically is not affected by the appointment of the receiver after the date of the 
contract, since the equitable interest of the buyer is not destroyed by the receiver's 
appointment. May the receiver be held liable personally in some cases? and, can 
specific implement be ordered by or against him?
The receiver may be held liable personally for any obligation entered into by him 
during the period of performing his task, unless it is stipulated o t h e r w i s e / ^46) g0> 
specific implement may be ordered by or against him within the circumstances of every 
case, although the remedy was refused on the ground that, implement of the obligation 
by the company shall involve expenses for which the receiver might be personally held
liable/147)
Again, Lord Ordinary Stott had no doubt that the receiver is deemed to be the agent 
of the company's act/^48) "They are his own acts and by Sec.17 (2) of the A c t / ^ 49) 
he incurs personal liability on a contract entered into by him in the performance of his 
function" /1 50)
Sub-Section 2:Insolvencv in Iraqi civil law
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2.1-The Insolvent
A debtor whose assets become insufficient to pay his due debts is deemed to be an 
insolvent, There should be apprehension based on reasonable grounds that he will lose 
or hide his property or transfer it to others, otherwise the debtor cannot be judged 
i n s o l v e n t / ^  1) The creditors should apply to the court for interdiction of the debtor, 
who shall not be able to dispose of his property, or to acknowledge of any other debt 
thereafter/*52) ^he insolvent debtor cannot dispose of his property, after the court's 
judgment. Every creditor is entitled to obtain a copy of the court’s decision for 
enforcement and execution of the decree by the Execution Administration O f f i c e / * ^ )  
In addition, a custodian should be appointed to administrate the debtor's property on 
behalf of the creditors and the insolvent debtor himself. The insolvent debtor can be 
appointed as a custodian to look after his assets, unless there is fear of his bad faith or
other good reason/*54)
Issues such as to what extent specific performance can be compelled by or against 
the insolvent debtor, should the insolvent debtor be subject to the supervision of the 
custodian, are fundamental isuess.
As a general rule, the debtor is prevented from acting or disposing of his property, 
whether sale, mortgage, donation,..etc, unless stipulated o t h e r w i s e / * ^ )  However, 
the following cases are exceptions to the above rule.
1-The insolvent debtor is entitled to sell the whole or some of his assets, where the 
majority of the creditors, which represent three quarters of the debt, agree, provided 
that, the price must be appropriated for payment of the debt/^ 6 )  either by paying the 
sum to them directly or to the court’s t r e a s u r y / * ^ )  to be distributed between them.
2-A debtor, with the court's permission, may dispose of his property even without 
his creditor's consent, providing he does so at its normal price and value which should 
be then deposited to be distributed between the c r e d i t o r s / * ^ )  it seems that the debtor 
may be subject to be compelled to perform specifically, or he may be granted the 
remedy
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The contracting party will hesitate to contract with the insolvent party, because the 
creditors of the insolvent debtor are entitled to oppose his act in order to protect the 
debtor’s assets from being disposed of. If, however, the debtor is permitted in the 
manner described above, the other party can enforce the obligation against the debtor 
without any opposition by the creditors. The debtor, consequently, may enforce the 
other contracting party to perform specifically as well, if it is possible. Specific 
performance may be granted by or against the insolvent debtor who is permitted by the 
court to contract, regardless of the creditor's s i t u a t i o n /159)
The custodian
The insolvent debtor, as a general rule, cannot dispose of his property and he is not 
allowed to contract, since he is judged i n s o l v e n t / ! 60) The person who undertakes 
such responsibility is the custodian. He is empowered to act and to dispose of 
property. Nevertheless, the insolvent debtor himself could under some circumstances, 
be appointed as a c u s t o d i a n / ! 61)  or the custodian may be another person, whether one 
of the creditors or a person who is not a party to the contractual relationship. Thus;
1-The custodian is the debtor himself.
2-The custodian is a creditor or a stranger to the contractual relationship.
l:The custodian is the debtor himself
In accordance with Article 171 (1) of Iraqi Civil Code, the debtor, originally is the 
custodian over his property, for he is in a better position than others to administer his 
property for his creditor's benefit and for himself. If the insolvent debtor takes 
responsibility for the custody and administration of his property, it means that he is 
approved by his creditors and by the court to do so. Therefore, every transaction he 
concludes is valid, and consequently, specific performance can be enforced by or 
against him as a normal contracting party.
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2:The custodian is either a creditor or a stranger to the contract
The custodian should be appointed to administer the property on behalf of the 
creditors and the insolvent debtor himself, the custodian in this case being either a 
creditor or a stranger to the contractual relationship. It is questionable whether specific 
performance can be enforced by or against the custodian.
It seems that the custodian may be ordered or granted the remedy, for the following 
reasons:
1-All the debtor’s assets are regarded as confiscated, except certain 
categories/162) After the confiscation, there should be a person responsible for 
administrating the assets until they are divided and distributed between the creditors. If 
the custodian is one of the creditors or a stranger to the contract, he takes responsibility 
for performing the obligations entered into by the insolvent debtor. Thus, specific 
performance may be granted by or against him.
2-As long as the insolvent debtor is not allowed to conclude any contract or to 
dispose of his property, the custodian (163) should take the responsibility of doing 
s o / 1 6 4 )  Thus he, according to his contracts or transactions, is compelled to perform 
specifically, or he is entitled to order the other contracting party to do so.
The insolvent debtor may be either a custodian or a debtor who is deprived of 
disposition of his property and prevented from acting in it. If the debtor is a custodian, 
he is able to conclude contracts and to dispose of his property for the interest of his 
creditors and for himself. Thus, in such a case, he is not acting as an insolvent debtor. 
Therefore, he does not need to act or to dispose of his property under the supervision 
of a custodian, for there is no custodian but himself. Specific performance then is 
granted by or against him. On the other hand, if the custodian is a creditor or a stranger 
to the contractual relationship, the insolvent debtor is not entitled to act or to conclude 
any kind of disposition, unless there is approval either by the c o u r t / 165) or the 
c r e d i t o r s / 166) or by the custodian. The custodian, then is subject to be held liable for 
his transactions and contracts, and therefore specific performance is decreed by or 
against him. The insolvent debtor's act, whether under the supervision of the court, or
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the creditor is regarded, as valid as the custodian's act, because he is permitted to act.
The insolvent debtor sometimes acts when he is not entitled to act. To what extent 
is such an act valid?
Iraqi Civil Code has established a solution for the interest of all parties. The law 
considers the insolvent debtor's acts under no supervision or permission by the court or 
by the creditors, is suspended in the interest of the creditors, who have the power either 
to ratify or to nullify it.(^7) Thus, if the act is ratified by the creditors, the insolvent 
debtor may take full responsibility for his act as a legal act and he may then be 
compelled to perform such act specifically, or he may be granted specific performance. 
If the act is nullified by the creditors, no specific performance can be granted by or 
against the insolvent debtor.
2.2-The Liquidator
The liquidator plays a substantial role in the case of a company in liquidation.(168) 
He, according to the companies law, has many duties to do. He has the power to fulfil 
all the contracts which are concluded by the co m p an y /^ ) Furthermore, according to 
Article 159 (Secondly) of Companies Code, the liquidator is an agent for the company 
within the powers which are given to him during the period of liquidation. He may 
fulfil the obligations and he may act on behalf of the company. Thus, he may be 
granted specific performance, or he may be compelled to do so under the obligation he 
has undertaken on behalf of the company.
The liquidator is subject to the general committee’s supervision, by virtue of Article 
166 of Companies Code. He, is also subject to the registrar's supervision. He should 
report in detail to the registrar concerning the liquidation, the activities, and the 
development of liquidation every three months. The registrar takes responsibility for 
studying and examining these reports to see whether the liquidator acts within his 
powers, and oversees the procedures of these acts. The registrar is entitled to discuss 
with the liquidator every thing concerning the liquidation in accordance with Article 164
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of Companies Code.
It seems that although the liquidator is considered as an agent during the period of 
liquidation, he is restricted to acting under the supervision of the general committee of 
the company or the supervision of the registrar to a certain extent. He is able to fulfil 
the obligations of the company, under Article 161 of Companies Code. Nevertheless, 
the liquidator is not obliged to follow the advice or the supervision of the registrar or 
the general committee of the company, unless he has acted in an unprofitable way or 
has caused damages or losses. The law in such a case has established certain 
restrictions under Articles 158,168 of the Companies Code to protect those who have a 
contractual relationship with the company, whether creditors or members.
Thus, specific performance can be granted by or against such a liquidator on behalf 
of the company in liquidation. Granting or refusing specific performance in such a case 
is based on the general rule of the theory of obligation in performing specifically.^O)
Comment
1-In Scotland the bankrupt party has the right to specific implement, but it should 
be under the supervision of the trustee, whether interim or permanent, for the whole 
estate of a bankrupt party vests in the trustee for the benefit of the creditors. It seems 
that granting specific implement by or against the bankrupt party should be fulfilled 
through the trustee, either by supervising the bankrupt's act or by approving it. 
Therefore, the bankrupt party is restricted in disposing of his property. In Iraqi civil 
law, the case is slightly different and the insolvent debtor enjoys more power in dealing 
with his assets and contracts, and there are circumstances in which the insolvent debtor 
is entitled to act and to dispose of his property. Thus, specific performance can be 
granted by or against the insolvent debtor.
It seems that Iraqi civil law regarding the ability of the insolvent debtor to act and to 
dispose of his assets is more flexible than Scots law. It is tme that both laws appoint a 
person to administer the property and assets of the insolvent debtor and the bankrupt
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person. He is a trustee in Scotland, and a cusodian in Iraqi civil law. In Scots law the 
bankrupt debtor is deprived of any freedom to act on his property, unless the trustee 
approves such an act, even if it is for the benefit of the creditors, whereas, the insolvent 
debtor in Iraqi civil law is entitled to contract and to act in two cases which enrich his 
property and assets for the benefit of his creditors and for himself.
2- In Iraqi civil law the insolvent debtor may be appointed as a custodian over his 
property. That means, he can contract and dispose of his property, for appointing him 
as a custodian reflects the approval of the creditors and the court's permission. It 
seems that the insolvent debtor in such a case has more scope to act with his property. 
That may be more beneficial for all the creditors because the insolvent debtor knows his 
property and the means of exploiting better than any one else.
In Scots law, the case is different, for the bankrupt debtor has no opportunity at all 
to become a trustee. He is always under the supervision of a trustee.
As a general rule, Iraqi civil law concurs with Scots law as regards depriving the 
insolvent debtor of acting or disposing of his property. However both laws are very 
different regarding the opportunity of the insolvent debtor to act or to be appointed as a 
trustee or a custodian. In addition, the two laws are different regarding the details of 
whether the insolvent can act or contract, or can be compelled to perform specifically, 
or to be granted specific perfpormance. Also, they have different stand point 
concerning the ability of the bankrupt debtor to act freely and independently.
Each law is vulnerable to criticism, for in Iraqi civil law, giving the insolvent debtor 
such power to contract and to become a custodian, may make him abuse such power 
and reduce the creditors' chance to obtain their debts. It may encourage the debtor's 
escape from paying, despite the advantages of giving the insolvent debtor such a 
power.
In Scots law, the above risk does not exist and there is no fear of abusing such a 
right or a power, because he is deprived of it. However, depriving the bankrupt of any 
right to his assets and property is too extrem. Scots law treats the insolvent debtor as if 
he does not exist, and thus there is no way to consider his acts or contracts without his
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trustee's supervision and approval.
3-The liquidator in Scots law is subject to the court or the liquidation committee 
supervision in accordance with case of winding up. He may also act without need to be 
supervised by the court. In these different situations, the liquidator is the person who 
should deal with the company's acts. He may be ordered to perform the obligation of 
the company specifically, or he may insist on having specific implement if the company 
is a purchaser. The court plays an essential role in supervising the liquidator. 
However, he may not be supervised sometimes. Thus, whether the liquidator is or is 
not supervised, the consequences are to benefit the company and its creditors.
In Iraqi civil law, the liquidator has the power to fulfil all the obligations of the 
liquidated company, although it is under different supervisions. The liquidator is 
subject to the supervision of the general committee and the registrar. The liquidator is 
regarded as an agent for the company in liquidation.
Section 4: Assignation, i.e.. "A ssignm ent"
A contracting party may assign his right under certain circumstances to another 
party. Specific implement as a matter of right to the aggrieved party may be assigned 
similar to other rights from one party to another, although no one can confer more 
rights than he possesses. Although assignability of specific implement is possible, it is 
affected by certain circumstances in both Scots and Iraqi systems.
The case will be considered in both systems respectively as follows:
Sub-Section 1:Assignation of specific implement in Scots Law
The only person who is affected by an obligaion is the contracting p a r t y / 1 7 1 )  No 
liability can be imposed on or right to be sued on strangers to the contract/172) 
Nevertheless, there are many exceptions to the above general rule, for a third party may 
have a right to compel an obligation under a contract, despite not having any contractual 
right to sue for damages where the performance is d e f e c t i v e / 1 7 3 )  j n  addition, "The 
purchaser of an article acquires no title to sue on a contract which the seller may have
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made in relation to that article, nor is he bound by them"/174) Thus, "...a purchaser 
of movable incurs no liabilities. If he is a sub-purchaser, he is not liable for the price to 
the original seller" .(175) js questionable whether specific implement is assignable.
A person, who is a third party to a contract, may acquire liability if such right and 
liability of the original contracting party can be and has been assigned to h i m / ^ 6 )  "He 
steps into the shoes of and stands in the place of one of the original contracting 
p a r t i e s " / ^ )  Moreover, "a right of action for breach and claim of damages for breach 
are all assignable, even though the contracts which they arise are not assignable" .(178) 
It seems so far that specific implement is an assignable remedy, unless there is 
detectus personae c r e d i t o r / 179) which is applied, according to Lord Kinnear, in Cole 
v. H a n d a s v d e / l ^ O )  "when a person is employed to do work or to perform services 
requiring some degree of skill or experience. And it is therefore to be inferred that he is 
selected for the employment in consequence of his own personal qualification. Such a 
contract is not assignable by him to a third person who may not be competent for the 
work". It was laid down that, if the contract is one for which specific performance 
could have been obtained before assignment, the assignee will be able to obtain specific 
performance after assignm ent/^)
In Scots law, the rules and priciples of assignation lead to the concluion that 
specific implement is assignable, for an assignee is put by the assignation in the 
situation of, or in the place of the cedent. Thus, he will be entitled to sue or to be sued 
as the cedent has b e e n / 1 8 2 )  All claims arises out of the obligation which could have 
been pled against the assignor may face the a s s i g n e e / ^ )  The assignee, subsequently 
may face a claim of specific implement if the contract is for sale of goods, although the 
" assignee is not....necessarily exposed to latent or undisclosed claims which could 
have been made against the cedent. If he takes in good faith, for value and without 
notice of any trust or claim limiting the assignor’s right, he takes free from any latent 
claims affecting the object a s s i g n e d " / ^ )
Specific implement could be a liability on the assignee, in the case of assignation
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from the seller's side. The assignee is ordered to perform what has been assigned to 
him by the assignor, "the seller", for "if.....a contract be assigned by one of the parties, 
the assignee may in general compel the other party to do for his benefit whatever he 
would have been liable to do for the assignor’s benefit,..."/!85) where there is an 
agreement between the contracting parties that the right resulting from the contract is 
unassignable/186) specific implement is considered unassignable. It was stated (187) 
that, even though there is no restriction on assignment of the contract expressly, the 
court can conclude from the contract's nature and the surrounding circumstances that 
the contracting parties have intended that the assignor's obligation should be performed 
personally.
The cedent cannot confer greater right than he himself p o s s e s s e s / 188) and the right 
which is conferred to the assignee is subject to all defences, exceptions and pleas which 
are pleadable by the debtor against the a s s i g n o r / 189) Thus, the asignee obtains what 
the assignor had obtained before assignation. If, for instance, a seller A has sold 100 
cars to a purchaser B. The purchaser B has assigned his right of obtaining the 100 cars 
to a purchaser C. C is entitled to claim specific implement against the seller A directly, 
because the assignee acquires the right to sue if the contract is assigned/190) and the 
law implies that the assignee is conferred every thing necessary by the assignor to make 
the assignation effective/191)
It is questionable whether the third party, such as a sub-contractor or another 
assignee in case of several assignations of one right, is entitled to obtain the remedy of 
specific implement.
The third party is either another assignee or creditor or claimant to the fund or the 
d e b t/192) a  has assigned, for instance, a debt due to him to B. Latter, he has 
assigned the same debt to C. Who is preferable to obtain his right first? The criterion 
in preferring one party to another is the intimation/193) Thus, he who is intimated 
first will carry out the debt and obtain his right/194) Further, the attachment which is 
"prior in date to the intimation, even though it is subsequent to the assignation, will 
prevail over the assignation"/195) When the intimation is prior in date to the
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arrestment, the assignation will be preferred. It seems that the third party who obtains a 
right assigned to him from the assignor is able to enforce it against the debtor/196) 
The problem that the third party may face is the matter of preference between him and 
another party. If he is preferred and obtains the right assigned, he is entitled to seek 
specific implement. In the case of a sub-contractor, for instance, A has contracted with 
B to sell him specific or ascertained goods. Is A entitled to assign his duty of 
performance to another party C? The answer is, yes, unless there is delectus personae 
d e b i t o r i s M ^ l )  or> there is express or implied agreement between the contracting 
parties to the contrary. To what extent can specific implement be compelled by or 
against the sub-contractor?
The contracting party may delegate the performance of the contract to another party, 
and he is entitled to assign his right under the c o n t r a c t /* 98) The contract may also be 
performed by a third party or a sub-contractor, unless there is delectus personae/199) 
If, for instance, the original contracting party’s obligation, is to pay the price, why 
should not the other party agree and accept such payment by a sub-contractor, or a third 
party?
It is submitted, therefore, that there is no reason or bar against ordering the third 
party, or the sub-contractor to perform specifically the obligation which has been 
assigned to him by the assignor. In addition, the sub-contractor may seek for specific 
implement, as long as, he has fulfilled all his obligations towards the other contracting 
party. Furthermore, specific implement is more applicable, for the responsibility of the 
original contractor stands still even though he has delegated his obligation/^00) Thus, 
the two parties, "the original and the sub-contractor", will remain liable against the 
other party who seeks the remedy of specific implement, because "it is not generally 
competent for a party to a contract, whatever its nature may be, to assign it so as to get 
rid of the liabilities he has undertaken. He may be entitled to tender performance by a 
third party, but will remain liable if that third party's performance be defective"/201) 
Therefore, the party bound by the contract must exercise care in choosing the sub­
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contractor, otherwise he will be responsible for any harm resulting from choosing an
unsuitable sub-contractor.^^)
Sub-Section 2:Assignment in Iraqi civil law
A creditor shall have the right to transfer to others the right over debts which are 
owned to him, provided that, there is no stipulation against such transfere, whether by 
law or by an agreement of the two contracting parties, or by the nature of the 
obligation.(203) jn jraqi civil law every obligation is assignable, whether that right is a 
civil or commrecial right.(204) However, there are exceptions to the above rule, by 
virtue of Article 3 6 2  of Iraqi Civil C o d e . ( 2 0 5 )  xhe question arises, whether specific 
performance is granted by or against the assignee?
The assignee replaces the assignor in his right, which is transferred to the assignee 
with all its properties, appurenances and securities. In addition, assignment of a right 
comprises its warranties, such as, sureties, privileges and mortgages, as well as 
interests and instalments that have fallen due.(206) Every obligation is also 
a s s i g n a b l e ,(207) uniess agreed otherwise, or provided by the l a w ,(208) or when the 
nature of the contract stands as a bar against assignment,1(209) or jf tjje creditor 
personally is considered in concluding the o b l i g a t i o n .^  10) if a seller A has assigned 
his contract to B, B is compelled to hold full resposibility of the sale contract towards 
the purchaser. Meanwhile he is entitled to be secured by the assignor who has 
transferred that right to him, for he shall have the contract transferred to him with all its 
properties, appurenances and securities.^*1) The assignee B shall face all defences 
that the debtor of the right assigned is entitled to raise against the assignor at the 
moment the assignment becomes effective against him. Thereupon, the assignee is 
entitled to the remedy of specific performance and he is subject to perform specifically 
if the debtor had such a right in the first place.
It is inconceivable that the assignee should be prevented from securing that right, 
for the general principles of Iraqi civil law give the assignee the right to defend, to
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claim, and to raise an action of specific performance.
Assignment is not effective as against a debtor or a third party unless it is accepted 
by the debtor or at least he is notified that there is an assignment. Acceptance by the 
debtor does not render the assignment valid as against third parties, unless it has an 
established d a t e . (212) xhus, if the debtor has been notified of the assignment and he 
has accepted it, there is no excuse for refraining from performing the assigned 
obligation. It is questionable whether the third party, such as a sub-contractor, or 
another assignee, when there are several assignments, is entitled to insist on having the 
remedy of specific performance, or to be obliged to perform his obligation specifically. 
In the case of several assignments of one right, the first assignee, who executes his 
right is preferred on the other assignees.(213) xhe third party in the assignment is, 
whoever obtains right over the assigned right.(214) xhus, the third party is either 
another assignee, or a creditor to the assignor who has attached on the assigned right, 
or other creditor to the assignor when has been declared insolvent. The assignee who 
notifies the debtor first, or has obtained the debtor's acceptance (215) js preferred over 
other parties. He may be granted specific performance, or he may be compelled to do 
so.
If an attachment is served upon the debtor of the assigned debt, before the 
assignment becomes valid and effective for the third party, the assignment will be 
regarded as equivalent to an attachment vis-a-vis the distrainer, according to Article 374 
of Civil Code. However, if another attachment is made after the assignment becomes 
valid and effective as against the third party, the debt is divided pro rata between the 
first distrainer, the assignee, and the second distrainer. It is inconceivable, that one of 
the creditors, in the above case, alone has the right of specific performance. It is the 
right of all creditors to have specific performance if it is applicable.
The third party could be the creditor of the insolvent assignor if, before the 
assignment becomes valid and effective as against the debtor, the assignor has become 
insolvent, in such a case, all the assignor's creditors become as third p a r t y . ( 2 1 6 )  xhe 
right assigned is considered as a part of the whole property of the debtor "assignor",
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which is divided pro rata between the creditors and the a s s i g n e e . ^ ? )  The third party 
to the assignment is entitled to have the right of specific performance, and he is 
equivalent to the assignee in obtaining the remedy, in accordance with the general rule 
of specific performance in Article 246 of Civil Code, but the priority depends on 
whether the assignment becomes valid and effective before or aftert commencement of 
the insolvency.
Comment
1-Both laws concur on the point that the assignee is entitled to the remedy of 
specific implement if the assignor has that right before assignment in the first place. No 
higher right or additional right can be assigned to the assignee by the assignor. In 
addition, all pleas and exceptions pleable against the assignor's right in the first place, 
i.e. "before assignment" are pleadable against the assignee, unless agreed otherwise.
2-The law of Scotland and Iraq diverge, however, upon the case o f the 
assignability of the remedy of specific implement as regards the seller as an assignor, or 
even as an assignee, for in Scots law the seller cannot confer such a right to the 
assignor. He does not have the right of specific implement, so he cannot transfer it to 
other party,whereas in Iraqi civil law the the seller can do so.
C O N C L U SIO N
1-Granting or refusing the remedy of specific implement by or against the 
purchaser relies on the principle of "Exceptio  N on a d im p le ti co n tra c tu s" . 
Nevertheless, the Scots purchaser cannot be compelled to perform his obligation 
specifically whatever that obligation is. That may lead to the conclusion that specific 
implement is a remedy restricted to certain type of aggrieved parties.i.e., the purchasers 
only and always. This conclusion affects the concept of the remedy and its nature in 
Scotland. The consequences for the seller is that whether he is bankrupt or insolvent, 
assignor or assignee, he is deprived of the remedy of specific implement.
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2-Restricting the right of specific implement in Scotland to the case of refusal of 
delivery by the seller is incomprehensible, for specific implement is an ordinary legal 
right, which should cover all cases of breach and it should be decreed whenever it is 
possible. It is inconsistent with the nature of the remedy in Scotland.
3-Depriving the aggrieved seller of his right of specific implement cannot find any 
reasonable justification and support in Scots law, for the remedy should be a mean 
which can be used by any aggrieved party.
4-To treat equally all contracting parties in granting or in refusing the remedy of 
specific performance in Iraqi civil law, reflects and represents the true nature and the 
real concept of the remedy as an ordinary legal remedy. It is a matter of right open 
permanently to the aggrieved party no matter who he is.
5-Granting specific implement as a remedy for breach of contract for the sale of 
goods in Scots law, whether the obligant is a purchaser or a bankrupt or as an assignee 
who represents the purchaser's side, is governed by the general principle, which is 
"specific implement is granted whenever there is breach to the obligation of delivery of 
goods, providing, it is possible to perform such obligation against the failure party, 
who is always the seller", and there are no exceptional grounds of law or equity stand 
against it being granted.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DISTINCTION BETWEEN SPECIFIC IMPLEMENT. DAMAGES 
AND INTERDICT. ^ “PERFORMANCE OF THE OBLIGATION 
TO REFRAIN FROM DOING SOMETHING"
Introduction
Damages may be granted either in addition to or in substitution for specific 
implement under certain circumstances.
Every obligation has a positive and a negative character, an obligation to do, and an 
obligation to refrain from doing something. Scots law has diffrentiated between these 
two characters and has different remedies for each. Thus, the remedy of interdict has 
been established. On the contrary Iraqi civil law considers doing and refraining from 
doing somthing as two aspects of one remedy, specific performance.
The issue of the distinction between damages, specific implement, interdict and 
performance of the obligation to refrain from doing something will be considered in 
two sections, as follows:
Section one: Damages
Section:Two:-The remedy of Interdict and specific performance as a remedy for 
breach of the obligation to refrain from doing something.
Section One:Damages
Damages as a remedy for breach of a contract for sale of goods may be granted with 
or without the remedy of specific implement. However, the award of damages depends 
on whether specific implement is granted or refused. Furthermore, where damages are 
awarded in addition to the remedy of specific implement, the problem of adequacy of 
damages arises. To consider these further:
Sub-Section l:Effect of adequacy of Damages on the remedy of specific implement. 
Sub-Section 2:Damages in addition to or in substitution for specific implement.
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Sub-Section l:Effect of adequacy of damages on specific implement
The adequacy of damages test plays a substantial role in the case of specific 
performance in English law, for where complete justice can be achieved by damages, 
specific performance will not be granted. However, the case is different in Scots and 
Iraqi laws, when the test of adequacy does not play an important role. The case of 
adequacy will be examined as follows.
1-The adequacy of damages in general.
2-Influence of adequacy of damages on specific implement.
1-The adequacy of damages in general
"Adequacy of remedies has always been somewhat m ercurial"/!) In addition, "The 
adequacy test, for the most part, remains as a stumbling block to specific performance 
of chattel contracts".1@) "It is a severe limitation in sales of other things than lands"@ ) 
"It is arbitrary and irrational"^) The question of adequacy of damages is more or less 
ambiguous, and there is no clear rule by which the court can always examine the 
adequacy of damages test. It is a matter of discretion. Professor Corbin has pointed 
out,(5) that "A reading of many modem cases will make clear the fact that the question 
of adequacy of other remedies is very frequently not even referred to in the opinion of 
the appellate court. They do not take the trouble to explain why such remedies are not 
adequate for complete justice, even though their inadequacy does not clearly appear 
from the reported facts". Damages are considered to be an inadequate remedy in certain 
cases and therefore, the remedy of specific performance has been g ran te d /^ ) 
Nevertheless, there are many cases, where specific performance was refused on the 
grounds that the remedy (damages) at law is adequate/^)
Where damages fail to afford a complete remedy to the aggrieved party ,^ ) or the 
amount of damages is impossible to a s s e s s / ^ )  they are considered an inadequate 
r e m e d y / 10) Therefore, specific performance is granted.
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Specific performance in English law is affected substantially by the adequacy test.
It is not granted when the plaintiff obtains the equivalent to what he has contracted for
by d a m a g e s /^ )  Lord Redesdale s ta te d /1^) that "unquestionably the original
foundation of these decrees was simply this, that damages at law would not give the
party the compensation to which he was entitled: that is, would not put him in a
situation as beneficial to him as if  the agreement were specifically performed. On this
ground the court in a variety of cases, has refused to interfere, where from the nature of
the case, the damages must necessarily be commensurate to the injury sustained".
Furthermore, Kindersley V-C. pointed o u t / 13) that specific performance will not be
decreed by the court with regard to personal chattels in the minority of cases by reason
of that damages are sufficient. Nevertheless, specific performance will be ordered if
damages are not sufficient remedy to compensate the aggrieved party/1^)
The question of adequacy of damages is a question of fact in each case/1^) "it is
unsafe to rely on decisions reached on other contracts and in other circumstances"/1**)
Thus, in a contract for sale of chattels "the circumstances often are found to be such that
an award of damages which is intended to enable similar chattels to be purchased does
not provide an adequate r e m e d y " / ! ^ )  Damages may be inadequate, even when the
pursuer can buy goods similar to those in the contract, if the fluctution of the price is so
great, that the party who is obliged to accept damages cannot be sure of being put in as
good a position as he would have been if  the contract were specifically performed and
♦
the goods supp lied /l^ ) Furthermore, where the goods or items are unique, specific 
performcance can be granted. Thus, "the more unusual the subject-matter of the 
contract, the more difficult it becomes to assess the plaintiffs lo ss" /!^ ) and "damages 
can be readily assessed but not so easily co llec ted"/^)
Nor can damages be described as an adequate remedy when the defendant is unable 
to pay them, because of his insolvency/^ 1) Under these circumstances specific 
performance is justified and will be d e c r e e d / ^ )
In Allseas International Managment Ltd. v. Panrov Bulk Treansport and o t h e r s / ^ )  
Allseas claimed that the vessels Star Delta and Star Gazar had been sold to them by the
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defendants ( Panroy, Roymar, and the bank ) on March 19, 1984. The plaintiffs 
obtained an injunction to prevent the sale from taking place to Saned, the fourth 
defendant. The plaintiffs applied for a decree of specific performance of the sale 
contract or alternatively for damages. The owners opposed the plaintiffs claim. Saned 
who was the purchaser of the two vessels by the agreement between him and the 
owners of the vessels, claimed specific performance of this agreement. They also 
claimed damages as an alternative remedy. Held by the Queen's Bench Division (Com. 
Ct.) that,"on the facts and the evidence no binding contract was reached between 
Allseas and the defendants and in the circumstances specific performance of the second 
agreement for the sale of the two vessels to Saned would be granted". Accordingly, 
without discussing whether damages are or are not an adequate remedy, specific 
performance was granted by the court. In addition, specific performance was ordered 
without examining the vessels to establish whether they were unique or easily 
obtainable from the market.
The way the court's decision may be regarded as advancing the law of specific 
performance is that it compelled the defendant to specific performance because, "the 
court has powers to make such an order under Sec. 52 of the sale of goods Act. 
Neither the owners nor the bank would wish to oppose such a sale which would indeed 
be in comformity with what they want" .@4)
The problem of adequacy where the contract was for something unique appeared 
again in Eximenco Handles A.G. v. Partrederiet Pro Chief and Levantes Maritime 
Corp..(25) where; the first defendants agreed to sell the "Oro Chief' to the plaintiffs for 
$8 Million. The time for delivery was extended from time to time, and by the date of 
Apr. 6,1983 the plaintiffs failed to pay the price in exchange for the documents which 
are required by the contract. Accordingly, the first defendants, "the owners", cancelled 
their contract with the plaintiffs and contracted with Levantes, who became second 
defendant for a price $ 8.2. Million.
It was held: "that: .........(6)- the owners were under a subsisting contractual
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obligation to deliver the vessel to Levantes. (7)- if there had been a subsisting contract 
to sell to Eximenco, the court would have ordered it to be specifically performed". 
Many dicta can be taken from that judgment, namely:
1-Staughton J. s a i d ,(26) concerning the uniqueness and the characteristics of the 
vessel, "The test is plainly satisfied in the present case. Oro chief is an Ore/oil carrier. 
She has certain advantages of flexibility in trading. Only a limited number of such 
vessels of similar size exist. At present none is available for sale in the market". He 
added, in relation to Eximenco and their need for the vessel, "Eximenco sought to 
prove that they had a particular need for the vessel as an Ore/oil carrier, the attempt 
failed. An ordinary tanker would have suited just as well for the time being. And 
ordinary tankers of similar size are a v a i l a b l e " . ^ ? )
The question of how much the party needs the article should be irrelevant. It is 
neither one of the principles of the uniquness nor of the adequacy test. As far as 
specific performance is concerned many authorities recognise th a t ,(28) where the article 
is unobtainable in the market, specific performance will be granted, regardless of the 
degree of the party's need for the goods. In addition, where damages are considered 
inadequate to compensate the aggrieved party, specific performance is d e c r e e d . ( 2 9 )
2-The judge s ta t e d ,^ )  "If I held that there was a subsisting contract to sell to 
Eximenco, I would have ordered it to be specifically performed". It is thought then, 
that there is some contradiction, for he said that,(31) "An ordinary tanker would have
suited th e m  ". Then he said that if there was a subsisting contract he "would have
ordered" specific p e r f o r m a n c e . ^ )  it indicates that he avoided the need test at least for 
Eximenco, but it was found substantial in this case for Levantes, who "made somewhat 
more of a case that they had a special need for this v e s s e l " . ( 3 3 )
Finally, it can be concluded that the judge would have been better to have 
concentrated on the test of uniqueness and adequacy, without considering the need for 
the vessel by either party. If it is unique and cannot be replaced by damages or cannot 
be obtained elsewhere, that should be a sufficient criterion, and provide satisfactory
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ground to grant the remedy of specific performance, regardless of the need for such an 
article. That is the principle of English law as regards specific performance in the sale 
of goods contract.
In Cn Marine INC. v. Stena Line A/3 and Regie VOOR Maritiem Transport "The 
Stena Nautica" (No.21.(34) the defendants let their vessel to the plaintiffs for a period 
of 108 days during summer time in each year for a period of five years. The plaintiffs 
had an option to buy the vessel according to the charter at the end of the first five years. 
The plaintiffs renewed the contract for one year more. Accordingly, they were entitled 
to exercise their option to buy the vessel at the end of 1983. Nevertheless, the 
defendants (Swedish owners) entered into negotiations between (1981-1982) which 
were in breach of the contract to the plaintiffs. The defendants arranged to demise the 
vessel to the Belgians (the other plaintiffs) for two years with an option to buy the 
vessel. The Belgians took delivery of the vessel on Feb. 28. 1982 in good faith and 
without notice that she had been demised to the Canadians for the summer season.
It was held, by Q.B. (Com. Ct.) "that the Canadians were entitled to specific 
performance of the option to purchase ".
It was held by the Court of Appeal: "that A (1) as a matter of law an order for
specific performance could be made in respect of a vessel but it in no way followed that 
there should be an order for specific performance in respect of every contract for the 
sale of a vessel.
(3) in the circumstances, damages would be an adequate remedy for the Canadians 
and it would be just to confine them to that remedy...........
(B) .......  there were serious doubts whether even if  an order for specific
performance were made in favour of the Canadians, without the conditions imposed in
favour of the Belgians, the vessel would be able to be in service ; on balance the
Canadians had failed to discharge the onus which lay on them, and the Belgians were
entitled to specific performance of the charter party ". This case, it is submitted,
represents the English law's stand point in respect of specific performance as a remedy 
for breach of contract for the sale of goods, especially on the point that, "it in no way
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followed that there should be an order for specific performance in respect of every 
contract for the sale of a v e s s e l " . ^ )  The reason for that is, that the remedy of specific 
performance is discretionary, and it is not granted except "if (the court) thinks fit"(36)
and "specific performance can be made in the case of a ship; but in this case,   it
seem s that damages would be an adequate remedy. In those circumstances, as a
matter of discretion, it seems that this is not a case for any order for specific
performance" @7)
The principle of adequacy of damages dominates every occasion specific 
performance is applied for, even if the goods are specific or ascertained. Thus, for 
instance, Lord Justice May confirmed the above s ta tem en t,^ ) by saying that, "He (the 
judge) expressed the view, with which I entirely agree, that as a matter of law an order 
for specific performance can be made in respect of a ship. P er contra , it in no way 
follows that there should be an order for specific performance in respect of every 
contract for the sale of a ship". Courts, it seems, will not grant specific performance 
for delivery of a ship unless it is unique and it cannot be substituted by another ship.
Otherwise, damages offer an adequate remedy, for "It seems quite clear that but
for the fact that the vessel in question happened to be a sistership of two vessels in 
service with the Canadians, he "the judge" would have taken the view that damages 
were an adequate rem edy"P9)
The same happened in Societe Des Industries Metallurgiques S.A. v. The Bronox 
Engineering Co. Ltd.(4ty) it was held, "that (2) on the evidence, the machine was one 
which was obtainable in the market in the ordinary course upon placing an order and 
damages were sufficient remedy; and the buyers were not entitled to a decree of specific 
performance under Sec. 52 of Sale of Goods Act". Lord Edmund Davies, pointed 
out(41) that, "That Sec.(52....) enables the court "if it thinks fit" to order specific 
performance of a contract to deliver "specific or ascertained goods". For present 
purpose I understand the parties to accept that the machinery in question was 
"ascertained goods" within the meaning of the section. But it is established law that
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such an order will not be made if damages would fully compensate the party 
aggrieved".
where justice is achieved by the award of damages, English Courts will refuse the 
remedy of specific performance. Specific performance in English law is an equitable 
remedy only granted when damages fail to compensate the aggrieved purchaser, for 
"the courts of equity did not decree specific performance in contracts for the sale of 
commodities which could be ordinarily obtained in the market where damages were a 
sufficient r e m e d y " / 4 ^ )  Further, Lord Justice Buckley s ta te d ,^ )  "that you cannot 
walk into a store or warehouse or shop and buy this type of machinery from stock. 
Nevertheless, it is I think, on the evidence, a type of machinery which is obtainable in 
the market in the ordinary course upon placing an order and although delivery in 
response to such an order must involve delay ".
It seems, however, that the exercising of the inherent discretionary power by the 
court, varies from one court to another, and there are no reliable criteria to justify or 
predict the conduct of the court in ordering specific performance or granting damages in 
a case where there are specific or ascertained goods, such as a ship or a machinery or 
some articles which are not easily obtainable. For instance, in B ehnke v. B ede 
Shipping Co. Ltd. Z44) Wright J. said, "Section 52 of the Sale of Goods Act gives the 
court a discretion, if it thinks fit, in any action for breach of contract to deliver specific 
or ascertained goods, to direct that the contract shall be performed specifically. I think 
a ship is a specific chattel within the Act.... In the present case there is evidence that 
the City was of peculiar and practically unique value to the plaintiff'. Specific 
performance was m ade.(^)
In Hart v. Herwig.(46) Sir W.M.James, L.J. pointed out that, "The right of the 
plaintiff here was to have the ship delivered to him in exchange for the purchase- 
money". Sir G. Mellish, L J . ^ )  Said also, that "In fact he has entered into this 
contract for the purchase of the ship, and he is entitled to the ship". Mr. Justice Parker, 
in "The Stena Nautica" (No2).(48) whose judgment has been reversed by the Court of
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Appeal, said that "ships are I fully accept not ordinary articles of commerce, nor can a 
purchaser, if his seller declines to deliver, normally obtain in the market a substantially 
identical vessel as could the purchaser in the Bronx case find, albeit after long delay, an 
identical machine". Furthermore, "The remedy under Sec.52 is both discretionary and 
can be made subject to c o n d i t i o n s " . ^ )  Nevertheless, the approach of another judge is 
different, for instance, Lord Denning s ta te d ,^ )  that, "In those circumstances, as a 
matter of discretion, it seems to me this is not a case for any order for specific 
performance". Again, it was s a id ,^ ^  that, "the court has to ask whether in the 
circumstances it is just that the plaintiff should be confined to the remedy in damages".
Finally, it is submitted, however, that the choice of remedies as between specific 
performance and the award of damages varies from one case to another and from one 
court to another, or even from one judge to another within one court. Above all, the 
onus is upon the plaintiff to justify the claim that, damages would not achieve justice, 
and inadequate remedy, and that he "the p lain tiff should not be compelled to accept 
them.(52) The plaintiff may fail to prove that the goods are unique, and subsequently 
he will not obtain specific performance, but damages.
2-Influence of adequacy of damages on specific implement
The adequacy of damages may or may not affect the remedy of specific implement. 
To examine such influence on the remedy, the case should be considered as follows:
2.1-Influence of adequacy test on specific implement in Scots law
The adequacy or otherwise of damages should, if it is to comply with the concept 
and the nature of the remedy of specific implement in Scots law, have no influence for 
the following reasons.
1-If the remedy of specific implement is a legal remedy, and it seems that it is. It 
should then be granted when certain conditions exist. Therefore "in Scotland the
breach of a contract for the sale of a specific subject gives the party aggrieved the
legal right to sue for i m p l e m e n t " ^ )
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2-The pursuer cannot be obliged to resort to the alternative of an action of damages, 
unless specific implement is refused for different r e a s o n s .(54)
3-In Scots law, the Lord Justice-Clerk,(55) stated, that the pursuer is perfectly 
entitled to say that "I do not choose to take the damages. I prefer to insist for 
implement". He added that "to say that a pursuer claiming implement, and alternatively 
damages, is not to be entitled to say, I prefer implement".
4-The remedy of specific implement is granted if  it is clear that what would be 
ordered to be done could be done r e a s o n a b l y . ^ )  Also, "The general rule of our law is 
that when a party has it in his power to fulfil an obligation which he has undertaken, the 
court will compel him to do so".(57) Nevertheless, the circumstances sometimes 
restrict the court to order damages instead of specific im plem ent.^)
5 -"Specific performance was not a remedy to which a party was entitled at
Common law in England  In Scotland, on the contrary, specific implement is one
of the ordinary remedies to which a party to a contract is entitled where the other party
to it refuses to implement the obligation he has undertaken I do not of course
mean to say that it would not be open to maintain there that in the circumstances of a 
particular case it would be inequitable to enforce that rem edy ".(59)
6-"In England the only legal right arising from a breach of a contract is a claim of 
damages; specific performance is not a matter of legal right, but a purely equitable 
remedy, which the court can withhold when there are sufficient reasons of conscience 
or expediency against it. But in Scotland, the breach of a contract for the sale of 
specific subject.... gives the party the legal right to sue for implement......»(60)
7-The court in Scotland, particularly, the Court of Session, has laid down that, 
even if implement is possible, it has inherent power to refuse the legal remedy upon 
equitable grounds, (^ l)
8-"In England the remedy of specific performance is an extraordinary remedy, it is 
always a matter of discretion, and defences are admitted in a suit for specific 
performance which are inadmissible according to the doctrines and practice o f the
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Courts of Scotland, where specific performance is part of the ordinary jurisdiction of
the c o u r t " . ( 6 2 )
Consequently, as long as specific implement has all these features and has all these 
differences from specific performance in English law, the adequacy .of damages is not a 
relevant factor, i.e.,(the adequacy of damages is a discretionary m a t t e r ) . ( 6 3 )  Specific 
implement may be refused, not because damages are an adequate remedy, but because
of other grounds.(64)
Scots courts do not reject specific implement just because damages are considered 
an adequate remedy, but because as Lord Young s a i d , ( 6 6 )  "that would be hard on the 
party who is required to perform, and where complete justice would be done to the 
other party by damages". Nevertheless, it was stated that "where the party can procure 
specific implement for himself with money damages awarded to him he practically gets 
specific p e r f o r m a n c e " . ( 6 6 )  Again it was stated, "If there is an obligation to deliver a 
certian quantity of any marketable commodity - quite common article which can be got 
in the market - to order specific performance - to order delivery of it - would be 
inconvenient and is never resorted to".(67) That is vulnerable to criticism, however, 
for this is an entirely different approach to the remedy of specific implement, and one 
which is contradictory to the concept and the nature of the remedy in Scots law, for the 
following reasons:
1-There is no other reason to refuse specific implement except the grounds which 
have already been considered. If the court refuses specific implement, and grants 
damages as an alternative remedy, on the grounds that the aggrieved party will be able 
to reach the same result by obtaining damages, i.e. by buying the article he needs, this 
amounts to the same thing as specific performance in English law, which considers that 
specific performance is an exceptional and extraordinary remedy,... etc. Surely no one 
can say that Scots and English laws are consistent as regards the remedy o f specific 
implement.
2-To say that, "what is done, is to order payment in the form of damages, if it
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would enable the party against whom the breach has been committed to secure specific 
implement himself by going into the market and getting the a r t ic le ",(68) merely raises 
again the whole question of adequacy of damages, for instance, where price fluctuates 
so greatly or the standard of a "marketable commodity - quite a common article",1(69) is 
different.
3-In English law, if damages are adequate, specific performance will not be 
decreed, because damages are considered as an equitable remedy,(70) and the plaintiff, 
by obtaining damages, can get the article he needs. In Scots law, according to Lord 
Young’s view, the same result will be reached.
4-Ordering the defender to perform specifically by delivering the commodity, 
achieves more justice than ordering him to pay damages to the pursuer, who then has to 
go into the market to get the same commodity, He may not get the same, for many 
reasons.
5-Lord Young's dictim,(71) "He may say - ( I am not going into the market, and 
you can do your worst.) we could put him into jail for contempt, but it is far easier to 
order him to pay a sum of money which will enable the party he has disappointed to 
procure specific implement himself’, is incomprehensible, because if the party refuses 
to obey the court's decision he should be imprisoned, unless he cannot perform that 
decision.
If specific implement is refused on the ground as Lord Young suggested, "because 
it is easier to order damages...." many defenders will refuse to perform, and 
subsequently .damages will become the ordinary remedy. Thus the concept and the 
nature of the remedy will be changed.
6-Another criticism could be made on Lord Young's statement,(7^) "But that is 
where justice would not be done by damages, and therefore specific performance is 
ordered". It is submitted, that this statement conflicts with the remedy of specific 
implement in Scots law. It represents the remedy in English law.
The above point of view is a result of the English law influence on Scots law, 
which leads to a very serious consequeces, such as, turning up-side-down the
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principles of the remedy in Scots law. It leads to the conclusion that, where justice 
would not be done by damages, specific implement is granted, and vice-versa. 
Damages will then become the ordinary remedy, and specific implement an exceptional 
one. Furthermore, through such a relationship to damages, it then also becomes a 
discretionary remedy, i.e. "if they are adequate no specific implement shall be decreed". 
Moreover, damages become the criterion by which specific implement is granted. It 
becomes an equitable remedy, because it is normally not ordered, unless damages fail 
to achieve justice.
To protect specific implement in Scots law, it may be suggested that the remedy 
should be isolated from the adequacy test and its effects.
2.2-Effect of adequacy of Damages on specific performance in
Iraqi civil law
The principle of adequacy of damages in respect of granting or refusing the remedy 
of specific performance has not been considered in Iraqi civil law, for the following 
reasons:
1-The creditor is entitled to have the contract or the obigation specifically 
performed, as long as it is possible to do so .(^ )
2-Specific performance is a legal remedy. Thus, whenever the cerditor has applied 
for it, or the debtor has offered by himself to do so, then, unless it is impossible, there 
is no way to grant damages instead,1 or even t0 consider the principles of adequacy 
of damages.
3-Specific performance, in fact, is not a discretionary remedy, for the court has no 
power to refuse it, if  it is possible, in accordance with the meaning and spirit of the 
provision of Article 246 (1) of Civil Code. Nevertheless, it may be said, that the court 
has discretionary power to some extent according to Article 246 (2) of Civil Code. If 
specific performance is too onerous for the debtor, he "the debtor" may then limit 
performance to payment of sum of money as a remedy, providing this way of
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performance does not seriously prejudice the c r e d i to r .^ )  The court has such a 
discretion, but not to consider whether damages may or may not achieve justice better 
than specific performances, i.e. "adequate or in adequate". The adequacy test is out of 
consideration in this case, for the court even in the case of refusing specific 
performance under Article 246 (2) of Civil Code under equitable grounds examines 
only, whether granting or refusing specific performance is just or unjust. It does not 
take into account any consideration whether damages are an adequate or inadequate 
remedy.
If  the debtor has offered by himself to perform specifically, the creditor cannot 
reject this offer. The court should insist on having him accept specific 
p e r f o r m a n c e , ^ )  regardless of damages, whether they are adequate or inadequate.
4-Because Specific performance is not an equitable r e m e d y , ^ )  it is not restricted 
by any principle of whether the goods are or are not easily obtainable in the markets, 
for in Iraqi civil law if the creditor has applied for specific performance, or the debtor 
by himself has offered to perform his obligation specifically, the remedy will not be 
rejected by the court.
5-Under Article 248 (2) of Civil Code, the creditor has the right to acquire an article 
or goods at the expense of the debtor, where he "the debtor" has refrained from 
performing his obligation. Surprisingly, the Civil Code has provided for the above 
Article under the remedy of specific performance. It is submitted, however, that that 
kind of performance is not specific performance. It is an award of damages to obtain 
article or goods of the same k ind .(^)
Comment
Specific implement in Scots law, has sometimes fallen under the influence of 
specific performance in English law. Thus judges were of the opinion that the remedy 
of specific implement is not granted where justice can be achieved by damages.
The remedy of specific implement for breach of contract for the sale o f goods
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should not be affected by the adequacy test. Scots law is at one with the Iraqi civil law 
in that respect. The only slight difference is that the test of adequacy of damages is not 
taken into consideration at all by the Iraqi civil law.
Sub-Section 2: Damages in addition to or in substitution for 
specific implement
Damages, sometimes, are granted in addition to specific implement to relieve loss 
the aggrieved party has suffered, when granting specific implement is not sufficient to 
compensate him.
Damages may be granted in substitution when specific implement is considered 
inappropriate.
Damages will be considered as follows:
1-Damages in addition to specific implement.
2-Damages in substitution for specific implement.
1-Damages in addition to specific implement
Damages are granted in addition to specific implement under certain circumstances
in both laws. They will be dealt with as follows:
-Damages in addition to specific implement in Scots law.
-Damages in addition to specific performance in Iraqi civil law.
1,1-Damages in addition to specific implement in Scots law
The aggrieved party has been granted the remedy of specific implement, however, 
he may still suffer loss either by delay of performance, or because performance is 
defective. If, for instance, the seller has delivered the goods to the purchaser by a 
decree of specific implement, but the goods were defective, the purchaser still has the 
right to claim damages because he is not completely satisfied with the re m e d y .^ )  it  is 
unjust to leave the purchaser to his defective goods without any compensation. The 
purchaser has an unequivocal right to reject the g o o d s . ^ 0 )  Such a purchaser may 
claim damages in addition to specific implement. However, it was stated,1(81) that "it is 
scarcely necessary to stress that a party claiming implement may also be entitled to
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damages". Nevertheless, suppose that a purchaser A has ordered a machine from a 
seller B. B knows and was informed that A has bought this machine for the purpose of 
carrying on his business. In addition, it was known to B that if the machine was not 
delivered at the time fixed by the contract, A would suffer loss of business and he may 
suffer other damages. It is questionable whether A is entitled to damages in addition to 
the remedy of specific implement.
A is entitled to the remedy of specific implement if he applies to the court asking for 
such a r e m e d y , ^ )  and to damages alone if he is only applies for damages, because 
each party is entitled to recover damages if the party breaches the c o n t r a c t . ^ )
The purchaser A is entitled to recover damages in addition to specific implement, 
for it is unfair to leave the buyer who suffers loss he does not cause without a complete 
remedy. Moreover, it is unlawful enrichment, because, the seller "will reap an 
unjustified benefit at the expense of the other (the p u r c h a s e r ) " . ^ )  So he should pay 
for the loss that he caused. Scots authorities are few in this respect.
1-In Linn v. S h i e l d s . ^ )  Lord Justice-Clerk pointed out that there are three aspects 
of measuring the damages, which he stated as being "a conclusion for damages over 
and above performance in respect of injury to the subject, or loss by delay". 
Furthermore, "proceeding for implement of a contract do not necessarily bar claim of 
damages founded on the same breach of contract as the defender's delay or failure to 
implement his obligation may have caused the pursuer loss over and the lack of having 
the obligation performed".1$ 6 )
2-In Sutherland v. M ontrose Shipbuilding Co/ ^ L o r d  Cowan noticed that 
whatever damages may have been suffered by the purchaser from the delay in making 
delivery of the specific article beyond the period fixed by the contract, may be 
recovered from the seller. "He cannot otherwise be kept indemnis for loss sustained by 
him through the seller's mora. He is entitled to have the specific subject he has bought 
delivered to him and he is entitled to have indemnification for loss sustained by and 
through the seller's mora to deliver".
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3-Support may be found in the English authorities. For instance, in Grant v. 
Dawkins/88) the seller failed to perform a contract of sale of a house. The contract 
was for a sale free from incumbrances. The house was subject to two mortgages. The 
plaintiff raised many claims, including damages and specific performance,...etc. It was 
held that the purchaser was entitled to these remedies. Again, in Oakacre Ltd. v. Clair 
Cleaners (Holdings') Ltd/^9) ft was hgftk "that whilst no cause of action had occurred 
for damages for breach of contract before the writ was issued, the court was not 
obliged to consider the damages claim as an isolated claim at law and, since the action 
was originally properly constituted and brought in good faith as a specific performance
action, the court could consider the plaintiffs whole case  that, in the
circumstances it would be unjust for the plaintiffs to be deprived of relief to which they 
were entitled...". Again, in Jaques v. M iller/9 0 )  the court awarded £250  to the plaintiff 
by way of damages in relation to his loss of profit, besides granting specific 
performance to the plaintiff. Also, in Corv v. The Thames Iron Works & Shipbuilding 
"a plaintiff who has filed his bill for specific performance of a contract and 
compensation in damages, and has obtained performance from defendants before the 
suit is brought to a hearing, does not thereby lose his right to consequential relief in 
damages in respect of injury occasioned to him by the delay of defendants in 
performing the contract".
It seems that damages can be decreed in addition to the remedy of specific 
implement according to the above cases, for there is no reason why the purchaser 
should not have the right to obtain damages, if he has suffered loss by reason of the 
seller's delay or defective implement, since that loss is a natural and a probable result of 
the seller's failure. They should be recoverable along with the remedy of specific
implement/^)
1.2-Damages in addition to specific performance in Iraqi civil law
Damages, it was laid down, (93) ^  either for non- performance specifically, as it
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has already been discussed, or for delay in performance specifically by the debtor. 
Under Article 169 (2) of Iraqi Civil Code.(94) they are granted, in addition to specific 
performance whenever there is loss to the creditor caused by the debtor. Furthermore, 
under Article 168 of Civil Code it is established that damages are an appropriate remedy 
in addition to specific performance as a remedy for non-performance of the obligation, 
unless the reason for non-performance is impossibility, which arose beyond the 
debtor's control. It states, "when specific performance rendered impossible, the 
obligant shall be condemned to pay damages for non-performance of his obligation, 
unless he establishes that the impossibility of performance arose from a cause beyond 
his control. The same principle may apply, if the obligant delayed in performing his 
obligation".
The purchaser in Iraqi civil law is entitled to damages in addition to the remedy of 
specific performance on many occasions. The rule of granting damages in addition to 
specific performance can be established on the following grounds:
1-Any obligation can be performed specifically, unless certain circumstances stand 
against it.(95) Suppose that the seller has performed his obligation specifically but the 
goods somehow are d e f e c t i v e , (96) or the seller has delayed delivering them to the 
purchaser,(97) jn such cases the purchaser has suffered loss. In each case he is 
entitled to have the obligation specifically performed. In each case the purchaser is 
entitled to damages in addition to specific performance if he has suffered loss, for 
Article 169 (2) of Civil Code provides that, "Damages are an appropriate remedy for 
every obligation arises from the contract, whether it is an obligation to transfer property 
or benefit or any other real right, or an obligation to do or not to do something. It 
comprises the loss that the creditor has suffered and the profit he has missed, providing 
damages must be the natural consequence of non-performance of the obligation by the 
debtor, or his delay in performance". Thus, the purchaser is entitled to damages for 
any loss he has suffered or benefit he has had to forgo.
2-Depriving the debtor of any damages in addition to specific performance in the 
above cases could be considered unlawful enrichment, for the debtor, "the seller", will
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gain unlawful benefit. Thus, he must compensate the aggrieved party "the creditor" 
under Article 243 of Iraqi Civil Code/98)
3-It was s t a t e d , (99) that where ordering the party in breach to stop his infringment 
is pointless, for there is nothing to be gained from granting the remedy of specific 
performance the aggrieved party is entitled to obtain damages for loss he has suffered 
and benefit he has missed.
4-The Iraqi Civil Code support the conclusion that damages may be awarded in 
addition to specific performance. Article 169 (1) provides that "If damages are not 
being determined in the contract, or if the provision of law does not determine them, the 
court then undertakes to do so". Additional support may be found under Article 169
(2) of Civil Code above/*00) Furthermore, Article 177 (2) of Civil Code, gives the 
creditor the opportunity to have damages in addition to specific performance. It states, 
"In bilateral contracts, if one of the contracting parties does not fulfil his obligation, the 
other contracting party may, after serving a formal summons, demand rescission of the 
contract with damages if due. However, the court may grant additional time to the 
debtor. The court may also reject the demand for rescission, if the part of the obligation 
which the debtor has failed to fulfil is insignificant in comparison with the whole 
obligation". Thus under the last paragraph of the above Article which says: "...the 
court may reject the application for rescission", the obligation should be performed, and 
the creditor is entitled to have damages for any loss he has suffered or for delay in 
performance. The creditor according to the above Article is entitled to damages in 
addition to rescission. Where the debtor has performed the obligation, and also caused 
loss, damages may also be awarded, subject to the court's discretion in considering the 
circumstances of whether the debtor deserves additional time to perform, or whether the 
debtor is bom fide or mala
Finally whatever he has chosen, whether specific performance or rescission of the 
contract, the buyer is entitled to damages for any loss he has s u f f e r e d / 1 0 2 )
Comment
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Again both Scots and Iraqi law are similar, in that damages may be awarded in 
addition to specific implement. The basis of granting damages in addition to specific 
implement in each law is sufficient to show that damages cannot be denied if 
performance of the obligation specifically does not satisfy the completion of 
performance of the contract. Furthermore, in both legal systems there is no justification 
for denying the buyer's right of damages in addition to specific implement, if he has 
suffered loss or been denied benefit. Nevertheless, it should be noted that Iraq law 
provides wider scope for this double remedy. The seller in Scots law does not have the 
right to obtain specific implement, unlike the seller in Iraqi civil law. Therefore, he can 
only obtain damages. In Iraqi civil law, specific performance can be granted in several 
circumstances such as delay in delivery or disturbance of the purchaser either by the 
seller himself or by a third party. Damages can be awarded in addition if they are due.
In Scots law specific implement is restricted to the case of delivery of specific or 
ascertained goods. Furthermore, all the obligations referred to above cannot be 
performed specifically. Therefore, damages would be granted either alone or in 
addition to anothe remedies, i.e.,(Interdict, rescission....etc.).
2-Damages in substitution for specific implement
Damages may be granted in substitution for the remedy of specific implement on 
certain grounds in both Scots and Iraqi laws respectively, as follows.
2.1-Damages in substitution for specific implement in Scots law
The court may, instead of compelling specific implement grant damages. The 
choice of this remedy rests on many considerations, mostly "equitable g r o u n d s " . ^ 3 )  
Although there is some overlap with the materials reviewed respecting the grounds for 
refusal of specific implement, the following points should nevertheless be noted:
1-In Scots law the breach of an obligation for the sale of a specific or ascertained 
goods or things gives the aggrieved party the right to sue for specific i m p l e m e n t / 104) 
Generally, if the aggrieved party, "the purchaser", in Scots law elects to sue for specific
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implement, "he cannot be compelled to resort to the alternative of an action of 
damages"/105) There is, however, an exception to the above principle which is, when 
"specific implement is shown to be impossible"/1 06) Where specific implement can 
be granted, however, damages cannot be awarded as an alternative.
2-In Moore v. Paterson/10^ Lord Shand pointed out that, "The general rule of 
our law is that when a party has it in his power to fulfil an obligation which he has 
undertaken the court will compel him to do so". This dictim, it seems conflicts with 
what was said that, "Frequently the court will not order specific performance. Indeed,
as a rule it will not order specific performance where complete justice would be
done to other party by dam ages"/!^  This is becacuse:
(1)-The court always has discretion to examine whether the remedy of specific 
implement or damages is the appropriate remedy within the circumstances (109) 0f 
whether there are exceptional equitable and legal grounds.
(2)-"upon equitable grounds" (110) it is possible to reject specific implement by the 
court, otherwise the court should grant the remedy for the aggrieved party, because it is 
a legal and ordinary remedy/111)
(3)-Lord Watson cited three authorities/H^) and pointed out that, "these 
authorities seem to establish, if that were necessary the proposition that the court has 
the power of declining, upon equitable grounds, to enforce an, admittedly, legal right; 
but they show that the power has been very rarely exercised".
3-Lord Young in the same dictum above/H 3) said that "the court will not order 
specific performance. Indeed as a rule it will not order specific performance where that 
would be hard on the party who is required fo perform....". So again when it is hard 
no specific implement can be ordered. The alternative then will be granting damages.
4-In Union Electric Co. Ltd. v. Holman & Co./H 4 ) The Lord President said "It is 
argued that this is an action ad factum prestandum and the subjects arrested cannot 
satisfy the judgment in such an action. No it seems to me that when a person asks for 
delivery of specific article of which there is a pretium ajfectionis, the decree that he 
wants is the true decree for specific performance; but when he says to the other person,
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"we have a contract: under that contract you are bound to deliver; you have not 
delivered; deliver or else pay damages", he is not asking for a decree ad factum  
praestandum in the proper sense at all". According to that dictim, the criterion of 
whether the remedy of specific implement or damages are applicable, is whether the 
article represents pretium affectionis.
5-Professor D.M.Walker,^ on the basis of Davidson v. Macpherson.^  *6) has 
suggested that "where it is reasonably praticable for the pursuer to implement the 
contract himself, he may be authorised to do so, and get decree against the defender for 
the cost of performance". It seems that the pursuer may be authorised to implement the 
contract himself, in order to have his obligation specifically performed. He is granted 
damages so that he can buy the thing that he has contracted for. By doing so the 
pursuer cannot be considered to have been granted specific implement. It is a decree 
for damages. The pursuer cannot be considered to be implementing the contract 
himself, but in fact he is granted damages, and granting the pursuer damages cannot be
regarded as implement of the contract, for it has been said,that "damages a re  due
from the party who fails in any particular respect to make due performance of all or any 
part of the obligation undertaken by him in avalid and subsisting legal contract".^
6-Damages can be granted as an alternative to specific implement, as in Summerlee 
Iron Co. v. Caledonian Rv. ( ^ ^  The defenders, (Railway Company), were bound to 
make and maintain a level crossing over land which belonged to the pursuers, (Iron 
Company). The pursuers sued for a decree compelling the defenders to construct the 
crossing. The pursuers then asked leave to amend their summons by adding a 
conclusion for damages instead of specific implement. The Court of Session allowed 
the amendment. Lord S a lv ese n /^ ) noticed that, "if the pursuers had for a moment 
anticipated that a decree for specific implement could not be granted, they would 
originally have sought the alternative remedy which they now ask leave to add". He 
added, "where a decree is asked for implement of a contractual obligation, and where 
the pursuers recognise that the defenders may have disabled themselves from giving
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such implement, one is quite familiar with the insertion of conclusions for damages to 
provide against such a contingency”.(* ^ 0)
The question arises as to whether the pursuers should have to amend the summons, 
when the remedy of specific implement is not obtainable, to have an alternative 
conclusion for damages, or the court should grant damages as an alternative to specific 
implement automatically without amending the summons.
The remedy of specific implement must be applied for by the pursuer, otherwise it 
cannot be granted, despite the party's right to the remedy when its the appropriate 
remedy, and despite the unjust consequences to deprive the party of his right to it.
Suppose that the pursuer does not mention in his petition any other remedy but 
specific implement and the court has refused the remedy for certain reasons. It is not 
fair and just to deprive him any other remedy, for the following reasons:
(1)-Generally, the remedy of specific implement is an alternative form of remedy to 
damages, although the two remedies "are not fully alternative, that is, it is not open to 
the pursuer in any and every case to conclude for both alternatively, nor for one or the 
other in his absolute discretion”.(^1)
(2)-In Moore v. P a t e r s o n . (^ 2 )  it was noticed that, "assuming the pursuer had a 
title to sue, it was in the discretion of the court, in such a case, to determine whether it 
would ordain specific implement or give decree for damages only, and that in the 
present case the latter would have been the appropriate remedy". Thus, damages are 
the appropriate remedy within the circumstances.
(3)-In Stewart v. K e n n e d y / Lor(j Watson pointed out that," he cannot be
compelled to resort to the alternative of an action of damages unless implement is 
shown to be impossible...". Thus damages are the appropriate remedy where 
performance of the obligation specifically is impossible, or even upon other equitable 
grounds. Further, "Even where specific implement is possible, I do not doubt that the 
Court of Session has inherent power to refuse the legal remedy upon equitable 
grounds•« (124)
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(4)-In Mac Arthur v. L a w s o n / 1 2 5 )  Lor(j shand said, "The law will not compel 
parties to enter upon, or in some cases to keep up, a close and intimate relation against 
their will, but will give damages for breach of contract, the most common example is
an engagement to marry  so also in partnership, the law shall not compel specific
implement where the copartnership has not begun, but damages will be given in lieu of 
implement".
(5)-The exceptional hardship that would be involved in performing specifically 
renders the pursuer entitled to dam ages/l^)
It seems that the court cannot order damages if the pursuer applied only for specific 
implement, because there could be no way of assessment to the damages. If specific 
implement is refused by the court, the pursuer would have to raise an action for 
damages. The pursuer, however, may amend his crave by adding an alternative crave 
for damages, (127) so he can secure his right of damages where specific implement 
becomes impossible, (128) or the court decides not to grant it within its discretion for 
exceptional circumstances/129) if the pursuer includes an alternative crave for 
damages, he is not barred from insisting by his crave on a decree of specific 
im plem ent/130) Nevertheless, sometimes even if the pursuer claims specific 
implement, neither specific implement nor damages can be granted. For instance, in 
Leitch v. Edinburgh Ice Co./131) a defender agreed to let a piece of ground to the 
pursuer. It also agreed that the pursuer should receive from the defender the old 
material of the buildings. The pursuer then brought an action against the company for 
damages for breach of contract by the defender in failing to hand him over the old 
. material. It was held; that "the obligation to deliver the old material was an obligation to 
deliver a specific thing, and that as the thing had perished without fault on the part of 
the company, they were not liable in damages for failure to deliver it". It seems that 
neither specific implement nor damages can be granted if failure to perform is neither 
party’s fault.
In Harvey v. Smith. (132) was noticed, " that the second conclusion was 
ancillary to the first, and that if the first conclusion was dismissed, damages could not
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be awarded under the second". Consequently, it is submitted that damages cannot be 
considered as an alternative to specific implement in Scots law, unless there are 
grounds for refusing the remedy of specific implement. Furthermore, an application by 
the pursuer for specific implement and damages together does not affect the court’s 
discretion to award damages as an alternative, if specific implement is refused.
2.2-Damages in substitution for specific performance in Iraqi
civil law
Basically, in Iraqi civil law, damages are not an alternative remedy to specific 
performance. Nevertheless, damages may be granted as an alternative remedy in 
certain circumstances, namely:
1-It was laid down t h a t / 133) j f  j t  j s  not possible to perform the obligation 
specifically because of the debtor's fault, damages are an appropriate remedy instead of 
specific performance. Furthermore, under Article 246 (2) of Iraqi Civil Code, if 
specific performance is too onerous for the debtor he may limit performance to payment 
of a sum of money as indemnity providing that this method of performance does not 
seriously prejudice the creditor/134) xhus> damages may be granted instead of 
specific performance.
2-Damages may be an alternative to specific performance if the contracting parties 
have agreed that it is, regardless of whether specific performance is an appropriate or 
inppropriate r e m e d y / 135) However, if the creditor has applied for specific 
performance, but specific performance cannot be granted, he is not entitled to damages 
alternatively, unless he adds a new crave or amends the original crave, for damages are 
not included implicitly in the original c r a v e / 1 3 6 )  Furthermore, it was stated, ( 1 3 7 )  that 
the court cannot judge or examine something unknown. In addition, the civil court is 
obliged to consider precisely what the plaintiff has applied for. Thus, the court is not 
empowered to grant the applicant more than he has applied for in his petition, or to 
grant him something d i f f e r e n t / 1 3  8) Also, it is in the defendant's interest, that the
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plaintiff should be precise and definite in his petition, to let him know precisely what he 
is supposed to do, to prepare his defence against the a c t io n . ( 1 3 9 )
It seems that the court cannot grant damages instead of specific performance, unless 
the plaintiff has applied for them. It is submitted, however, that the court after 
considering the case, and presuming, that specific performance cannot be granted for 
one reason or another, the court may grant damages automatically. It is unjust to 
deprive the plaintiff of his right of damages, especially when the court becomes aware 
of his right within the action. Further, time and expenditure may be saved.
Nevertheless, it was pointed out (140) that there is no separate option for either 
party to select damages as an alternative to performing the obligation specifically. 
Thus, the creditor is entitled to reject remedies which have been offered by the debtor, 
and to insist on having specific performance. The debtor also is entitled to reject the 
creditor's application for damages instead of specific performance provided that specific 
performance is appropriated 41)
3-According to Article 248 (2) of Iraqi Civil Code, if however, the debtor does not 
fulfil his obligation, the creditor may, upon an order of the court, or in case of urgency 
even without such an order, acquire an article of the same kind at the expense of the 
debtor. Alternatively, he may claim the value of the article without prejudice to his 
rights to damages. It is doubtful whether such performance is specific performance. It 
is submitted, however, that whenever the creditor is unable to obtain the item he has 
contracted for, and obtains money damages to buy that article, specific performance is 
no longer applicable.
Comment
There is concurrence between Iraqi civil law and Scots law as regards whether 
damages are or are not granted alternatively to specific implement. They are granted in 
both laws within certain circumstances. Furthermore, the main considerations for 
granting damages as an alternative remedy to specific implement are either the
219
impossibility of performing the obligation or exceptional hardship or undue difficulty in 
doing so.
The courts in Scotland and Iraq cannot order damages automatically, where specific 
implement is refused, unless damages are sought for alternatively or additionally. That 
is due to the consequences of the ambiguous and indefinite crave.
Section Two:The remedy of interdict and specific performance for 
breach of an obligation to refrain from doing something
An obligation of a negative character (not to do something) may be enforced by an 
action called interdict in Scots law. In Iraqi civil law, it is called specific performance. 
Interdict is different from specific implement although Iraqi civil law considers it as a 
specific performance for breach of an obligation to refrain from doing something. 
Interdict and specific performance as a remedy for breach of an obligation to refrain 
from doing something should be considered in two sub-sections, namely:
Sub-Section 1: The nature of interdict and specific performance as a remedy for 
breach of an obligation to refrain from doing something.
Sub-Section 2: Grounds for granting and refusing interdict and specific 
performance as a remedy for breach of an obligation not to do something.
Sub-Section l:The nature of Interdict and specific performance for 
breach of an obligation of refraining from doing something
Interdict has its own special nature. It is a discretionary, and exceptional remedy. 
By contrast, specific performance as a remedy for breach of an obligation not to do 
something is an ordinary legal remedy. These two remedies will be considered as 
follows:
1-The nature of interdict in Scots law.
2-The nature of specific performance as a remedy for breach of an obligation to 
refrain from doing something in Iraqi civil law.
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1-The nature of interdict in Scots law
Interdict is a remedy ordered by the court "either against a wrong in course of being 
done, or against an apprehended violation of a party's rights, only to be awarded on 
evidence of the wrong, or on reasonable grounds of apprehension that such violation is 
intended".1^42) T h e  process of interdict is by its peculiar nature, quasi- c r i m i n a l / ^ )  
Therefore, it is different from any other civil s u i t / 144) Thus a party is liable to 
summary punishment, fine and imprisonment, and may be held liable for expenses too, 
if he fails to observe the interdict in any p a r t i c u l a r / 145) Furthermore, it is of an 
extraordinary nature, for it is "not to be given except for urgent reasons, and even then 
it is not as a matter of right, but only in the excercise of a sound judicial 
d i s c r e t i o n " / ^ )  An interdict is thus an extraordinary, and discretionary remedy.
Interdict is also a preventative r e m e d y / * 4 7 )  In Hav's Trs. v. Y o u n g / 1 4 8 )  Lord 
Gifford, noticed that, "The remedy of judicial interdict is a most important one, for it 
proceeds on the principle that prevention better than cure, and that in many cases it is 
more expedient to prevent a wrong from being done than merely to attempt to give 
subsequent redress." Further, it "is a preventive proceeding, and by its very nature it 
may competently be invoked in suitable circumstances to restrain the commission in the 
future of a violation of rights not yet committed but only reasonably 
a p p r e h e n d e d " / 1 4 9 )
The court's jurisdiction in granting or refusing interdict is equitable. The court is 
never bound to grant or refuse i n t r d i c t / ^ 0 )  It has been laid d o w n / ^ l )  that "there is 
an equitable power vested in the court in virtue of which, when the exact restoration of 
things to their former conditions is either impossible of would be attended with 
unreasonable loss and expense, quite disproportionate to the advantage which it would 
give to the successful party, the court can award an equivalent -in other words- they can 
say upon what equitable conditions the building should be allowed to remain where it 
is, although it has been placed there without legal right".
As a discretionary remedy, it follows that in many cases it will be inapplicable, or
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will be refused even if there are good grounds in law especially if public interest is 
in v o lv e d /^ )  Furthermore, interdict has been refused by the court in circumstances 
where the other party had trespassed in good faith and unintentionally/^)
It is open to question to whether the discretionary aspect of the remedy means that it 
is equitable and exceptional.
It was also pointed o u t / 154) ^a t the remedy of interdict is "not to be given except 
for urgent reasons". In addition, "even then as a matter of right, but only in the 
exercise of a sound judicial discretion"/155) Furhter, in Earl of Crawford v. 
P a t o n / 1 5 6 )  Lord Salvesen stated that "The court is not in the habit of granting the 
remedy of interdict unless a wrong has been done or is apprehended". It means, that 
granting the remedy of interdict relies on exceptional, and extraordinary 
circumstances/15^) In addition interdict cannot be granted, "unles a wrong has been 
done or is apprehended"/^^) Also, "The essence of a case for interdict is that either 
there is a wrong being actually committed, or that a wrong is apprehended"/159)
Again, "interdicts are granted by this court when appreciable wrong to a man,
whether in his property or other rights is threatend"/!^)
Due to the very peculiar nature of the interdict/1^1) a party failing to perform or to 
observe it may be exposed to a punishment, such as fine and imprisonment/1^^) It is 
of great importance that the courts should make a satisfactory examination of the urgent 
reasons and other circumstances i.e., a wrong being actually committed, or is 
a p p r e h e n d e d  /1  ^ ^) The court may refuse to grant an interdict even when the prayer has 
shown good grounds in law for granting i t / 1^4) in addition, a wrongful or illegal act 
being committed unintentionally and in a good f a i t h / 1^5) may constitute a reason for 
refusing interdict by the equitable jurisdiction of the court. Consequently, the court’s 
discretion is very wide. The court may use that discretion to examine the wrong or 
illegal act, in order to distinguish between completed and continuing wrongs/1 ^ )  for 
such a distinction is substantial for granting or refusing interdict.
Thus the court's discretion is the sole criterion in granting interdict. The equitable
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jurisdiction is applied in favour of granting rather than refusing interdict To the 
contrary, specific implement is based on legal grounds and therefore its not a 
discretionary remedy. Thus, the court's equitable jurisdiction will be applied against 
granting specific implement.
2-The nature of specific performance for breach of the 
obligation of refraining from doing something in Iraqi civil law
When a debtor undertakes to refrain from doing something, and commits a breach 
to such an obligation, the creditor may demand the suppression of the breach of the 
obligation, without prejudice to his right of d a m a g e s / 167) This kind of obligation is 
of an ordinaiy nature. It is the negative character of specific performance, i.e to refrain 
from doing s o m e t h i n g / 1 6 8 )  The nature of specific performance as a remedy for 
breach of the obligation of refraining from doing something is similar in most respects 
to specific performance as a remedy for breach of obligation of doing s o m e t h i n g / ^ )  
In the case of the obligation not to do something, the debtor is regarded as 
performing his obligation as long as he refrains from doing the thing that he has 
promised not to d o / 1 ^ 0 )  The position is changed at the moment the debtor does the 
thing that he has promised not to d o /l^ l)  Therefore, the obligation no longer can be 
respected, namely; "specific performance has become impossible", and damages will be 
granted as an alternative to ordering the debtor not to commit bieach/1^)
Although the remedy for breach of an obligation to refrain from doing something is 
considered in Iraqi civil law as specific performance, it has special characteristics which 
make it slightly different from specific performance for the obligation to do or to give 
something. The obligation not to do something is deemed to have been carried out so 
long as the debtor refrains from doing that thing, but if he breaches such obligation, the 
distinction should be drawn between two cases, namely:
(l)-When it is possible to remove the consequences resulting from the breach by 
ordering the defaulting party to stop his unlawful a c t/^ 3 )  0r the creditor demands the 
court's order to suppress the debtor's a c t / ^ 4 )  specific perfomance can be achieved by
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the the court's judgment/*^5) jf for instance a purchaser A has bought specific goods 
from a seller B. The seller has undertaken under the contract, not to disturb the buyer 
in his enjoyment. The creditor may stop the disturbance by asking the court to compel 
the seller to do so. In this kind of cases the remedy for breach of the obligation of 
refraining from doing something can be fulfilled at any time the debtor commits breach 
to his obligation/*^6)
(2)-When it is impossible to remove the consequences resulting from the breach of 
the obligation, such as if the debtor discloses know-how.
Breach of the obligation in the above case is regarded as an end to the obligation, 
for it is impossible to be performed specifically any more by the debtor. The only 
remedy possible is damages. However, it is not impossible to ordain the party in 
breach to refrain from committing another breach at least for the fu tu re /* ^  It was 
argued^*78) that, as soon as the debtor commits a breach to his obligation, there is no 
alternative but compensation. In addition, the compensation can only be monetary, 
such as if the worker discloses the "know how", the employer cannot demand the 
suppression of the breach because it is impossible for the worker to respect his 
obligation. Thus, the remedy is called specific compensation, and this can occur by 
removing the suppression. The above argument differentiated between specific 
performance and specific compensation by saying that, specific performance always 
takes place before breach of the obligation. Thus, the debtor is considered as 
performing his obligation specifically as long as he refrains from committing breach of 
the obligation, whereas specific compensation always takes place after breach of the 
obligation. Therefore, suppression of infringment is always achieved by specific 
compensation/*79) xhiS above argument has been criticised and rejected, by stating, 
that the purpose of suppression is to reinstate the debtor to his position before the 
infringment took place/*80) Above all, there is no distinction between the obligation 
to refrain from doing something, and performing the obligation to give or to do 
something, for in both specific performance is granted/* ***) Further, the above
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argument ( l^ h a s  been challenged (183) for the following reasons:
It is inconsistent with Article 212 of Civil Code,(1 **4) which provides for the 
obligation to refrain from doing something, with the Chapter, which is devoted to the 
remedy of specific performance, not with the Chapter of compensation in lieu of
performance^
Specific compensation cannot be considered as a remedy for a breach of obligation 
to refrain from doing something, for it has no legal basis. The law classifies two ways 
of performance, either specific performance, or compensation in lieu of performance, 
i.e. "damages" in this respect. In addition, specific compensation seems different from 
specific performance only in the heading, because under the above argument the 
remedy for breach of the obligation to refrain from doing something is considered 
under the subject of specific performance, and the examples are given show that the 
debtor, who infringes his obligation, may be compelled to stop the breach to his 
obligation when it is p o s s i b l e .(^6 )
To what extent can specific performance as a remedy for breach of the obligation to 
refrain from doing something, be regarded as a preventive remedy?
Performance of the obligation not to do something, is fulfilled by warning the 
debtor not to do the thing which he has undertaken not to do, and by reminding him 
that he is subject to the punishnment under Article 240 of Iraqi Criminal C o d e ,(* ^  if 
he disregards the o b l i g a t i o n .^  Basically, the remedy for breach of the obligation to 
refrain from doing something is not a quasi-criminal nature. It is a civil law remedy. 
However, if the debtor insists on committing breach to his obligation after being 
informed not to do so, he then is subject to be punished under the above Article of 
Criminal Code.
There are two kinds of breaches to the obligation of refraining from doing 
something, namely:
1st:-Breach of the obligation, which can be prevented and stopped after being 
committed, and 2nd:-Breach of the obligation, which cannot be stopped and
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prevented after being committed.
In the first case, the obligation is still effective. For instance, "the obligation not to
disturb the purchaser in his enjoyment of the sold item". If the seller commits
breach, he can be enforced to stop that.
In the second case, if for instance the debtor has disclosed know-how which should 
be confidential, thus ordering him not to break his obligation is no longer applicable, 
for it is pointless.
It seems that the remedy of specific performance for breach of obligation of 
refraining from doing something, is a preventive remedy. It can be assumed in the two 
above cases. When it is anticipated that the debtor will break his undertaking, thus, 
providing such expectation is based on reasonable reasons, the court can prevent him 
doing so.
The remedy for breach of the obligation to refrain from doing something is specific 
performance, for if the creditor has applied for it, the court should answer his 
application if performance of the obligation is still possible. It is a matter of right to the 
c r e d i t o r / 1 ^ 9 )  Damages cannot be considered as an alternative to ordering the debtor to 
refrain from doing which he has promised not to d o / 190) Nevertheless, if 
performance of the obligation is exceptionally hard and unduly difficult for the debtor, 
the court will order damages. If, for instance, the court has assumed that suppression 
of the infringment is too onerous for the debtor, it may limit performance to damages, 
provided that this method of performance does not seriously prejudice the 
c r e d i t o r / 1 9 1 )
The court’s discretionary power appears to be stronger in this part of specific 
performance than in the positive part, i.e., "specific performance as a remedy for 
breach of obligation of doing something", especially, if the infringment is recurrable. 
The court, in such a case, shall take the due steps and procedures to prevent the 
recurrence of such infringment whenever it is p o s s i b l e / 192) Where the breach of the 
obligation to refrain from doing something is of such a nature that it cannot recur, 
namely, "can be broken for once", such as in the case of disclosing know-how, the
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only remedy then is damages. The court may use its discretion, however in deciding 
whether the obligation to refrain from doing something is worth respecting after the 
breach has been committed. The court will consider the circumstances and examine the 
nature of every obligation to decide whether specific performance is or is not possible. 
The court may be convinced that the debtor, even after he has broken his obligation, 
can nevertheless usefully be ordered to perform his obligation, at least for the future. 
There upon, the court may compel him to so.
The court's intervention to grant the remedy in the case of the obligation to refrain 
from doing something, does not affect or alter the nature of the remedy as an ordinary 
legal remedy.
Comment
1-In comparing interdict and specific performance as a remedy for breach of 
obligation to refrain from doing something, in both Scots and Iraqi laws, it should be 
observed that each has a different character, for ordering the debtor to refrain from 
doing something is specific performance in Iraqi civil law. It is a remedy for breach of 
an obligation of negative character. Thus, ordering the debtor to respect his obligation 
before he breaches it, and ordering him to stop his infringment if he has committed a 
wrong, means ordering him to respect the obligation which he has undertaken. It is not 
an order to indemnify the creditor. The creditor may be compensated if he has suffered 
loss. Furthermore, whenever it is possible to enforce the obligation against the debtor, 
i.e., "preventing him from doing what he has undertaken not to do", the obligation is 
deemed to have been fulfilled. On the contrary, in Scots law interdict is considered as a 
remedy granted by the court against the party who has committed wrong or is going to 
do so. It is not specific implement.
2-Ordering the debtor to respect what he has promised not to do is not an 
exceptional remedy. It depends on the character of the obligation whether it is of a 
negative or a positive character and, it is surely useful to order the debtor, who has
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already, broken his promise to stop breaking that promise. Also, it depends on the 
state of the debtor who is going to break his obligation. Thus, in these cases, ordering 
the debtor to perform his obligation by the court, is not an exceptional remedy. It is 
performance of the obligation which is of a negative character.
In Scots law, the remedy of interdict is not to be given except for urgent reasons. 
Therefore, it is considered as an extraordinary and exceptional remedy.
3-The Iraqi court has discretion towards granting or refusing specific performance 
as a remedy for breach of an obligation to refrain from doing something, but it cannot 
be said that the remedy is a discretionary remedy. Consequently, performing the 
obligation of refraining from doing something is examined under the same principles as 
those of the obligation to give or to do something. The case of interdict on the other 
hand, is different. It is a discretionary remedy which relies very much on the court’s 
discretionary power.
4-Specific performance for breach of an obligation not to do something, and the 
remedy of interdict, have something in common, namely:
(1)-The contracting party, who has breached the obligation may be exposed to a 
punishment and to a fine.
(2)-Both of the remedies can be regarded as a prophylactic measures against 
breaking the obligation by the contracting party.
Sub-Section 2: Grounds for granting and refusing the remedy of 
interdict, and specific performance for breach of an obligation to 
refrain from doing something
The decision to grant or refuse the remedy of interdict as a remedy for breach 
of an obligation of a negative character depends on the wrong and its 
circumstances. Not every wrong will give grounds for granting or refusing the 
remedy. Also, the court's discretionary power may play a substantial role in 
granting or refusing interdict.
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Specific performance as a remedy for breach of the obligation to refrain from doing 
something is based on the same grounds as those of the remedy for breach of the 
obligation to do something. Granting or refusing the remedy of interdict and specific 
performance will be considered as follows:
1-Grounds for granting or refusing interdict in Scots law.
2-Grounds for granting or refusing specific performance as a remedy for breach of
the obligation to refrain from doing something in Iraqi civil law.
1-Grounds for granting and refusing interdict in Scots law
It was s t a t e d ,(193) that" in many cases it is more expedient to prevent a wrong
from being done than merely to attempt to give subsequent redress". Moreover,
"Interdict may competently be invoked in suitable circumstances to restrain the
commission in the future of violation of right not yet committed but only reasonably 
a p p r e h e n d e d ".(194) Furthermore, it was pointed out that, "the essence of a case for 
interdict is that either there is a wrong being actually committed, or that a wrong is 
a p p r e h e n d e d . "(195) Again, "Broadly speaking, interdict is granted against a wrong 
which is in the course of being committed or where there is reasonable grounds for 
apprehending that a wrong is intended to be committed".
Thus, interdict is competent only against a wrong, but as it was laid down (197) 
that if the act is something which is merely unpleasant or unwelcome, or harmful yet 
permissible in accordance with the law, interdict in such a case is not competent. 
Interdict is not competent against every wrong, although "it is competent to interdict 
only what is a legal wrong and infringement of the complainer's right".(198)
If a contract of sale of goods, for instance, contains a clause under which one of the 
contracting parties is bound to refrain from pursuing some conduct, any breach or 
threat thereof may give the other party the right to claim interdict.(199)
Interdict, it was said, "is not a remedy to be had for asking; it involves penal 
consequences in case of breach; and it will only be given upon clear averment and proof
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of actual or defenitely apprehended invasion of a legal r i g h t " . @ 0 0 )  xhus ^  the case of 
a contracting party who has undertaken not to continue a paricular trade, interdict is the 
appropriate remedy, on the assumption that such an obligation is valid and legal.^01) 
By the same principle a seller who has undertaken not to damage or resale the sold 
goods or even not to disturb the buyer in his enjoyment, interdict is an appropriate 
remedy, because the seller's first obligation is to refrain from committing breach to his 
obligation.
Suppose, that a seller A has sold a car to a buyer B. A has undertaken not to do 
many things under the contract, such as; not to disturb, not to damage the goods, or 
not to resale the thing to another person. Suppose also, that the seller A has broken one 
or more of his undertakings after the completion of the contract. Is the buyer B entitled 
to interdict him from doing so?
The case for interdict is that either there is a wrong being committed, or a wrong is 
apprehended.(202) Further interdict is granted on reasonable grounds against an 
apprehended violation of a party's r ig h ts .^ ^  Thus interdict is granted against the 
seller for the following reasons:
First: 1-The wrong which has been committed by the seller should be either a 
threatened or continuing one, for interdict is regarded in many cases,1(204) ^  
incompetent and inappropriate against a wrong completed. However, if there are 
averments of intention which show that the wrong will continue after being completed, 
interdict in this case is an appropriate re m e d y /^ )  Furthermore, it was pointed out 
by Lord M a c l a r e n , ( 2 0 6 )  that "the complainer has to establish such action on the part of 
the respondent as will justify a reasonable apprehension that they are going to interfer 
with his rights". Thus the above seller will be interdicted if he has committed a 
continuing wrong or a threatened one. The problem which arises here is, under which 
circumstances is the wrong if it is threatened, considered?
2-Interdict is an inappropriate remedy where the act is something just unpleasant or 
unwelcome, or even harmful but legally permissible.^^) should be a threatened 
wrong. It lies with the court's discretionary power to consider whether the wrong is or
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is not threatened. Furthermore, "to support an application for interdict the complainer 
has to establish such action on the part of the respondent as will justify a reasonable 
apprehension that they are going to interfer with his r i g h t s " . ( 2 0 8 )  Also, "Broadly
speaking, interdict is granted against a wrong where there is reasonable grounds for
apprehending that a wrong is intended to be committed".1(209) Thus, the matter of 
reasonable ground is a matter subject to the court's discretion, although the court is 
never bound to grant an equitable jurisdiction unless is sure that granting such judgment 
will not cause another w rong.^W  jn addition, in Winans v. Macrae.^ L o r d  
Young, pointed out that, interdict is granted by the court, if appreciable wrong whether 
in property or in other rights, is threatened, otherwise, no interdict can be granted. In 
Caledonian Rlv. Co. v. Magistrate of G l a s g o w . @ 1 2 )  it was held that, it was premature 
to order interdict, therefore, it was refused. Thus unless there is evidence of an instant 
threat or intention to do so, interdict cannot be decreed.
3-It seems that there are two substantial elements in considering whether the wrong 
is threatened, namely:
(1)-The court's discretionary power towards granting or refusing interdict.
(2)-The evidence which shows that the defender is intending to commit a wrong.
4-If a wrong is a continuing one, interdict is the appropriate rem edy.^ 
Nevertheless in Hood v.Trail.(214) interdict is considered inappropriate against a 
wrong which is contingent and which may not arise.
In Gavin v.Ayrshire Countv Council. ^ i t  was laid down by Lord Cooper that 
"Interdict is a preventive proceeding and by its very nature it may competently be 
invoked in suitable circumstances to restrain the commission in the future of a violation 
of rights not yet committed but only reasonably apprehended. That is a general rule. 
But when the subject of an application for interdict is an anticipated nuisance, the rule 
requires to be formulated with greater precision. There are certain operations or works
which are "ticketed by law as nuisance because the law holds that they cannot be
carried on without constituting a nuisance..". He added that, "I should have great
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difficulty in regarding these apprehensions as reasonable, much less as presenting that 
degree of strong probability which the rule requires. The best that can be said for such 
speculative fears is that it is not impossible that at some unpredictable future date the 
envisaged concatenation of circumstances may occur. But that is all, and that will not 
suffice".^16)
5-There is no difficulty in considering whether a wrong is a completed or a 
continuing one, as the court within its discretionary power can examine the 
circumstances. Thus a completed wrong may be interdicted if it is likely to r e c u r , @ 1 7 )
Secondlv:-The wrong which has been committed or is apprehended, should be 
illegal. Thus, "to justify the interposition of the court in granting an intertdict, the party 
applying for it must show a legal title to the subject, of which his use and enjoyment 
and right of possession are alleged to be unlawfully interferred with; and further, he 
must show either that there has been plain invasion on his property by a party having 
no right or title whatever in or to the subject or its u s e . . .".(218) jf  seller in the 
above example has disturbed the buyer because he is unpaid seller, no interdict can be 
granted against him. Furthermore, "interdict is competent against a threat to 
dispossess, as the taking of corporeal movables without the possesser's consent would 
b e , civilly, spuilzie and, criminally, possibly theft".1(219) Thus, an unpaid seller, who 
still retains possession of the goods under the right of lien until payment of the price, 
may justify interdict against the buyer who wants to take possession of the goods,(220) 
because the seller still has lawful title to possession of the goods. If the seller lawfully 
has disturbed or even prevented the buyer from taking possession of the goods, the 
buyer cannot interdict him from doing so, because, "A decree of permanent interdict is 
an order prohibiting a defender from doing an illegal a c t " , ( 2 2 1 )  o n  a n  assumption that 
the buyer has broken one or more of the contract's conditions. It can be concluded 
then, that the pursuer should not give the defender any opportunity to raise any legal 
claim against him. Otherwise, the wrong that has been committed or apprehended will 
be regarded as lawful, and therefore no interdict can be ordered.
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T h ird lv :-The wrong should not be committed in good faith,(222) or 
mistakenly,1(223) o r  a c c i d e n t a l l y . ^ ^ )  consider these facts, the court, in deciding 
whether to order or to refuse interdict, examines its equitable jurisdiction. The court, as 
has already been considered,1(225) jjas wj(je discretionary power to grant or refuse 
interdict.
Examining the circumstances surrounding the wrong itself is vital for granting 
interdict, for the wrong may be committed in good faith, or mistakenly or accidentally. 
Therefore the remedy will not be granted.
Finally, interdict is a decree issued by the court to order a defender to refrain from 
doing something. Granting or refusing interdict is based on the nature of the wrong, 
i.e., "threatened, committed, continuing" in accordance with the court's discretionary 
power.
On the contrary, specific implement is a legal remedy if the goods are specific or 
ascertained. Also, the wrong does not play any role in granting the remedy of specific 
implement, although it could be a reason for refusing it when the wrong is committed 
by the purchaser. Furthermore, there is no difference between seller or buyer, i.e., 
"any party to the contract is subject to be interdicted".
2-Grounds for granting or refusing specific performance as a remedy 
for breach of an obligation to refrain from doing something in Iraqi
civil law
Ordering the debtor to respect his obligation of refraining from doing what he has 
undertaken not to do, is subject to the same grounds those have already been 
c o n s i d e r e d .(226) However, it is doubtful whether the debtor's refusal to perform his 
obligation of refraining from doing something is subject to the court's discretionary 
power. Nevertheless, the remedy is not for the court to grant if it thinks fit. It must 
grant it whenever it is possible, for the following reasons:
1-It is considered as a specific performance,'(227) ^  the court's discretionary 
power plays little part.
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2-If performing the obligation to refrain from doing something is possible, the 
court must order the debtor to comply with it. No other alternative remedy can be 
ordered.
Specific performance as a remedy for breach of the obligation, whether, to do or 
not to do, cannot be granted unless it is applied for to the court by the creditor.1 jn 
the case of a threat to breach the obligation, the thing that the creditor can do, is to tell 
the court about it. The court will take the due steps to prevent such threat or it may 
warn him of the consequences of breaking his obligation. The court will examine the 
possibility of breaking the obligation, and if it thinks that the debtor is serious in his 
threat, warn him to respect the obligation. If the threat remains, and later the wrong is 
committed, that may convince the court to compel him to a greater penalty than if the 
wrong had been committed without persistance. This occurs when performance of the 
obligation is impossible. Where the obligation can be fulfilled even after being broken, 
the court orders the debtor to stop his infringment, and forces him to pay the penalty if 
he insists on not respecting the decree, taking into account the loss suffered by the 
creditor and the creditor's unjustifiable attitude.
Where the debtor refuses to comply with the obligation of refraining from doing 
something legally, that means that he is entitled not to perform his obligation by one 
way or the other, for in bilateral contracts in Iraqi civil law, if one of the parties does 
not peform his obligation, the other party may, after serving a formal summons on the 
debtor, demand the performance of the contract or its rescission with damages if 
due.(229) Further, under Article 178 of the Civil Code the parties may agree that, in 
case of non-performance of the obligations flowing from the contract, the contract will 
be deemed to have been rescinded "ipso facto" without a court's j u d g m e n t . ( 2 3 0 )  
Thus, whenever the debtor has an excuse, i.e. "legal excuse" not to perform, the 
creditor cannot compel him to do so. In the sale of goods contract, the seller is obliged, 
for instance, not to disturb or not to claim any right on the goods against the buyer. 
Suppose that the buyer has not paid the price. The seller in claiming repossession of
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the property or in disturbing the buyer’s enjoyment, is not deemed to have committed 
breach to his obligation. If the wrong has been committed or the breach of the 
obligation of refraining from doing something has occurred by mistake or in good faith 
or accidentally, the court will compel him to stop breaking the obligation. It seems that 
the court’s order depends on the nature and the kind of the obligation whether it is 
possible to be repaired or it is impossible to be performed specifically, after committing 
a b r e a c h . (231) The debtor is deemed to have committed a wrong when he does not 
perform his obligation, whether deliberately or by negligence,1(232) because the 
debtor's obligation is an obligation to achieve a result i.e., refraining from doing the 
thing that he has promised not to do.(233) Therefore, whenever the debtor does not 
achieve that result, he is deemed to have breached his obligation.
Iraqi civil jurisprudence and the judiciary are silent concerning the matter of specific 
performance as a remedy for committing a wrong or breaching a contract mistakenly or 
in good faith or accidentally. However, it is submitted that the debtor is obliged to 
respect his obligation and to stop breaking his promise if the obligation can be carried 
on after committing breach, such as to stop the seller from disturbing the buyer, and 
ordering him to pay damages if they are due. Nevertheless, if the obligation cannot be 
carried on after committing breach, the debtor should be compelled to pay damages, for 
performing the obligation specifically becomes impossible.
The kind of obligation of refraining from doing something, whether it can or cannot 
be carried on after committing breach, plays an essential role in ordering or refusing 
specific performance, and in the way that the court exercises its discretionary power 
towards the problem of granting or refusing the remedy. Nevertheless, the principles 
in Article 246 (1) of Civil Code, which provides; "A debtor shall be compelled to 
perform his obligation specifically, if such performance is possible", govern the whole 
matter.
Comment
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The remedy of interdict in Scots law and specific performance for breach of an 
obligation to refrain from doing something in Iraqi civil law, have something in 
common; both of them are based on the wrong, whether it has been committed or it is 
being committed or it will be committed, taking into account the nature of the 
obligation, and whether it is possible to be performed after being broken by ordering 
the debtor to stop his wrong or it is rendered impossible at the moment that the 
contracting party breaks the obligation. Also, in both laws, the seller and the 
purchaser are equal in obtaining such a remedy. Nevertheless, Iraqi civil law and Scots 
law are entirely different upon certain cases, namely:
Interdict in Scotland is an entirely discretionary remedy. It is granted under the 
court's discretionary power even if the wrong is a continuing one, although the 
possibility of granting interdict in such a case is very strong compared with the other 
cases. In Iraqi civil law, the case is different, for specific performance as a remedy for 
breach of the obligation to refrain from doing something, is a matter of right and not a 
matter of discretion. Nevertheless it may be subject to the court's discretionary power 
more than the other positive character of the remedy, i.e. "to do or to give something", 
because specific performance as a remedy is based, on wrongs which need to be 
examined by the court. However, ordering the debtor not to do something, is not a 
discretionary remedy, for the grounds of granting and refusing the remedy are the same 
in both the positive and negative aspects of this remedy.
CONCLUSION
1-Specific implement should and must be isolated from any influence of the 
adequacy test, for if there is any influence by such a principle, specific implement 
becomes a remedy of a different nature, one which will not be granted readily. Also, 
the criterion by which damages can be tested as adequate or inadequate is not settled in 
one rule. It depends on the circumstances in each case. In addition, the principle of 
adequacy carries with it another test, which is the test of uniqueness.
2-If the adequacy test and the uniqueness test interfere in the principles of specific
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implement and are accepted as a principle governing the grant or refusal of the remedy, 
specific implement will become an equitable, exceptional, extraordinary and 
discretionary remedy.
3-Damages in addition to specific implement are granted whenever there is 
dissatisfaction with the performance of the contract, where the creditor, "the buyer", 
has suffered loss or has been deprived of benefit by reason of the debtor's fault.
4-Damages as an alternative remedy to specific implement are not ordered, unless 
there are grounds for doing so.
5-The decision to refuse specific implement and grant damages alternatively is 
based on equitable grounds besides other legal grounds. However, granting specific 
implement should not be a matter of discretion, but of legal grounds.
6-Interdict is entirely subject to the court's discretionary power in Scots law. 
Therefore, it is a discretionary, equitable, and extraordinary remedy. It is of different 
nature from specific implement. On the contrary, specific performance for breach of an 
obligation to refrain from doing something in Iraqi civil law, is specific performance. 
There is no difference between it and specific performance as a remedy for breach of an 
obligation to do or to give something.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURES
Introduction
An action of specific implement is brought to determine whether it is an appropriate 
remedy. To raise an action of specific implement in the court, certain steps and 
procedures are required, which affect both the existence and the validity of the remedy. 
Two fundamental issues will be considered, namely:
Section one: Jurisdiction.
Section Two: Procedures
Section one: Jurisdiction
The court which hears the action of specific implement should consider the 
competency of its jurisdiction. Two categories of courts will be considered in dealing 
with the jurisdiction, namely:
Sub-section: 1 -The Court of First Instance.
Sub-section:2-The High Court.
Sub-Section: 1-The Court of First Instance
An action of specific implement is usually amenable to the jurisdiction of the Sheriff 
Court and Court of First Instance in Iraq, unless circumstances stipulate otherwise. 
The court may have privative jurisdiction towards the action of specific implement in 
certain cases. The Court of Session may also act as a Court of First Instance. 
However, in this study, it will not be considered in detail. The study is devoted to 
examining the Sheriff Court and the Court of First Instance as follows:
1-Sheriff Court in Scotland.
2-Court of First Instance in Iraq.
1-The Sheriff Court in Scotland
The Sheriff Court's civil jurisdiction is wide.^^ Actions for damages or debt are 
within the court's jurisdiction without any upper pecuniary l i m i t .  (2) In addition, the
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Sheriff Court has privative jurisdiction in all causes if the value of the causes does not 
exceed £1500 exclusive of expenses and interest. Such a cause must be brought to the 
Sheriff Court only, and it is not subject to the review of the Court of Session,^) The 
Sheriff Court's jurisdiction in such a case is considered exclusive and its decision is 
final, according to statute.^) However such cases are now brought as summary 
causes,(5) and the provisions on appeal in regard to such causes apply to them. Under 
them a case appealed to the Sheriff principal can be further appealed to the Outer house 
of the Court of Session on point of law if the Sheriff principal gives leave.
The Sheriff Court privative jurisdiction is subject to one exception, provided by 
S.26 of Court of Session Act 1988, which permits the summary trial by the Lord 
Ordinary of the Court of Session on any dispute or question not affecting the status of 
any person which might competently be the subject of any cause in the Outer House, or 
which might competently have been the subject of any such cause but for the provision 
of S.7 of the 1907 Act.
The issue of how the value of the cause is to be determined, is fully considered in 
the undemoted w orks.^
To what extent can the remedy of specific implement be granted within the court's 
privative jurisdiction?
The court can grant specific implement in an action of sale of goods, for when the 
action is within the court's privative jurisdiction, there is no reason why the court 
cannot grant specific implement if there are no equitable circumstances or grounds of 
law stand against granting it.
Civil Jurisdiction and Judgment Act 1982, in Sched.8, Rule 2 (1) provides that "a 
person who has no fixed residence may be sued in a court within whose jurisdiction he 
is personally cited". Furthermore, Rule 2(2) provides that "in matters relating to a 
contract, a person may be sued in the court for the place of performance of the 
obligation in question". In comparing the above Rule and Sec. 6 of Sheriff Courts 
(Scotland) Act 1907, which provides "Any action competent in the Sheriff Court may
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be brought within the jurisdiction of the Sheriff: (f-) where the action relates to a 
contract the place of execution or performance of which is within the jurisdiction, and 
the defender is personally cited.", the difference is clear, for "Under Sched.8 rule 2(2) 
the Sheriff has Jurisdiction over the defender if the place of performance of the 
particular contractual obligation which gives rise to the pursuer’s claim is situated 
within the Sheriffdom, and rule 2 (2) does not require personal citation of the defender 
within the jurisdiction".^) However, there has been no consideration as to where the 
contract was made either in S. 6 of the Sheriff Courts (Scotland) Act 1907, or in rule 2 
(2) of Civil Jurisdiction and Judgment Act 1982
Where the action relates to non-performance, the action should be raised in the- 
Sheriff Court in whose jurisdiction performance ought to have been made.(^) It is 
submitted, therefore, that the Sheriff Court in such a case may order specific implement 
if the contract, for instance, is for sale of goods, for the Sheriff Court has jurisdiction 
in respect of any action relating to the contract which seems in many means, either to 
enforce the contract or to compel damages for non-performance, or for an action in 
order to declare the meaning of that contract.^)
According to Civil Jurisdiction and Judgment Act 1982 Sched. 8 rule 1 domicile is 
the principal ground of jurisdiction. It provides that, "persons shall be sued in the 
courts for the place where they are domiciled". It has been s t a t e d , (10) that, "For the 
purpose of the 1982 Act, it is vital to appreciate that domicile is accorded a meaning 
entirely different from that which it has in Scots law when referred to as a ground of 
jurisdiction in status actions (i.e., the country or territory where a person has his 
permanent home). In the 1982 Act domicile has its continental European meaning of 
something approximating to habitual residence".
If an action for delivery of goods has been brought to the Sheriff Court by a 
pursuer who is resident within the Sheriffdom, the Sheriff Court shall examine all 
conditions relating to the defender's residence and to the remedy sought. Specific 
implement will be granted if it is an appropriate remedy. If the remedy of specific 
implement is inapplicable, damages will be compelled alternatively.
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The Sheriff Court, which parties have agreed is to have jurisdiction to settle 
disputes which have arisen or which may arise in connection with a particular legal 
relationship, will have exclusive jurisdiction,'( H )  with certain e x c e p t i o n s / ^ )  Also the 
court has jurisdiction over the defender when the movable property is situated within 
the Sheriffdom, according to Sched. 8 rule. 2 (9) of Civil Jurisdiction and Judgment 
Act 1982. The court may proceed on actions of specific implement or damages. Thus, 
the pursuer has no choice but to raise his action against the defender whether in the 
Sheriff Court for the place where the defender is domiciled in Scotland, or in the court 
for the place of implement of the obligation in question. The pursuer may also sue the 
defender, in a court within whose jurisdiction he, (the defender), is personally cited, if 
he has no fixed place of r e s i d e n c e / ^ )  If the debtor is not domiciled in Scotland or in 
another parts of the United kindom, it is p r o v i d e d / ^ )  that he is sued in the courts; (a-) 
where any of his movables property has been arrested, or; (b-) the situation of his 
immovable property in which he has benefical interest.
By rule (15), certain sub-rules have been provided for;
1-In case of the defender being one of many defenders, he is sued in the court for 
the place where any one of them is d o m i c i l e d / ^ )
2-In case of counterclaim arising from the same contract, the court which has 
jurisdiction over such an action is the court in which the original claim is p e n d i n g / ^ )
Where the defender is domiciled in England or Wales, he is, in this case and 
according to sched 4 Article (5), subject to the Scottish Court's jurisdiction, if  what is 
sought to be performed is a contract, and if Scotland is the place of implement of that 
c o n t r a c t / I f  the defender is domiciled neither in Scotland nor in the United 
kingdom but within another E.E.C. member state, by Sched. 1 Article 5 (1) the 
Scottish Court would have jurisdiction if what is sought to be performed is a contract 
where Scotland is the place of its performance.
As domicile represents the basis of the jurisdiction, it assumes a great importance. 
It has been said that "domicile for the purpose of the Act has now statutory meaning
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differing widely from its long established meaning in Scots la w " .( 18)
According to Sec. 41 (2,3,4), an individual is domiciled in the United Kingdom if 
(a)- "he is resident in the United Kingdom, (b)-the nature and circumstances of his 
residence indicate that he has a substantial connection with the United Kingdom". 
Under Sec. 41 (6),where a defender has been resident in the United Kingdom or in a 
particular part of the United Kingdom for a period of time not less than three months or 
more than three months, "Sub-section 3 (b) shall be presumed to be fulfilled unless the 
contrary is proved". This means "unless the contrary be shown, he "the individual" is 
presumed to have a substantial connection with the United Kingdom and with that
p a r t " . ( l ^ )
Thus, the Sheriff Court's jurisdiction under Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 
1982 is either to grant damages or to compel performance of the contract, for an action 
relating to a contract, could be an action for specific implement or an action for damages 
or other a c t io n s .^ )  Further, the defender might be ordered by the Sheriff Court to 
perform his obligation specifically, or he might be ordered to pay damages altenatively, 
where he has no fixed residence, but he has been cited personally.^!)
When a defender is domiciled in a Sheriffdom with more than one Sheriff Court 
district the pursuer may seek to sue him in any court of that Sheriffdom; but a Sheriff 
Clerk may decline to cite a defender domiciled in another court district, and the Sheriff 
at a paricular court is entitled to exercise a discretion whether to issue a warrant of 
citation if  the defender is more suitably amenable to another court o f the 
S h e r i f f d o m . ( 2 2 )
In terms of Rule 2 ( 3 )  of Sched. 8, "a person who is not domiciled in the United 
Kindom may be sued in the courts of any place where (i) any movable property 
belonging to him has been arrested. This rule is applicable to defenders who are not 
domiciled in the United Kingdom. Thus, the Sheriff Court will have jurisdiction over a 
defender if the moveable property is arrested within the S h e r i f f d o m . ( 2 3 )
The effect of arrestment to found jurisdiction, it has been suggested, "is only to
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subject the defender to jurisdiction of the court in the particular action in which it is 
u s e d " .(24) jf the pursuer desires to retain the subject to be available for satisfaction of 
any decree which he may obtain against the defender, he must obtain and use a warrant 
for arrestment on the dependence of the a c t i o n . ( 2 5 )
The pursuer in any action has the choice of forum. He has the right to bring his 
action either in the Sheriff Court or in the Court of Session (The Outer House), and 
vice versa. Further the Sheriff Court may remit the case to the Court of Session and 
vice versa. In a recent case, the pursuer's choice of forum has been confirmed. In 
Macintosh v.British Railway's Board, the pursuer brought his action to the Lord 
Ordinary instead of the Sheriff Court. The Lord Ordinary remitted the case to the 
Sheriff Court. It was held that "(4)-although the Lord Ordinary had had regard to the 
practical and procedural advantages of the action remaining in the Court of Session he 
had placed too much reliance on the factors of smallness and simplicity and had not 
given proper regard to the pursuer's right to choose the forum in which to pursue his 
claim, and that he had accordingly misdirected himself in l a w . . ".(26)
It was stated,(27) that "Parliament has deprived the Court of Session of jurisdiction 
in cases which are within the privative jurisdiction in the Sheriff Court, but in all other 
cases there is concurrent jurisdiction. The pursuer is entitled to avail himself of the 
jurisdiction of whichever court he finds more convenient or appropriate to his own 
circumstances. It is not for the court to deprive him of his choice on grounds which 
could apply generally to every case of that type."
The Sheriff Court may be competent not only as a Court of First Instance, but may 
act as a Court of Appeal in certain conditions. The competency of appeals from the 
Sheriff to the Sherif Principal is regulated by the provision of S.27 of 1907 Act. An 
appeal to the Sheriff Principal is competent without leave, against all final judgments of 
the Sheriff. (28) Thus an interlouctor making an order ad factum praestandum may be 
appealed without leave to the Sheriff Principal.(29) Such orders include an order to 
make consignation,(30) and an award of interim access to which an order for delivery 
is attached.(31)
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Where a statute empowers a Sheriff to make a certain order and does not describe 
procedures, the ordinary form in the Sheriff Court will apply, which is that there 
should be an appeal from the Sheriff to the Sheriff Principal. (3 2) Thus a Sheriff 
Principal may entertain an appeal against a recall of arrestment by the Sheriff. (3 3) 
Also, an appeal is competent without leave against an interlocutor which is incompetent 
in the sense that the Sheriff had no power or right to pronounce it.(34)
2-Court of First Instance in Iraq
The court, according to the Civil Procedure C o d e , (35) has jurisdiction over actions 
of different n a t u r e . (36) These actions take two forms, namely:
First: Actions subject to review by the the Court of Appeal, as a Court of 
Cassation not as a Court of Appeal.
Secondly: Actions subject to the Court of Appeal and the Court of Cassation.
First:- Actions subject to review by the Court of Appeal.
It has been established that many actions are subject to the jurisdiction of Court of 
First Instance in Iraq. They are as follow:
1-Actions relating to movables and debts up to 500 D in a rs .^ ? ) These actions of 
such value of cause are subject to review by the Court of Appeal as a Court of 
Cassation.1(38) if the value of the cause is more than 500 Dinars but less than 1000 
Dinars, the action then is subject to review by the Court of Cassation without being 
reviewed by the Court of A p p e a l .^ )
2-Actions of due instalments up to 500 D i n a r s . (34)
Secondly:-Actions subject to review by the Court of Appeal and the Court of
Cassation, namely:
1-Whenever the value of the cause is more than 1000 Dinars, the action is subject
to the Court of Appeal review and the Court of Cassation review .^)
2-All bankruptcy a c t io n s .^ )
The value of the cause of the action plays role in the competency of the court. To
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know whether the action is subject to the Court of Appeal alone or to the Appeal and the 
Court of Cassation together. How the value of the cause is determined, and in which 
circumstances the value of the cause will be considered and estimated, are fundamental 
questions in relation to the competent jurisdiction.
Iraqi civil procedures law has clarified the case of the value of the cause, and a 
general rule has been established to consider such a case. The value of the cause of any 
action has to be considered in accordance with the original petition at the time of raising 
the action.'(43) Any later change in the action or any alteration to the procedures 
thereafter, has no effect on the initial competency of the action in the court. 
Unfortunately, Iraqi jurisprudence and civil procedures law are totally silent on whether 
interests and expenses are excluded or included. It is submitted, however, that the 
interests and expenses are excluded in general, but in exceptional cases should be 
included, such as, if the nature of the dispute requirers it. Nevertheless, it is preferable 
to leave the question of the nature of the dispute, and whether interests and expenses 
constitute part of the disputed sum, to the court’s discretionary power.
The importance of considering the value of the cause is to state the fee of the 
competent court and to decide whether the action is reviewed by the Court of Appeal or 
the Court of Cassation.
It is questionable whether the Court of First Instance privative jurisdiction is 
competent. All the Court of First Instance decisions, by virtue of civil procedure law, 
are either under review by the Court of Appeal or the Court of C a s s a t i o n . ^ )  If the 
value of the cause is less than 500 Dinars, the action is subject to review by the Court 
of Appeal. If, on the other hand, it is more than 500 Dinars, it is reviewed by the Court 
of Cassation Court. It seems then that the court has no privative jurisdiction.
The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance is very wide and covers different 
actions. One of these is the action of remedy of specific performance. In considering 
the case of specific performance by the Court of First Instance, it should be taken into 
consideration that the remedy is an ordinary legal r e m e d y . ^ )  jt i s  compelled
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whenever performance of the obligation is possible, (47) regardless of whether the 
obligation is to pay sum of money or to deliver movables. The court, according to the 
civil procedure law, has jurisdiction as regards all actions relating to debt or movables 
up to 500 Dinars. Thus, the court can grant the remedy of specific performance. The 
same is applied to actions of instalments, actions of possession,1(48) and actions of 
interdiction of an insolvent d e b t o r . ^ )
The Court's jurisdiction is also competent over actions where the value of the cause 
is over 1000 Dinars, or actions of bankruptcy and liquidation. These kinds of action 
are subject to review by the Court of Appeal as appellate court, and subject to review by 
the Court of Cassation t h e r e a f t e r . ^ )  it is submitted, however, that the court in these 
actions will grant specific performance if it is an appropriate remedy. It has the 
jurisdiction to do so.
As a general rule that the jurisdiction is based on domiciled 1) However, domicile, 
according to Iraqi Civil Code, in Article 24, "is the place where a person resides 
whether permanently or temporarily. A person may have more than one domicile at the 
same time". Thus, in an action for movables or due debt, where the defendant is an 
individual, the competent court for reviewing such an action is the court where the 
defendant is d o m i c i l e d . ^ )  if the defendant is a corporate body, or under liquidation, 
the action should be brought in the court for the place where the main branch is 
s i t u a t e d . ( 5 3 )  if  there are many defendants to the action, the competent court is the court 
where one of them is domiciled. The plaintiff can choose one of them to raise his 
action.(54)
The court's jurisdiction over immovables is competent according to Article 36 of 
Iraqi Civil Procedures Code. Further, in an action relating to a contract, the action 
should be brought in the court for the place where the obligation has to be performed, 
or in the court which has been agreed to be c o m p e t e n t . ^ )  o r  i n  the court for the place 
where the contract was made.(56) Furthermore, if the defendant is a bankrupt debtor, 
the action in such a case should be brought in the court for the place where the 
merchant's place of business is situated.^) if  he has several places of business the
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action should be brought in the court for the place where his main or central place for 
business is situated.^)
Where the defendant is not domiciled in Iraq and has no residence there, the action 
is raised in the court for the place where the plaintiff is d o m i c i l e d . ^ )  However, if the 
plaintiff has no residence in Iraqi territory, the action should be raised in one of the 
Iraqi courts situated in B a g h d a d . ( 6 0 )
Comment
In comparing the two systems i.e., (Iraqi and Scots) regarding the jurisdiction of 
the Court of First Instance and the Sheriff Court, the following issues arise:
1-As regards the matter of privative jurisdiction.
The Court of First Instance in Iraq has no privative jurisdiction. It could be 
considered as a defect in the Iraqi Civil Procedures Code which should be seriously 
taken into consideration, for the court should have its own independent character, at 
least in few certain cases. Depriving the court of any privative jurisdiction renders its 
decisions reliant on the higher court in every case, which overburdens the higher court.
On the contrary, the matter of privative jurisdiction is well settled and very well 
established in the Sheiff Court in Scotland. In this respect, therefore, Scots law is 
more practical than Iraqi law.
2-In Scots law if the value of the cause is less than £1500, the action will not be 
reviewed by the Court of Session subject to statutory provisions regulating summary 
cause a p p e a ls .^ !)  While in Iraqi civil procedure law, if the value of the cause is less 
than 500 Dinars the action will not be excluded from review by the higher c o u r t.^ )  
Also, if the value of the cause is more than 1000 Dinars the actions is subject to the 
review of the Court of Appeal and the Court of Cassation.
3-As regards specific p e r f o r m a n c e , ^ )  the Court of First Instance and the Sheriff 
Court have competent jurisdiction over actions whether to grant or to refuse the 
remedy. The differences in considering the remedy of specific implement if they exist,
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might be found in a very details between the two systems which cannot be considered 
in this work. Nevertheless, there is one matter relating to the jurisdiction of the two 
courts which is the competent jurisdiction over a contract or related to a contract, 
especially the place where the obligation was made. The action should be raised either 
in the court for the place where the contract was made or where it has to be performed, 
in accordance with Article 37 (1) of Civil Procedures Code. While in Scots law, the 
action should be raised in the court for the place of performance of the c o n t r a c t . ^ )  
Thus, according to Scots law no consideration is given to the place in which the 
contract is made.(65)
The practical consequences of this inconsistency between the two systems in this 
particular case are:
1-The Iraqi law is more flexible, because the action can be brought either in the 
court for the place where the contract was made or in the court for the place where the 
contract has to be performed.
2-The plaintiff is free to raise the action in different courts and is not restricted to 
the court for the place where the contract has to be performed. This difference between 
the two systems reflects the jurisdiction of each court.
Finally, one major difference between the Sheriff Court and the Court of First 
Instance is that the Sherif court (Sheriff principal) may exercise jurisdiction as an a 
appellate court, where as the Court of First Instance has no such competent jurisdiction.
Sub-section 2: The High Court
In Scotlandthe judgment of the inferior court may or may not be amenable to review 
by the higher court, in accordance with the circumstances of the action and the value of 
the cause. In Iraqi procedure law the action is amenable to the jurisdiction of the higher 
courts, which are the Court of Appeal and the Court of Cassation. In this study, I will 
avoid considering the Court of Cassation as a supreme court, and concentrate on the 
Court of Appeal, in order to achieve a more concentrated study and useful comparison.
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For the same reason, I shall not refer to the House of Lords. Similarly, the study will 
concentrate on the Court of Session as a high court of Appeal not as a Court of First 
Instance, which will be considered only briefly. The Sheriff Principal also is 
considered as an appellate court, although this has already been examined b r i e f l y . ( 6 6 )
1-Court of Session in Scotland.
2-Appeal Court in Iraq.
1-The Court of Session
The Court of Session is the superior civil court in Scotland. It "is likewise both a 
Court of First Instance and a Court of Appeal".1(67) it has jurisdiction over actions 
founded on contracts and obligations, "whether bilateral as in the case of contracts, or- 
unilateral; and whether for implement or for damages in respect of breach of contract, 
or refusal to fulfil a unilateral obligation, as well as actions of damages founded on 
delict or injury, may be brought in either court irrespective of the sum concluded for, 
unless it is under £25 (now £1500)".(68) The Court of Session has power to grant 
remedy in whatever form may be necessary for the redress of wrong and for making 
rights effectual (69) Further, petitory actions, whatever their object, for instance 
actions for delivery of goods, and actions to enforce implement of the contract,'(70) are 
competent either in the Court of Session or in the Sheriff Court. Thus, the Court of 
Session has jurisdiction in respect of contracts which are made or to be performed, 
within Scotland is the locus contractus or the locus solutionis, and, where there is no 
other ground of amenability, the defender is cited in Scotland. (71)
In exercising its original jurisdiction, the Court of Session acts in certain cases as a 
Court of First instance.^) An ordinary action may be brought before a Lord Ordinary 
The jurisdiction of a Lord Ordinary is almost exclusively original. By virtue of his 
original jurisdiction, he is a judge of first instance in cases above (£1500) in value.(73) 
The judgment of a Lord Ordinary, if not brought under review within the time fixed by 
statute, has the authority of a judgment of the court, but is not a precedent binding the 
Inner House.(74)
The Court of Session has power to order remedy in whatever form may be
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important and necessary to make rights e f fe c tiv e .^ )  Furthermore, it exercises its 
jurisdiction in many ways, such as, declaratory, possessory, protective, suspensive, 
and petitory or rescissory. Thus, in petitory actions,1(76) the action could be for a 
decree ad factum  praestandum  to enforce performance of the contract, or an action for 
payment of money, as in dam ages.^?) Also, the court has jurisdiction in respect of the 
subject-matter as long as the value of the cause exceeds £1500,(78) and the defender is, 
or can be made, subject to its jurisdiction.(79) The defender is subject to the court’s 
jurisdiction if he is resident in Scotland,(80) or, when the nature and circumstances of 
residence indicate that he has a substantial connection with Scotland/**!) Residence in 
Scotland for three months is enough to indicate a substantial connection.(82) Thus the 
Court of Session has jurisdiction in every kind of action or proceeding, particularly, all 
petitory actions/*^) in addition, movable property situated within Scotland is amenable 
to the jurisdiction of the court,1( ^ )  within the circumstances of the value of the cause.
The arrestment of movable property establishes jurisdiction in all petitory actions. 
Arrestment on the dependence of an action in the court proceeds on a warrant contained 
in the summons, (85) and may be recalled or restricted by the court.(86) Also, the 
court jurisdiction is competent in actions of damages for breach of contract or actions 
for implement of contract or for d e l i c t i )
It seems, that the court's jurisdiction over the action for the remedy of specific 
implement is competent. The defender is subject to the jurisdiction of the court,where 
the above circumstances exist.
The Court of Session as a Supreme Civil Court in Scotland, exercises an appellate 
jurisdiction by virtue of which it can review on the merits certain of its own decisions, 
the decisions of lower civil courts, including the Sheriff Court.(88)
Before considering the competency of appeal to the Court of Session, it should be 
remembered that the pursuer has the choice of forum in the appeal level similar to the 
choice of forum in the first stage. Thus he may bring the action to the Sheriff principal 
or to the Court of Session, and vice versa.
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The competency of appeal to the Court of Session is regulated by Sec. 2 8  of the 
1 9 0 7  Act, such as, final judgment,'(^9) interlocutory judgments appealable without 
leave,1(90) interlocutory judgment appealable with leave.(91) Further, the Court of 
Session has power to review by way of appeal, reduction,(92) or suspension,(93) the 
proceedings of inferior courts and tribunals, including the Sheriff Court, and may set 
aside any incompetent or irregular proceedings,(94) and may regulate any failure by the 
court to exercise jurisdiction.(95) The interlocutor complained of is regarded by the 
appellate court as valid until it is shown that there is reason for altering it.(96)
The Court of Session after exercising its competent jurisdiction in relation to the 
action under review, should follow certain proceedings. The court rehears the 
case.(9^) It means th a t" the appellate court considers the pleadings, productions and 
other documents which were before the court below, including any notes of evidence, 
and any additional materials properly before the appellate court itself; hears the 
submissions of the parties, which may be on any matter relative to any of the 
interlocutors pronounced in the case; and reaches its own decision, altering or recalling 
the interlocutor or interlocutors complained of if, on full consideration, it concludes that 
the court below was w r o n g " . ( 9 8) Also, it questions the fact and the credibility of the 
witnesses in certain categories of d e c i s i o n s . ( 9 9 )  it will be reluctant to do so generally, 
because the Court of Appeal places an emphasis on the value of seeing and hearing the 
witnesses. It also exercises, a judicial discretion, for the appellate court may intervene 
if  it is satisfied that the judge did not exercise his discretion at all,(100) or, if  he 
misdirected himself in law while exercising his discretion,1(101) or, he misunderstood 
or misused the evidence or the material facts before him,(102) or failed to take into 
account some relevant considerations.( 1 0 3 )  Furthermore, an assessment of damages 
that have been judged by the inferior court will be considered too.d04) Accordingly, if 
a final judgment of the Sheriff Court, where leave is required for appeal has been 
brought to the Court of Session as the appellate c o u r t , ( 1 0 5 )  the above 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  (106) shall be taken into account to reconsider the inferior court's
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judgment. The appellate court after rehearing and questioning the facts of the case, may 
reach a decision which differs from that of the inferior court. In H iggins v. 
J&C.M.Smith (Whiteinch) Ltd./1Q7) the House of Lords dismissed the appeal, on the 
ground that "Where there were concurrent findings of fact in the courts below, 
generally the House of Lords would interfere with those findings only where it could 
be shown that both courts had clearly been wrong". Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle, 
stated/108) that "this is a salutary principle whose purpose is to prevent this house, as 
the ultimate court of appeal, from being flooded with cases which depend not upon 
important questions of law but upon pure questions of facts". It appears that most 
successful appeals turn on point of law than fact. Finally, specific implement within 
the circumstances of the case will be granted if it is an appropriate remedy, or it may be 
refused by the court within its satisfaction and within the grounds for refusing the 
remedy.
2-The Court of Appeal in Iraq
The Court of Appeal has jurisdiction when the value of the cause is over 1000 
Dinars. Furthermore, the Court of First Instance decisions as regards bankruptcy 
actions and liquidations are amenable to the jurisdiction of the Court of A p p e a l / ^ )
Action cannot be brought to the Court of Appeal directly before consideration by the 
Court of F i r s t  I n s t a n c e / HO) for the Court of Appeal main task is to review the 
decisions of the Court of First Instance and whether to recall or change or amend such 
d e c i s i o n s /m )  Thus, the court cannot exercise jurisdiction as a Court of First 
Instance. The Court of Appeal may exercise jurisdiction as a Court of Cassation in 
certain kinds of actions, namely:
1-Actions of debt and movables up to 500 Dinars.
2-Actions of due instalments up to 500 Dinars.
3-Action of division of common property, "movable and imovable property", 
whatever the value of the cause is.
If the action is reviewed by the Court of Appeal, the court will examine the matter
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of law and of fact to reach the right conclusion. (H 2)
To what extent is the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal competent to order or to 
refuse the remedy of specific performance?
The Court of Appeal may exercise jurisdiction of either Appellate Court or Court of 
Cassation. The difference between the two cases is that matters of law and matters of 
fact concerning the case will be considered, in the former case, while in the latter case 
only matters of law will be considered.(113)
The Court of First Instance judgment must be final in order to be reviewed by the 
Court of A p p e a l , as that judgment is appealable without leave, and appeal is 
available to every party as matter of right. Reviewing the case by the Court of Appeal 
transfers the whole disputed case, but it is restricted only to the judgment and the points 
complained of.(H 5) It was held,(116) that the submission to the Court of Appeal is 
only restricted to the final judgment, while if there is no final judgment no appeal can 
take place. '
The parties to the action are entitled to submit new evidence to support their 
claim ,(H 7) even if this new evidence and proofs have not been submitted before. It 
has been stated by the Court of Cassation, that the appeal is not only to know whether 
or not the final judgment of the Court of First Instance is legal and valid, but to transfer 
the case to a higher court, so that court may rely on a new investigation to pronounce its 
judgm en ta l 1^) Nevertheless, neither party can apply for a new claim or action or 
introduce a third party to the previous one in front of the Court of Appeal, unless it has 
been claimed or introduced in front of the Court of First Instance.^ 19)
The Court of Appeal rehears the case. It listens to the respondent's claim and his 
application and reconsiders his evidence and defence against the judgment of the Court 
of First Instance under review.
The judgment of the Court is either to confirm the final judgment of the Court of 
First Instance, to recall, or to amend it.(120) When the Court of Appeal confirms that 
the judgment under review is legal and valid, the defendant will then be forced to fulfil
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his obligation. While, if the Court of Appeal recalled the judgment of the Court of First 
Instance, the defendant is no longer under obligation to fulfil.
The court has jurisdiction to compel or to reject the remedy of specific performance, 
for the court has jurisdiction over actions of movables and debts where the value of the 
cause is more than 1000 Dinars, or actions relating to bankruptcy regardless of the 
value of the cause, and actions of liquidation. If specific performance is an appropriate 
remedy, the Court of Appeal will compel the party to perform his ob ligation /121) 
Nevertheless, many actions cannot be appealed, but they can be cassated, such as, if 
the value of the cause is more than 500 Dinars but less than 1000 D in a rs /122) Also, 
the judgments of the Court of First Instance in actions where the value of the cause is 
more than 1000 Dinars, provided that, the action is not brought for appeal by the party* 
against whom the decree has been granted, such action will be reviewed automatically 
by the Court of C assation /123) The Court of Appeal has no jurisdiction over such 
action, because the court cannot intervene in any action, unless the action is brought for 
review. Therefore, the Court of Appeal cannot impose or reject the remedy of specific 
performance in such action within the above circumstances.
Comment
The Court of Session in Scotland and the Court of Appeal in Iraq have something in 
common, which is the jurisdiction of the Appellate Court. The Court of Session 
jurisdiction is not competent over actions where the value of the cause is less than 
£1500, while the Court of Appeal in Iraq has such jurisdiction, but it acts as a Court of 
Cassation in certain circumstances. Also, the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal in Iraq 
is competent over actions where the value of the cause is more than 1000 Dinars. In 
such cases the court exercises jurisdiction as Appellate Court.
The Court of Session jurisdiction is competent if the value of the cause is over 
£1500 in accordance with the circumstances those have been provided for by Sec. 28 of 
1907 Act.
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Actions, where the value of the cause is more than 500 Dinars but less than 1000 
Dinars are not subject to the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal. They are directly 
subject to the jurisdiction of the Court of Cassation. The jurisdiction of the Court of 
Session in Scotland is regarded as competent where the value of the cause exceeds 
£1500 within the circumstances of appeal to the Court of Session by Sec.28 of 1907 
Act.
Concerning the right to appeal, in Iraqi civil procedure law leave is not required by 
the Court of Appeal or the Court of Cassation. It is amatter of right to the party against 
whom the decree is granted, whereas in Scots law, leave is required.
Regarding the granting and refusing the remedy of specific implement, the Court of 
Session in Scotland, and the Court of Appeal in Iraq are consistent, because whenever 
the action is subject to the court's jurisdiction, neither court will hesitate to compel the 
remedy or to reject it within the circumstances of granting and refusing the remedy. 
The major difference between the two courts is, that the Court of Appeal cannot acts as 
a Court of First Instance, while the Court of Session can do so. Also, the Court of 
Session is the Supreme Civil Court in Scotland, while the Supreme Court in Iraq is not 
the Court of Appeal, but is the Court of Cassation.
Section Two: Procedures
The action should be brought into the court under certain requirments. Those 
procedural steps are crucial to obtaining a decree of specific implement. Further, the 
judgment "decree" of specific implement is pronounced in the light of these 
proceedings. The decree must be enforced against the defender, which might then be 
combined with imprisonment if the refusal of the defender is met. These proceedings 
will be considered fully in relation to the Scots Sheriff Court and the Iraqi Court of 
First Instance, while the procedures of the action under the High Court i.e.(the Court of 
Session or the Court of Appeal) will be avoided.
In general, procedures will be dealt with as follows:
Sub-section: 1 :-Proceedings of the action of specific implement
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Sub-section:2:-The Judgment "decree" of specific implement. 
Sub-section:3:-Enforcement of the decree of specific implement.
Sub-section: 1-Proceedings of the action of specific implement 
Commencement of the action of specific implement and pleadings play a substantial 
role in the action as a whole, for the initial writ or the summons is the first important 
step to be taken into consideration by the pursuer. All the essential elements should be 
included, otherwise the action will be rejected and the remedy will be refused.
Raising an action in accordance with the procedural rules has major influence on the 
action itself, and subsequently on the remedy of specific implement thereafter. 
Proceedings of the action will be examined as follows:
1-Proceedings of the action for specific implement in Scots law.
2-Proceedings of the action for specific performance in Iraqi civil law.
1-Proceedings of the action of specific implement in Scots law 
An action ad  factum  praestandum  is brought to enforce the performance by the 
defender of an act other than payment of m o n e y . (124) Further, an action at the seller 
instance for implement of the contract by payment of the price, with payment of 
damages as an alternative, is, competent.(125)
The action must be brought to the court as a summary cause, unless there is craved 
in addition, or as an alternative, to a decree ad fac tum  praestandum , a decree for 
payment of money exceeding £1500 in amount (exclusive of interest and 
e x p e n s e s ) .  (126) Qn the contrary an action ad factum  praestandum  is brought to the 
court as an ordinary cause, if there is craved in addition or as an alternative to it, a 
decree for payment of money exceeding £1500 in amount.
It seems that an action ad  factum  praestandum  is brought as a summary cause 
action, in two cases:
1-If the action is applied for without any alternative or additional crave for payment 
of money.
2-If the action is applied for with an alternative or additional crave for money
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payment not exceeding £1500 in amount, exclusive of interest and expenses.
The action, therefore should be traced within the procedures of the two cause rules, 
i.e. (ordinary cause and summary cause) as follows:
1-Action for Specific implement as an ordinary cause:
The essential requirement to bring an action of specific implement in the Sheriff 
Court is the initial writ, by virtue of the Ordinary Cause Rules under rule 3 (1), which 
provides, "All ordinary causes shall be commenced by initial writ as nearly as may be 
in accordance with form A as set out...". It is defined by S.3 (K) of the Sheriff Courts 
(Scotland) Act 1907 as "the statement of claim petition, note of appeal or other 
document by which the action is initiated". It must contain a statement, in numbered 
paragraphs, of the facts which form the grounds of the action. The statement is known 
as condescendence. This statement sets out the factual basis of the claim (127) xhe 
following statements are also required in the initial writ; (l)-the heading which 
identifies the court; (2)-the description, which identifies the pleading; (3)-the instance 
which identifies the parties; (4)-the crave which specifies the claim, and; (5)-the pleas- 
in-law, which are the legal proposition which justify the claim being granted.
Whenever possible, the full name and the correct designation of each party should 
be stated in the instance/128) If the name and the designation of the party who sues or 
to be sued, are not set forth in the instance, the instance in such a case, will not be in 
proper form and the action may be held to be incompetent/129)
Thus, once it has been decided that an ordinary action should be raised in the 
Sheriff Court, it is necessary in the first instance to select the Sheriff Court in which the 
action is to be raised/130)
The choice of the Sheriffdom in which it is proposed to raise the action will be 
determined by the relevant rules of the jurisdiction/131)
Another essential requirement to commence the action is the service of the initial 
w rit/132) it is a proceeding considered to give the defender sufficient notice of the 
writ and an opportunity to intimate an intention to d e f e n d / 1 3 3 )  Service on the
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defender, however, proceeds on a warrant of citation issued from the court in
question/134)
The warrant is usually a printed form attached to the initial w r i t / 1 3 5 )  The period of 
notice which must be inserted in the warrant and the form of citation according to rule 7
(1) which provides that subject to rule 11 and the power of the Sheriff to shorten or 
extend the periods of notice have been given to the defender; (a): 1 4  days when the 
defender is resident or has a place of business within the U.K., the Isle of Man, the 
Channel Islands or the Republic of Ireland; (b): 2 8  days when the defender is resident 
or has a place of business outwith the U.K, the Isle of Man, the Channel Islands or the 
Republic of Ireland but is resident or has a place of business elsewhere in Europe; (c): 
4 2  days when the defender is resident or has a place of business outside Europe.
The significance of due service of the initial writ is that it apprises the defender of 
the nature of the proceedings against him and gives an opportunity to lodge a notice of 
intention to defend if he wishes/136)
In fact, the topic of procedure is a large and complicated one and it is not proposed 
to examine it in detail here. Consideration will be limited to those aspects of the topic 
which are effectual in the context of specific implement, particularly the crave, the 
condescendence, and other certain procedures, as follows:
The crave
The initial writ consists of a c r a v e / 137) which plays a fundamental role in the 
decree of specific implement. The crave for a decree ad factum praestandum must be 
stated and framed in unambiguous terms which clearly specify what is to be d o n e / 138) 
It sets forth what is to be done by the court, which must be definite and s p e c i f i c / ^ )  
In addition, if the demand is for performance of the contract, it must state in what way 
it is to be done/l^D)
Because a decree ad factum praestandum must be issued in unambiguous terms, it 
will not be pronounced by the Sheriff Court unless its terms are precise. The defender 
needs to be left in no doubt as to the exact obligation which he should fu lfll/l^ l) It
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can be concluded that when the crave is indefinite, vague or ambiguous, a decree of 
specific implement cannot be issued, because the defender; first, will not know how to 
comply with such a decree; secondly, the court should not accept such a crave, as it 
leads to an indefinite and vague decree. It was stated,1(142) tjjat decree "must be an 
ordinary decree of court,...., and so a decree which can be obeyed by some specific act 
done on the part of the defender". Further, the court has to bear in mind the 
consequences of the decree of specific implement,'0-4$) as the defender should be left 
in no doubt regarding the obligation he has to perform,(144) otherwise he may 
unfairly, be exposed to penal consequences.
The considerable importance of the crave in, and its fudamental influence on a 
decree of specific implement is, that the precision, the accuracy and specification of the 
decree of specific implement which is required in such a decree mostly depends on the 
precision and the accuracy of the crave, for the court shall not pronounce a decree of 
specific implement except in terms of such precision as will leave the defender without 
any doubt regarding what he should peform .(^)
The crave may be framed for d e l i v e r y / 146) jn Merchants Facilities (GlasgowlLtd. 
v. K e e n a n / 1 4 7 )  tjje  pursuer raised an action against the defender. The pursuers craved 
the court to grant them a decree of delivery of one convertible suite and one display 
cabinet, and craved also to grant warrant to officers of the court to search for such 
articles. The pursuers also craved the court for decree against the defendr for payment 
of a sum of £ 1 0  IS. 6d. It was held by the Sheriff Court that "in an action for delivery 
in the Sheriff Court it was competent at Common Law to grant warrant to search at the 
sametime as granting decree". Thus, the pursuers who seek delivery may crave both 
delivery and a warrant to officers of court to search and take possession of the goods 
stated and specified in the crave. If the pursuer only craves delivery however, a search 
warrant is not prayed, and where there is no alternative conclusion, imprisonment is the 
only way by which he can enforce the d e c r e e / 1 4 8 )
The crave setsforth "the specific decree, warrant, or order a s k e d " / 149) It "should
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ask neither too little nor too m u c h " . ( ^ 0 )  Furthermore, "It is advisable where possible 
to crave all the requisite remedies in a single action".(151) Further, the pursuer’s 
solicitor may combine any number of craves to secure the decree which his client 
requires to protect or to enforce his right,'( ^ 2) for ^  alternative crave for damages is 
usually desirable to be added lest the decree of specific implement is refused in the 
exercise of the court’s discretion, or lest compliance with the crave for specific 
implement becomes impossible during the dependence of the a c t i o n . ^ 3 )
In Me keller v. Dallas's Ltd..(154) was held "(2) that the fact that in the original 
action the pursuers had included the ordinary conclusion for damages did not constitute 
an election to take their remedy in that form so as to bar them from insisting on specific 
implement". In Mackav v. Campbell/*55) the defender was not entitled to avoid the 
grant of a decree in terms of the primary crave, and the pursuer was entitled to a decree 
of specific implement despite the lodging of the minute. If for instance an action 
craving (1) delivery and (2) failing delivery, damages, the Sheriff Court may enforce 
delivery as craved within a specified period, under certification that on his refusal to do 
so decree will be pronounced in terms of the alternative crave.'(156) jf  the defender 
does not comply with the court's order, the pursuer may minute that the defender has 
failed to implement the order, and the Sheriff Court may grant decree in terms of the 
alternative crave.(*57)
Suppose that the defender does not fulfil the decree on the primary crave after it is 
pronounced by the court. What should be done to compel him to obey the decree?
It was noticed/158) that the pursuer in such a case "may move for decree in terms 
of the alternative crave". Further, it was he ld /*^ ) "that upon the grant of decree in 
terms of the second conclusion, the seller would be personally barred from proceeding 
to enforce the original decree for payment; and decree granted in terms of the second 
and third conclusions". A crave for delivery, however, could be competent, but it is 
not so, if the contracting parties agreed upon the method by which the goods should be 
repossessed in case of the defender's failure to fulfil the contract/*60) Furthermore, it
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was held competent to have a joint and several craves in an action for delivery/* 6*) 
The Sheriff may allow the pursuer to amend the crave so as to seek remedy 
different from the one originally craved/*62) it is in the Sheriff Court's discretionary 
power to permit amendment, but it has to consider whether amendment is directed to 
determine the real question in controversy/*63) Thus, in Summerlee Iron Co. 
Ltd.v.Caledonian R v / * 6 4 )  a crave for damages may be added alternatively to a crave 
for specific implement. Nevertheless, even if an amendment is competent, it may be 
refused in the interests of justice/*66) The pursuer may also crave damages either 
alternatively or additionally/*66) The court then normally fixes a specified period 
within which delivery will be made/*67) The cause, it was said, "is continued so that 
the order for delivery may be intimated to the defender and he may be given an 
opportunity to implement it"/*68)
What if delivery has not been made within the specified time. The pursuer is 
entitled to move for decree for the alternative crave which is payment of a sum of 
m o n e y / * 6 9 )  Further, in Summary Cause Rules, rule (71) provides; "in an action for 
delivery the court may, when granting decree, grant warrant to search for and take 
possession of the goods and to open shut and lock fast places. This warrant shall only 
apply to premises occupied by the defender and may only be executed after the expiry 
of a charge following upon the decree for delivery".
To consider the influence of the crave as a procedural step upon granting or 
refusing specific implement, it should be noted, that the crave for a decree of specific 
implement should be precise and unambiguous and specify precisely what should be 
done, for it was pointed out/*^0) that "A conclusion for implement of a contract is a 
conclusion for nothing, unless it states in what way the contract is to be implemented". 
In addition, the crave was considered ambiguous by Lord Justice-Clerk/*^*) unless 
these words "and that by entering into possession of the premises and paying the rent 
when due", were added. Lord Neaves stated/*^) in the same case, that in his opinion
the "original summons was bad  for want of specification". And, "the true
objection to the summons was its not poinding out in a clear and practical manner what
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the pursuer s o u g h t " . ^ 3 )  Therefore, "No one could venture to enforce a decree, if he 
obtained it, in terms so vague and indefinite".^^^ Thus, the ambiguity of the crave, in 
one way or the other, affects the decree of specific implement itself and leads to an 
ambiguous decree which cannot be fulfilled. Further, in Middleton v. Leslie. ^ ^5) ft 
was noticed, that "in pronouncing decree ad factum praestandum, the court has to bear 
in mind the consequences and sanctions of such a decree. Failure to implement such a 
decree exposes a defaulter to the penalty of imprisonment which it is in the power of the 
pursuer to put in force". Also, a decree which is indefinite or vague or ambiguous is 
unenforceable.1(176) Thus the Lord P r e s i d e n t / 177) thinks that "in the case of decrees 
...which may expose a defender to a penal consequences, it is right that the court 
should so express the decree that the defender shall be in no doubt regarding the 
obligation he has to discharge". Also, in Munro v. Liquidator of Balnagown Estate 
£ £ . , ( 1 7 8 )  ft was observed, that "it is impossible:....to pronounce any decree ad  
factum praestandum which is not absolutely precise in every particular, both as to time 
and as to place".
Finally, it is submitted, that an indefinite, ambiguous and vague crave is another 
reason which can be added to the grounds for refusing specific implement. The court 
will reject the petition of the pursuer by reason of ambiguity and vagueness of the 
crave, and thereby he, "the pursuer", will lose his right to the remedy of specific 
implement.
The condescendence
In accordance with the initial writ requirements, the condescendence is also 
essential statement. It is not less important than the crave. It is a statement of the 
material facts on which the pursuer founds the claim which he has formulated in the 
c r a v e / 1 7 9 )  The pursuer should therefor set forth in the condesendence his title,1(180) 
and should set forth the circumstances in which he is compelled to assert i t / 181)
The condescendence must fulfil two essential functions:
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"l-It must state the facts which, if true, are such as to justify, or entitle the pursuer 
to decree in terms of his crave.
2-It must give fair notice to the defender of the case which he has to meet"/182) 
Black (183) has simplified the case of condescendence, by saying, "Suppose the 
action for implement of a contract or for damages for breach of contract. You 
obviously begin by describing the contract. If it is an oral contract, you should give 
full details who said what to whom. If it is in writting, simply give the date of 
document (or documents) in which it is embodied and a very brief description of the 
nature of the contract".
The condescendence may be altered by amendment,(184) or by adjustment,1(185) 
but it has been suggested that, "to frame them only after a careful appreciation of the 
relevant facts and law, so that they will require the minimum of subsequent 
alteration"/!86) it has been pointed out, that "...the primary consideration in drafting 
is that it is the function of written pleadings to enable the parties and the court to 
ascertain with precision those matters on which the parties are at issue and those on 
which they are agreed, and thus to arrive at the question which the parties wish 
decided. Thus, in an action of damages for breach of contract or negligence, the 
condescendence will set out the relationship between the parties and a chronological 
narrative of the facts"/187) in accordance with Sections (41-46) and Article 52 of 
Sched 1 of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgment Act 1982, it is necessary and essential 
to state paragraph 1 or 2 according to O.C.R., (a):the domicile of the defender. (b):the 
grounds of Jurisdiction/188)
The initial writ must also contain averments about any agreement which the pursuer 
has reason to believe may exist prorogating jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the 
cause to another court; and any proceedings which he has reason to believe may be 
pending before another court involving the same cause of action and between the same 
parties as those named in the initial writ/189)
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plea-in-law
Each party is required to include in his pleadings, after his statement of facts, a note 
of his plea-in-law, stated in consecutively numbered s e n t e n c e s / 190) when read 
together with facts averred in the statements of facts, the plea-in-law should substantiate 
the party's right to the remedy he seeks or his entitlement to decree of dismisal or 
obsolvitor. It is a statement of the legal grounds upon which the pursuer is entitled to 
the remedy set forth in the crave/191) There should be at least one plea-in-law 
addressed to every substantive part of the c ra v e /192) The plea-in-law focus the legal 
issue in the action, and the decree of the court is expressed in its interlocutor by 
sustaining or repelling them /193)
The plea stated should therefore be those which have a direct bearing on the case or 
upon the mode of proof by which it contended that the court should arrive at its 
decision/194)
Defence
It like the initial writ, begins by stating the name of the Sheriffdom and the place of 
sitting of the court.
The answer must be framed in paragraphs corresponding to the paragraphs of the 
condescendence/195) in each paragraph the defender must answer every statement of 
fact made by the pursuer in the corresponding paragraph of the condescendence/196) 
He must add any averments which he intends to prove. "He is obliged to respond to 
each averment by the pursuer in one of three ways: by admitting it, or denying it, or 
stating that the matter is not known and not adm itted"/197) The defender’s averments, 
must be relevant and specific /198)
The plea-in-law for the defender fall into two categories, (1): preliminary 
p l e a s / 1 9 9 )  and (2): pleas on the m e r i t s / 2 0 0 )
Where the defender wishes to put forward a substantial case of defence in answer to 
the pursuer's averments, the defender's answer, having dealt with the pursuer's 
averments, goes on to state by averments by way of explanation of facts which the
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defender intends to p r o v e / 2 0 1 )
He must give notice of any statutory defence on which he wishes to re ly /2 0 2 )  
Thus the defender's averments must be specific and re levan t/203 ) jf  particular 
averments are held to be irrelevant or lacking in specification, they will be excluded 
from probation/204)
2-Action for specific implement as a summary cause:
An action for specific implement as a Summary cause is commenced by summons. 
Rule (1) of Summary Cause Rules, provides that "a summons may be in one of the 
forms A to I. These forms are appended to the Summary Cause Rules".
The various forms cover different types of action and include all the common 
categories of summary cause.(205)
Summons comprises the following essential elements:
1-The heading must name the court in which the action is brought.
2-The names and designation of the parties.
3-The remedy sought or claim made by the pursuer must be stated with reference to 
statement of claim.
4-The defender must be informed where and when he should appear to answer the 
claim with a warming that, should he fail to appear, decree in abscence may be 
granted against him /206)
5-The summons should state that the pursuer is authorised to serve a copy of the 
summons on the defender not less than appropriate number of days before the 
appearance date.
6-There should be a statement, if the court requires to hear evidence, a date will be 
fixed for that purpose, and that parties are authorised to cite witnesses to attend on 
that date to give evidence.
7-There should be a statement that the summons is warrant for arrestment on the 
dependence or arrestment to found jurisdiction if either is appropriate.
274
8-The pursuer's solicitor’s name and adress must be shown on the principal 
summons.
The suggested form of summons in an action for delivery is in Form D . ( 2 0 7 )  The 
pursuer may seek payment as an alternative to delivery, in which case the court 
normally fixes a specified period within which delivery has to be made. The cause is 
continued so that the order for delivery may be intimated to the defender and he may be 
given an opportunity to implement it. The continuation may be to a specific date after 
the expiry of the period within which delivery is to be made, or it may be sin die in 
which case the pursuer may have the cause called again by means of an incidental 
a p p l i c a t io n . ( 2 0 8 )  if delivery has not been made within the specified time, the pursuer 
may then move for decree for the alternative sum.
The pursuer may ask the court to grant a warrant to search for and take possession 
of the goods of which delivery is sought. Such a warrant applies only to premises 
occupied by the defender and may be executed only after the expiry of a charge 
following upon decree for d e l iv e r y . ( 2 0 9 )
According to Rule 2  (1), "There shall be appended or annexed to the summons a 
statement of claim containing a concise statement of the facts which form the ground of 
action including, where appropriate, a note of the nature of any contract founded upon 
or any relevant statutory provisions. Without prejudice to the foregoing generality, 
where the cause arises from the supply of goods or services, the date or dates on which 
they were supplied shall be specified". It has been suggested that, including the phrase 
"any relevant statutory provision" in the rule, must amount to a statement of l a w / 2 1 0 )  
Further "in practice in anything other than the simplest type of case it is desirable, as 
being of assistance to the defender and to the court, for the pursuer to state the legal as 
well as the factual basis of his c la im " .( 2 1 1 )
Domicile must be also specified by the statement of claim in accordance with S.41- 
46 and Article 52 of Sched. 1 of Civil Jurisdiction and Judgment Act 1982.(212) Also, 
the ground of jurisdiction of the court must be specified.(213)
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Rule 3(1) provides that" the summons shall be signed by the Sheriff Clerk "with 
certain c o n d i t i o n " . (214) Ruje 3 (2) provides that the signed summons shall be warrant
for service on the defender ", and "When necessary provisions are included in the
summons it shall be warrant (a): for arrestment on the dependence..., (b): for 
arrestment to found jurisdiction.
A statement of claim must contain "averments about agreement which the pursuer 
has reason to believe may exist prorogating jurisdiction over the subject matter of the 
cause to another court.(215) And " averments about any proceedings which the 
pursuer has reason to believe may be pending before court involving the same cause of 
action and between the same parties as those named in the initial writ".(216)
Alteration of summons or statements of claim is permitted no later than seven days 
before the date fixed for the diet of proof, but the Sheriff may grant the motion "at such 
time thereafter as he in special circumstances may allow". The word alteration in the 
rule includes what would be described as amendment or adjustment in ordinary cause
procedures".(217)
The period of notice in Summary cause actions are stated in Rule 4(1). They are the 
same as those in Ordinary cause actions.
According to Rule 5, "citation shall be given in Form J and the certificate of citation 
shall be in Form K and the said forms shall be annexed or attached to the summons or a 
copy thereof...".
If the defender intends to defend the action he must state at first calling or at a 
continuation thereof.(218) He is entitled to lodge a counterclaim, but must normally do 
so at the first calling or a continuation thereof. (219)
2-Proceedings of the action for specific performance in Iraqi
civil law
The first step for any action to be brought to the court, is the process of 
commencement of the action by petition,(220) according to Article 44 of Iraqi Civil 
Procedure Code, which provides: "Every action must be commenced by initial writ,".
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It is a written form submitted by the claimant to the court. Thus an action should be 
brought to the court by a written application, called a petition.(221)
The plaintiff must submit the petition to the court and must submit as many copies 
as there are defendants. He must also provide a list of the documents and proofs he 
may rely on in his claim. He must sign every c o p y , ( 2 2 2 )  fa order to serve citation of 
the defendant, for non citation of the defndant of the petition is regarded a defect 
substantially affects his d e f e n c e . ( 2 2 3 )
The petition consists of many elements, such as the name of the court in which the 
action is brought,( 2 2 4 )  the date of raising the a c t io n , ( 2 2 5 )  a n d  the name of the plaintiff 
and the defendant with their occupation and their re s id en ce /^ ) The most important 
statements are the c r a v e , ( 2 2 7 )  a n d  the subject-matter of the a c t io n .( 2 2 8 )
The defendant must address his claim and petition to the court which has competent 
jurisdiction. However, if he brings his action to an incompetent court, such a court 
must transfer the action to the competent c o u r t .( 2 2 9 )
Regarding the name and occupation and the residence of the plaintiff and defendant, 
it is very important to include these statements in the petition, for it makes the task easy 
for the court, especially in c i t a t i o n .(230) Under Article 45 of Iraqi Civil Code "1: A 
special domicile may be elected for the performance of a specific act; 2:-A domicile 
elected for the performance of a legal act shall be deemed to be the domicile in so far as 
all matters relating to such act are concerned, including the procedure for enforcement 
by legal means unless the election of domicile is expressly limited to certain acts, 
excluding others; 3:-The elected domicile must be evidenced by writing".
The crave and the subject-matter of the action in Iraqi civil procedures law play a 
substantial role as to whether the plaintiff is entitled to obtain what he has claimed. It is 
submitted that the subject-matter is the request of the plaintiff from his petition. It is the 
right that the plaintiff endeavours to protect and to obtain thereafter. Moreover, it 
establishes whether there is such a right in such an action. It is to force the defendant to 
do something or to refrain from doing something.(231)
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The subject-matter of the action sets forth what the court is required to do. It is 
essential to the court to know what is the subject of the action, for on that basis, the 
court is able to determine the disputed case. Thus, Iraqi Court of Cassation once
h e l d , (232) tjja t » the petition is ambiguous to some extent, so the court of merits
should have ordered the plaintiffs to specify their subject-matter sufficiently and 
precisely. The decision which will be pronounced must solve and end the dispute 
between the two parties, and should be able to be executed thereafter".
The subject-matter of the action represents a fundamental element in any action. 
Thus, the court must decide within the limits of what the applicant, "the plaintiff', has 
demanded in his p e t i t i o n . ( 2 3 3 )  The p la in t if f  should remove any ambiguity or 
vagueness from his p e t i t i o n . ( 2 3 4 )  j f  there is any ambiguity or vagueness in such a 
petition, the whole judgment will be affected.
Since the statment of a subject-matter is substantial statement of the petition, it is 
submitted, however, that vagueness and ambiguity can constitute a factor for 
misleading the court in the process of pronouncing the decree of specific performance. 
Therefore, the court shall not take the risk of judging the case with an ambiguous and 
indefinite subject-matter. Possibly, the court will reject the action of an ambiguous 
subject-matter, for it was laid down that the petition, which does not include the 
subject-matter, is n u l l . ( 2 3 5 )  The problem here is not a matter of vacancy of the petition 
from any subject-matter, but it is a matter of ambiguity and vagueness of the subject- 
matter. The court, as has already been s a i d , (236) h a s  the power to order the plaintiff to 
make his prayer clear. Nevertheless, under Article 5 9  of Iraqi Civil Procedures Code 
the parties to the action can neither increase nor alter the subject-matter of the 
a c t i o n , (237) except in the case of incidental requirements.^ 8) Thus, the Court of 
Cassation h e l d , (239) that, having the plaintiff altered his subject-matter from 
demanding a certain sum of money to demanding the validity of the contract of sale 
instead, is considered a major alteration in the subject-matter of the action. Therefore, 
the action should be rejected. Whereas, the crave, i.e., "the plaintiff demands" it is
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said, is the plaintiffs request to enforce the defendant either to do or not to do
s o m e t h i n g .  ( 2 4 0 )
Another substantial statement is included in the petition. The statement of facts, 
evidence, the requirements of the plaintiff, and the pleadings. The element of fact is the 
cause (i.e., the material causes) by which the dispute has occurred. Thus, for instance 
if the subject matter of the action is the contract, or delicit, or unlawful 
enrichment,...etc., the plaintiff must refer in his petition, to these facts, in which he 
believes the defendant has breached his obligation.(241)
The evidence which the plaintiff wishes to use to prove his case must be included. 
It may be a written or oral evidence. The plaintiff can choose any evidence he thinks 
may assist him to prove his claim. He may also submit the evidence at any s t a g e . ( 2 4 2 )  
The plaintiff requirements statement is, the court's order, which the pursuer aims to 
obtain, in order to oblige the defendant to perform what he has undertaken to do or not 
to do. He may add to his previous claim the expenses of his action.
The plaintiff should rely on a basis of law in his action to obtain a judgment in his 
favour. Such a basis differs from one dispute to another. Thus, when the action is 
based on delict or breach of contract,..etc., the plaintiff must rely heavily on provisions 
of law which treat breach of contract or liability...etc. and which support his claim, by 
which the defendant is responsible for his act.
All the statements and details in the petition, are to serve one other purpose. It is to 
let the defendant have a clear idea of the action to prepare his defence against it.(243)
To what extent do the crave and th subject-matter of the action overlap?
The crave and the subject matter as has already been considered, play a substantial 
role in the p e t i t i o n . ( 2 4 4 )  They have more than one thing common. For instance, the 
subject-matter of the action should be fully taken into consideration by the plaintiff. 
The limitations of such subject-matter should also be determined in the petition in order 
to include and to cover all the requirements of the p la i n t i f f . ( 2 4 5 )  jt should also, inform 
the defendant to let him prepares his defence, and to enable the court to know what 
should be d o n e . ( 2 4 6 )
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The court cannot accept a petition which lacks a crave or a subject matter, because 
Article 50 of Iraqi Civil Procedures Code provides, "If there is mistake or lack of one
of the essential elements in the petition,   unless the plaintiff amends such a mistake
within a reasonable period, the petition is regarded null by the court's decision".
It was argued whether the "the plaintiffs claims", means the subject-matter of the 
action, or the demands by the plaintiff. Iraqi civil procedure law jurisprudence and 
scholars,(247) concurred that the said phrase means the subject-matter of the action. 
Nevertheless, if that statement is dropped from the petition, the action shall be rejected 
until the statement is amended or added. The same may occur with the crave. It is 
submitted that to apply to the court, a petition without the statement of what the plaintiff 
wishes to have, despite announcing and declaring the subject-matter of his action, is 
unacceptable and inapplicable. However, sometimes due to the nature of action, the 
plaintiff cannot state the subject matter of his action, for instance, in the action of 
usurpation.(248) whereas, the plaintiff cannot raise a petition without crave. 
Subsequently, it is submitted that the subject-matter of the action and the demands of 
the plaintiff complement each other.
Specific performance is affected by an ambiguous or vague crave or by action with 
vague or indefinite or ambiguous subject-matter, because, first; the action will be 
rejected unless these statements are included in the petition, secondly; as the Court of 
Cassation decided,1@49) that "the petition to a certain extent is ambiguous, so that the 
court of merits should have ordered the plaintiffs to specify their action and to 
determine the subject-matter precisely and specifically, for the decision which will be 
granted should be able to end and solve the dispute and able to be executed thereafter". 
Further, the court is restricted to what the plaintiff has demanded in his petition, if such 
demand is ambiguous and indefinite, the court may insist on him to specify and to 
clarify his crave,1(250) otherwise, the court shall reject the action. Furthermore, an 
ambiguous crave or subject-matter leads to an ambiguous decree. Thus, the court 
cannot grant the plaintiff more than he has craved for in his p e t i t i o n . ^  1) jf  the case is
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so, how can the court examine an action with an ambiguous or vague or indefinite crave 
or subject-matter? Surely it cannot do s o , (252) f o r  ^  already been explained, that if 
the contracting party applied for damages instead of specific performance, the court 
cannot reject this application and insist on him having specific performance and vice- 
versa, unless it is known to be impossible, or there is exceptional hardship or undue 
difficulty to do s o . ( 2 5 3 )
It can be concluded that, whenever the subject-matter of the action or the crave itself 
is ambiguous or indefinite, the court can reject the action but before rejecting it, the 
plaintiff should be asked to correct and to amend or specify his crave or subject-matter, 
otherwise specific performance cannot be granted.
The plaintiff is entitled, however, to amend the crave,'(254) adding to the 
original petition all expenses and expenditures which have been incurred at all the 
stages of the action, beginning with the Court of First Instance until the appeal stage, 
except the stage of cassation. Also, the case of incidental r e q u ir e m e n t s , ( 2 5 5 )  could be 
a very good example for amending the plaintiffs demands in his action.
Comment
1-Iraqi law and Scots law are consistent as regards, raising the action whether by 
initial writ or summons in Scots law, or by petition in Iraqi law. A party applying for a 
decree of specific implement in both systems must form his crave in unambiguous 
terms which clearly states what the court should do.
2-Ambiguity and vagueness of the initial writ or the summons generally and the 
crave particularly, are reasons in both systems to reject the whole action, and may 
constitute a reason to reject the decree of specific implement itself. Therefore, the 
ambiguous and indefinite crave which leads to an ambiguous decree can be regarded as 
a reason for refusing specific implement in Iraqi and Scots systems.
3-Iraqi civil procedures law includes an additional statement which is the case of 
the subject-matter of the action. This statement can be combined with the crave. They
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complement each other in representing the whole requirements of the plaintiff. While in 
Scots law, the crave should be sufficient to show what is to be done, is well established 
and settled by the Scots judiciary and scholars.
4-In Scots law the value of the cause and whether the action is brought with or 
without additional crave for damages, decides the nature of the court rules for raising 
the action, and therefore, different rules of procedures may be followed, whereas in 
Iraqi law, such division in the action and the procedural rules is not found.
Sub-section: 2:The judgment: "decree" of specific implement
Pronouncing a decree of specific implement against the party in breach is the aim of 
the aggrieved party, and the result of examining the action by the court. To obtain 
effective decree, many circumstances should be taken into consideration. The judgment 
will be considered in Scots and Iraqi systems respectively as follows:
1-Decree of specific implement in Scots law
According to rule 89 of the Ordinary Cause Rules, "(1) the Sheriff shall append to 
all interlocutors, except those of a formal nature, a note setting out the grounds upon 
which he has proceeded and in his final interlocutor on the merits he shall set out his 
findings in fact and in law separately:...”.
(2) where an interlocutor with note appended there to is pronounced by the Sheriff 
otherwise than in presence of the parties, the Sheriff Clerk shall forthwith provide the
parties with a copy of such interlocutor ".
The fundamental issue is that the decree should be s p e c i f i c , ( 2 5 6 )  f o r  the contracting 
party, who is subject to such a decree, may incur a penalty of imprisonment if he fails 
to comply, and has the right to know precisely what he must do. Thus, such a decree 
will not be pronounced on an ambiguous and vague c o n c l u s i o n . ( 2 5 7 )  n  should specify 
precisely what the defender should d o . ( 2 5 8 )
The decree must dispose of the whole of craves of the initial writ and any 
counterclaim. A decree may be pronounced in one of four types:
(l):granting decree deciding the merits of the action in favour of the pursuer.
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(2): granting a similar decree in favour of the defender.
(3):granting a decree of dismissal in favour of the defender.
(4):granting a mixed decree i.e.(decree of condemnor, absolvitor, and
dismissal).(^59)
The interlocutor must record accurately the order orally pronounced by the Sheriff 
from the bench, otherwise parties would leave the court under erroneous impression as 
to the terms of the interlocutor which was to be s i g n e d . ( 2 6 0 )  if it appears before the 
Sheriff signs the interlocutor, that order was incorrect, he may pronounce an 
interlocutor in different terms, only in exceptional circumstances.(251)
The judgment should be pronounced with the least possible delay after hearing the 
p a r t i e s ,(252) because long delays in pronouncing a decree can be regarded as a reason 
for disquiet and suspicion among the litigants who lose; and those who win the case 
may find that they have been deprived of equity and justice far too l o n g .(253)
A decree in favour of the pursuer must keep within the craves of the initial writ. If 
such a decree goes beyond these craves, for instance, by giving decree for a larger sum 
than craved by the pursuer, the decree may be set a s i d e . ( 2 5 4 )
In Middleton v. L e s l i e . ( 2 5 5 )  ft was observed that "in pronouncing decree ad 
factum praestandum the court has to bear in mind the consequences and sanctions of 
such a decree. Failure to implement such a decree exposes the defender to the penalty 
of imprisonment which it is in the power of the pursuer to put in force. I therefore 
think that in the case of decrees which may be thus enforced, or which expose a 
defender to penal consequences, it is right that the court should so express the decree 
that the defender shall be in no doubt regarding the obligation he has to discharge".
In Macdonald v. M a c k e s s a c k . ( 2 5 5 )  a landlord raised a petition for warrant to 
sequastrate and sell the tenant's effects for rent past due, in a Sheriff Court. In 
addition, the landlord sought for an order on the tenant to replenish the farm if 
necessary. The Sheriff Court ordered the sale and the sale having exhausted the 
subject, the landlord moved for another order to restock, then for a decree of summary
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ejection and warrant. The Sheriff Court accordingly granted warrant for summary 
ejection. It was held by the Court of Session, that "as the Sheriff had not fixed a time 
within which the restocking must be carried out, the tenant was not in default and that 
the decree of reduction of the warrant to reject fell in consequences to be pronounced".
The decree, must offer the defender a reasonable time to perform. If, however, the 
defender has delayed in performing the decree, such delay does not justify the court in 
suspending a charge in doing s o . @ 6 7 )
The extent to which the court can pronounce a decree for specific implement and 
whether or not such a decree can be amended or recalled by the court, are important 
issues.
The court may refuse to grant a decree of specific implement upon certain grounds 
which have already been fully considered.(268) The decree will not be pronounced 
unless the court is fully satisfied that the remedy should be decreed. There is no doubt
that the remedy is a legal one.(269) Nevertheless, it was stated,1(270) that » a
superior court having equitable jurisdiction, must also have a discretion, in certain 
exceptional cases, to withhold from parties applying for it that remedy to which, in 
ordinary circumstances, they would be entitled as a matter of course". How the court's 
discretionary power can be justified in granting or in refusing a legal remedy such as 
specific implement, is a questionable matter.
It has been submitted, that "there must be some very cogent reason for depriving 
litigants of the ordinary means of enforcing their legal rights" .@71) Furthermore, Lord 
Reid examined the problem in the case of White & Carter (Councils) Ltd. v. Me 
G r e g o r . ( 2 7 2 )  a n (j observed that there is some general equitable principle or element of 
public policy which requires some limitation of the innocent party's contractual right. 
The court thereby might not permit the enforcement of a legal right by such a party if he 
has no legitimate interest. It was stated,1( 2 7 3 )  that, "Even where implement is possible,
I do not doubt that the court has inherent power to refuse the legal remedy upon
equitable grounds". Thus, the decree of specific implement will not be ordered if it is
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impossible to enforce performance of the obligation and if compliance with it is 
impossible.(274) Also, it must be rejected if performance of the contract would cause 
exceptional h a r d s h ip . ( 2 7 5 )  The court will examine the circumstances surrounding the 
performance of the contract within its discretion. It was held,'( 2 7 6 )  that "it was not for 
the person seeking to enforce an obligation to aver that there were no circumstances 
which might lead the court to decline to enforce their legal right". If, however, the 
defender considers that there are grounds on which the discretionary powers of the 
court should be exercised, he should state averments and plea in his defence which is 
related to these g r o u n d s . ( 2 7 7 )
Regarding the issue of whether a decree of specific implement can be recalled or 
amended....etc. When a seller A has agreed to sell a specific article to a buyer B, a 
contract of sale is concluded between them. The buyer B has the remedy of specific 
i m p l e m e n t , ( 2 7 8 )  where the seller refuses to fulfil his obligation. Thus, the same is 
applied if the seller so delays that it cannot be known whether agood title can be given 
to the subject of s a l e . ( 2 7 9 )
Suppose, that a decree of specific implement has been pronounced by the court, but 
the goods perished or were destroyed by either the seller's fault or the buyer's fault or 
by reason beyond their control, after pronouncing the decree.
The Sheriff in his final interlocutor on the merits is directed to set out his findings in 
facts and findings in law separately, and to append to the interlocutor a note setting out 
the grounds upon which he has p r o c e e d e d .(2^0) If an interlocutor is not framed in 
accordance with the above rule, the Court of Appeal may remit the case back to the 
Sheriff Court to recall the interlocutor and issue another one instead.(281) The basis of 
the findings in fact is the oral evidence which the Sheriff heard and the written and oral 
evidence which he has e x a m in e d .(2^2) The seller in the case of specific goods may 
bear liability of risk. Whereas, if one of the contracting parties is at fault and the 
destruction of the goods is due to that fault, he is held liable in d a m a g e s . ( 2 8 3 )
Such a decree is unenforceable,1(284) for performing the obligation specifically has 
become impossible whatever the reason is, whether by the seller's or the buyer's fault
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or by reason beyond their control. Thus the seller cannot perform what he has 
undertaken to d o .@ ^
Interlocutors should be examined by parties’ solicitors as soon as they are issued by 
the court, and they should apply immediately for the correction of any incidental or 
clerical e rro rs .@ ^) The Sheriff then should authenticate any correction, although lack 
of authentication will not render the interlocutor in v a lid .@ ^) The parties should be 
intimated of the correction by the S h e r i f f  @ 88 )
It is doubtful,'@89) whether the Sheriff Court holds the same power regarding the 
alteration in substance of interlocutor which is pronounced by the Sheriff, as the Court 
of Session has to amend or recall its own interlocutor.@90) It was laid down that such 
correction could only be made before extract.@91) Although, the problem in the above 
case is, that the decree is unenforceable, because the subject matter either no longer 
exists or it has been so damaged that the purchaser will not be satisfied with it.
It has been argued, that it is doubtful whether the court holds such power in such a 
case. Thus "It seems clear that the Sheriff Court cannot ex proprio motu and without 
prior intimation to the parties correct any error other than a clerical or incidental error, in 
an interlocutor which has been issued and seen by the parties" .(292) Macphail 
suggested that the reported examples of recall and amendment of interlocutors by the 
Inner House are reliable guides to practice in the Sheriff Court.@93) Nevertheless, it 
has been stated that it is difficult, "to ground a practical objection to the Sheriffs 
making a correction of which he appears de recenti and concent of the parties in 
circumstances analogous of a reported Court of Session decision".@94)
When the court is deprived of such power, it must not expect that its judgment will 
be respected and obeyed by the defender, because, it is impossible to perform.
There is no error in such a decree in the above case, but the problem is in the 
goods, which have to be delivered to the buyer by virtue of the judgment. They do not 
exist any more.
It is the obligation of every party to the action against or in respect of, whom the
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decree is pronounced by the court to obey, unless and untill it is recalled, reduced, or 
varied.(295) however, a party "buyer" for instance, has been affected by the 
interlocutor believing that interlocutor is irregular or even void, he should seek remedy 
at once by way either of appeal, reduction or suspension, he must not assume that he 
may disregard such interlocutor with i m p u n i t y . ( 2 9 6 )
It may be relied on the case of Scott v. Mill's T r s . . @ 9 7 )  where an interlocutor was 
pronounced with out knowing the fact that one of the parties to the action had died. 
The Court of Session repeated the interlocutor to suit the new circumstances. The 
Sheriff Court may do the same and it "would be entitled to follow the same course" 
where there is similar situation, as Dobie s u g g e s t e d .  ( 2 9 8 )  Thus, the court could be 
empowered to amend or recall or revise its decision if the destruction of the goods 
happened after pronouncing the decree.
2-The judgment: Mdecree of specific performance" in Iraqi law
The court must pronounce its judgment as soon as the hearing of the parties ends, 
either on the same day, or at least within fifteen d a y s . ( 2 9 9 )  The decision should be 
signed by the judge.(300) jh e  decision after being pronounced should be specific, 
definite, and unambiguous, otherwise:
1-The defendant, may disobey such a decree, not because he intends to do so, but 
because he does not know how to comply with it.
2-The judgment will not be executed entirely, because it is ambiguous and the 
Execution Administration Office should inquire of the court how to solve the ambiguity 
and vagueness in the judgment. Also, as has already been considered, an ambiguous 
crave may lead to an ambiguous judgment. Therefore, the crave must be framed clearly 
and specifically, to obtain a definite and specific judgment, which is decisively ends the 
dispute, and can be executed.(301) Furthermore, an ambiguous decree cannot be 
executed by the Execution Administration Office, because it does not know how to put 
it into practice. In that case the Execution Administration Office cannot enforce the
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defendant to perform the decree. The Execution Administration Office in such 
circumstances should ask the court itself about the ambiguous part of its decree,'( 3 0 2 )  
without prejudice to the execution of the definite and specific parts of the 
j u d g m e n t . ( 3 0 3 )
A clerical or incidental error will not affect the judgment's validity. Nevertheless, it 
should be corrected by the same court, by which the decree was pronounced,'( 3 0 4 )  ^  
accordance with the application of the parties or even one of t h e m .( 3 0 5 )  The parties to 
the action should be intimated regarding the correction by the c o u r t . ( 3 0 6 )
If the court omits to consider some of the plaintiffs demands, for instance, if the 
lawyer's expenses are not included in the decision, or if damages are not included 
despite the plaintiffs crave, the decree may be challenged in the same court. The 
court's decree of whether the challenge is or is not acceptable, is subject to review by 
the Court of Cassation within seven days, begining the day following the applicant is 
being intimated of the d e c i s io n .(302)
The court, in pronouncing the decree of specific performance, uses its competent 
power.
To what extent does the court have discretionary power in granting or refusing 
specific performance? Does it have the power to recall or to amend its judgment, if 
after pronouncing it, the goods have perished or were destroyed, without the 
knowledge of the court, and with or without fault by either party ?
As regards the court's discretionary power towards specific performance, the court 
has such power, but in a very restricted respect, because specific performance is a 
legal, ordinary, and not equitable r e m e d y . ( 3 0 8 )  Nevertheless, the court's discretionary 
power appears heavily in two cases, for instance, impossibility to perform the 
obligation specifically,'( 3 0 9 )  an(j w h e r e  there is exceptional hardship and undue 
difficulty in doing so.(310) However, involving such a discretion would not alter or 
change the nature of the remedy. If specific performance is possible, the court has no 
discretionary power to refuse it.(3 * 1) The defendant will not hesitate to prove to the 
court that specific performance is extremely difficult or exceptionally hard for him, by
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producing evidence or by pleaing that specific performance is rendered impossible by 
the plaintiffs fault/312) The court, after examining all these pleas within its 
discretionary power, decides whether the decree of specific performance can or cannot 
be issued. The judgment should be justified and should be grounded logically @13) 
and sufficiently @14) n  should include all of the reasons on which the judgment is
based @15)
As regards the court's power to recall or amend its judgment if circumstances have 
changed after pronouncing the judgment, Article 160 (3) of Iraqi Civil Procedures Code 
provides,that the judgment of the court, is considered valid and operative, unless it is 
recalled or amended by the court itself or it is reviewed by a higher court, in accordance 
with the methods laid down by the law.
If after pronouncing the decree of specific performance, the goods or the subject 
matter have perished, performance of the obligation "the decree" becomes impossible. 
Under Article 160 (3) of Iraqi Civil Procedures Code the court has the power to recall 
the decree or to amend it. If the court does not amend it or does not have the power to 
recall its decree, it should not expect that its judgment will be fulfilled, bearing in mind 
that the consequence of not performing the court's decree, is imprisonment. The court 
must be careful in considering the defendant as a refusing party. Nevertheless, the 
party cannot be regarded as a contemnor, when it is impossible to perform the decree. 
The, consequences of non-performance or non-execution of the judgment depend on 
the reason for non-performance of the contract or the decree, for example, whose fault 
is it, that performance of the decree has been rendered impossible?
In accordance with Article 168 of Iraqi Civil Code, if the reason for impossibility 
of performance is beyond the debtor's control, he is not liable towards the other party. 
Thus, if after the judgment is pronounced, the goods have perished, by reason beyond 
the debtor's control, the court will recall the judgment.
If it is proved that the goods were destroyed at the time of making the sale contract, 
the contract is void, by virtue of Articles 127 (1), 128 (1) of Civil Code. The decree in
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all the above cases is unenforceable, and the court should recall its judgment or amend 
it within the new circumstances.
Comment
1-In Scots law, the judgment cannot be granted ambiguously, because the party 
against whom the decree is pronounced does not know how to comply with it, and thus 
he may be exposed to imprisonment.
The Iraqi civil procedures law deals with the matter similarly, and the defendant 
may be exposed to the same penal consequences, but unfortunitely, the Iraqi court and 
the Iraqi civil procedures law have announced that error can be committed by the court 
in pronouncing the decree. In addition, the judgment by the Iraqi Courts may 
sometimes be ambiguous to a degree that the Execution Administration Office cannot 
even understand how such decree can be executed and enforced against the defendant. 
Scots law is more effective than Iraqi civil procedures law in this respect for the 
following reasons:
(1)-Granting an ambiguous and indefinite decree may lead to another dispute. 
Thus, instead of ending the dispute and solving the problem, another dispute will arise.
(2)-The consequences of not performing the court's decree of specific implement 
may expose the refusing party to imprisonment. The refusing party therefore may be 
exposed to imprisonment in Iraqi civil law more often than in Scots law, because the 
ambiguous decree leads to ambiguous and unfair consequences.
(3)-If Scots law is favourable in this particular case, however, Iraqi law is more 
flexible, for if there is ambiguity and vagueness in the decree, the court may clarify the 
ambiguity or vagueness.
2-The court's discretionary power in the two systems is restricted. Nevertheless, it 
appears to have strong effect when grounds such as impossibility and exceptional 
hardship involved. Thus the court's discretionary power plays a substantial role in 
refusing the remedy of specific implement where the defendant "defender" claims that
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the fault of the plaintiff "pursuer" is behind the impossibility or the exceptional hardship 
to perform the obligation.
3- The Iraqi Court when circumstances change after the decree is pronounced, has 
the power to recall or to amend the decree more than Scots Court, for Iraqi Civil 
Procedures Code specifies, that the court can recall or amend its decree, whereas, there 
is doubt among Scots scholars whether the Sheriff Court does have such power to the 
same degree as the Court of Session has as regards the alteration in substance of the 
interlocutors. However, it has been suggested that, the courts in Scotland have power 
to recall or to amend the judgment if new circumstances have emerged.
Sub-Section 3-Enforcement of the decree of specific implement
After the decree of specific implement is pronounced, it should be performed and 
enforced against the refusing party. Enforcement of the decree may not be easy 
sometimes, for circumstances may arise, or the refusing party is of a special nature, and 
cannot be imprisoned, so that specific performance cannot be enforced. Enforcement 
of the decree in Scots law in this study will be considered only as an Ordinary Cause. 
Enforcement of the decree will be examined in Scots and Iraqi laws respectively as 
follows:
1-Enforcement of the decree of specific implement in Scots law
*
Under rule 90 of O.C.R., implementation of a decree, interlocutor or other order of 
the court depends on the issue of an extract containing details of the decree or 
otherwise, and a warrant for the execution of the diligence.
An extract of a decree in a defended cause may be issued after the expiiy of 14 days 
from the date of decree unless:
(1)- an appeal has been marked; or
(2)- an application for leave to appeal has been marked; or
(3)-the Sheriff has allowed extract to be applied for and issued earlier; or
(4)-the Sheriff has reserved the question of expenses.
In framing the crave of the writ/316) the method of implement asked for by the
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pursuer, must be specifically and precisely stated.^ ^  Therefore, the ambiguous 
crave may affect the decree and its p e r f o r m a n c e . ^ ^ )  Furthermore, "it is generally a 
good objection to an action for specific implement that the decree, if pronounced could 
not possibly be enforced" .(319)
Obedience to a decree of specific implement can only be compelled by 
imprisonment of the defender who refuses to comply with such a decree.^^0) 
Nevertheless, no person can be imprisoned on account of his failure to comply with a 
decree of specific implement, except in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 1 of the 
Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1940.
A party who has obtained a decree of specific implement is invested with a power to 
enforce the refusing defender to perform and to obtain a warrant for his 
imprisonment.(321) Such a party ,"the pursuer", makes an application to the court 
which pronounced the d e c r e e . ( 3 2 2 )  T h u s  a warrant for imprisonment may be granted 
after the court is satisfied that the defender, i.e., "against whom the decree of specific 
implement was granted", refuses to obey and comply with the d e c r e e . ( 3 2 3 )  j t  w a s  
pointed o u t , ( 3 2 4 )  that the applicant must convince the court that the respondent has 
refused to comply with such a decree. If the warrant for imprisonment has been 
granted, it should be then limited for a period not exceeding six m o n t h s . ( 3 2 5 )  where 
the court is satisfied that the respondent has obeyed and complied with the decree, the 
court must order his release im m e d ia t e ly . ( 3 2 6 )  The applicant, however, is responsible, 
as soon as he is satisfied that the respondent has complied with the decree, to inform 
the court "the S h e r i f f - C le r k " . ( 3 2 7 )  Many issues now may arise, for example:
1-What is the solution if a corporate body refuses to comply with a decree?
2-What if the decree can be performed through someone else or the agency of 
others?
3-Can the court recall a decree after pronouncing it, and in lieu of granting warrant 
for imprisonment, make an order for damages?
It was s t a t e d ,(328) that, "it would seem that where the defender is a corporate
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body, which cannot be imprisonned, an action concluding for performance by such a 
defender of some act which cannot be peformed vicariously conclusion for damages in 
the event of non-performance be added". Furthermore, in Lochgellv Iron & Coal Co. 
v. North British Rlv. C o . . ( 3 2 9 )  Lor(j Kinnear noted, that "It is true that a decree 
against a railway company could not in any case be enforced by imprisonment ”.(330) 
Further, "...the court will never pronounce such a decree except in terms which shew 
to the defender a certain specific thing which he is to do within a definite time, and his 
failure to obey the order to do such specific thing within such definite time will enable 
the pursuer who has obtained it to enforce obedience by imprisonment".^ 1) He also 
speaks of "...a decree which, although it professes to be for specific performance, 
could not be carried into execution by any process of l a w " . ( 3 3 2 )  Thus, it can be 
concluded from Lord Kinnear's dictum that, generally it is doubtful whether to order a 
decree of specific implement against a company or a corporate body, because it is 
incompetent, although there are exceptional c a s e s . ( 3 3 3 )
The case of Gall v. Loval Glenbogie L o d g e . ( 3 3 4 )  js the best example for non­
enforceability of a decree of specific implement in the case of a corporate body. It was 
h e l d , ( 3 3 5 )  that "a petition to the Sheriff to enforce an order by a Superior Court of a
society directing one of its branches to reinstate a certain person was
incompetent in respect that a decree to such effect could not be enforced, and that
the Sheriff was therefore not bound to pronounce it". Lord Trayner, in supporting the
judgment, pointed out,(^36) that "The Sheriff could not enforce his own order, if
the respondents refused obedience to it". And, "he is not bound to pronounce any 
decree which may be disobeyed without his having the means of enforcing obedience to 
it"  ( 3 3 7 )  Furthermore, "the Sheriffs decree could be enforced by imprisonment of the 
whole members of the respondent’s lodge is out of the q u e s t io n " . ( 3 3 8 )  Nevertheless, 
enforcement of a decree of specific implement would be competent in two ways, 
namely:
1-In the case of non-compliance by the respondent, the court can empower its
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officials to do some act e q u i v a l e n t . ( 3 3 9 )  Thus, a Clerk of the court, for instance, was 
authorised to sign a conveyance on behalf of the refusing party.
2-If the act in question could be done by officials, such as pronouncing the decree 
against the directors .(340)
It is submitted that, unless it is impossible to perform the obligation or when 
exceptional hardship involved, the court has the power and the means to enforce its 
judgment even if the refusing party is a corporate body, not by imprisonment of the 
whole members of the company or the director, but by ordering the company or the 
corporate boday to pay a penalty for non-compliance with the decree, either daily, 
weekly, or monthly. Also, the penalty should be increased in accordance with the 
unjustifiable attitude of the corporate body's representatives.
Performance of the decree through others cannot always be achieved, so that, the 
court will try to find any possibility of performance of the decree by the respondent 
even through agents or others. Gloag argued t h a t , ( 3 4 1 )  that "In such a case the object 
of the decree is to give the defender an apportunity to obtemper it". Alternatively the 
court has the power to recall the decree and make an order for such payment by the 
respondent as appears to the court to be just and equitable in the circumstances.( 3 4 2 )  
The court may sometimes authorise the pursuer to perform the obligation at the 
defender’s e x p e n s e . ( 3 4 3 )  jt seems that the court will take every possible step to 
enforce the decree of specific implement. If, for instance, the decree is for delivery of 
corporeal movables, a warrant to officers of court to search any premises in the 
occupation of the respondent, may be granted by the court.( 3 4 4 )  jf  m y ^  found in 
such premises, they will be delivered to the a p p l i c a n t . ( 3 4 5 )
It appears that the enforceability of a decree of specific implement is very flexible to 
a degree which affects the existence of the remedy itself. For instance, imprisonment is 
not operated to extinguish the obligation under the decree, and the applicant is not liable 
to aliment the respondent while in p r i s o n . (346) Thus the obligation remains 
eventhough the debtor or the refusing party is imprisoned. Nevertheless, imprisonment 
itself, is not the case, but the relation between the decree of specific implement and
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imprisonment, for it was pointed o u t , (347) t j j a t  » a s  the only method of compelling 
obedience to a decree ad factum praestandum is the imprisonment," of the refusing 
party. Furthermore, as has already been seen a corporate body or company cannot be 
enforced to perform specifically, because they cannot be imprisoned,(348) except in a 
few cases and within specific circumstances.(349) jn addition, even if the refusing 
party is imprisoned, it is not more than six months.(330) if he still refuses to comply 
with the decree of specific implement damages would be ordered alternatively. The 
court may recall the decree and make an order for payment by the respondent, in lieu of 
granting warrant for imprisonment, as if it appears to the court to be equitable and 
just.(331) Moreover, it has been noticed that "it is generally a good objection to an 
action for specific implement that the decree, if pronounced, could not possibly be 
enforced".(332) Suppose a corporate body or a company, A has sold specific goods to 
a buyer, B. B having fulfilled all his obligations against A, has the right to a decree of 
specific implement.(333) a  as a company it cannot be imprisoned,(334) if it refuses to 
comply with the decree.
The court, where the decree is for delivery of corporeal movables, may grant a 
warrant to officers of the court to search any premises in the occupation of the 
respondent, "the company", and to take possession of and deliver to the applicant, "the 
purchaser", of such movables which may be found in such premises. Such a warrant 
is deemed to include authority to search the refusing party's place for the purpose of 
carrying the warrant into lawful e x e c u t i o n . ( 3 3 5 )  Suppose, further, that the officers 
could not find the subject-matter or the goods had perished or were destroyed for any 
reason. Ordering the company to perform specifically in such circumstances is out of 
the question, because it is impossible. The company as a party in breach cannot be 
i m p r i s o n e d . ( 3 3 6 )  Damages are the alternative in such a case, for the court may in lieu 
of granting warrant for imprisonment, recall the decree and make an order for 
p a y m e n t . ( 3 3 7 )  Also the court makes such an order as appears to be just and equitable in 
the circumstances . ( 3 5 8 )
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It seems that the company can avoid performing specifically if it intends to. The 
only way to oblige the refusing company to perform the decree of specific implement, 
is by ordering it to pay penalty for any refusal or delay in delivering the goods sold to 
the purchaser, unless there are certain exceptional circumstances against such
performance.^^)
Another issue may arise, which is the possibility of enforcement of the decree of 
specific implement through others, such as agents.
If the principal has refused to deliver the goods to the purchaser, and the goods 
have been discovered with the agent by the court, there can be no doubt that the agent is 
obliged to hand them over to the p u r c h a s e r . ( 3 6 0 )  jf  the seller, is presumed to have 
hidden the goods, the court will search his premises to find them,(361) and may 
imprison him for not performing the decree, but not more than six months. Suppose 
after all these means, the seller does not comply with the court's order. The court will 
take the other step, which is to recall the decree, and may order payment in lieu of
granting warrant for i m p r i s o n m e n t . (3 62)
2-Enforcement of the judgment "decree11 of specific performance
in Iraqi civil law
A creditor who has obtained a decree of specific performance, has obtained 
automatically the power to enforce the debtor to fulfil his right, for acquiring that right 
requires the performance by the debtor of his o b l i g a t i o n . ( 3 6 3 )  j f  debtor does not 
respect or perform willingly what he has undertaken to do, the Execution 
Administration Office will intevene to imprison the refusing debtor after citing 
h i m . (364) imprisonment of the refusing debtor is the final means that the Execution 
Administration Office should employ to compel the party to. comply with the 
d e c r e e . ( 3 6 5 )  Furthermore, imprisonment of the debtor should take place by a decision 
of either a judge who acts as an executor or a judge of the Court of First Instance, with 
the creditor's application for such i m p r i s o n m e n t . ( 3 6 6 )  Nevertheless, imprisonment of
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the refusing debtor, does not extinguish his obligation or prevent the confiscation on 
his property.(367)
Imprisonment of the debtor must not be more for than four m o n t h s . ( 3 68) T h e  
creditor, however, can ask the Execution Administration Office to release the debtor 
even if he is not paid or has not obtained his d e b t . ( 3 6 9 )  The creditor is not responsible 
for informing the Execution Administration Office as to whether the debtor has 
performed the decree. This is the responsibility of the officer of the prison, to which 
the debtor is s e n t . . ( 3 7 0 )  He must release him as soon as the decree is f u l f i l l e d . ( 3 7 1 )
Sometimes the debtor cannot be imprisoned, for instance the debtor is as a 
corporate body, so it is questionable whether the court’s decree is enforceable.
The corporate body cannot be imprisoned, but this is not an obstacle to the 
execution of the decree of specific performance, for there is no distinction between an 
individual and a corporate body when they become debtors. If the debtor, whether a 
corporate body or an individual, undertakes to deliver goods to the creditor, he is 
obliged to do so in two ways, namely:
1-The goods are by virtue of a debt as a fungible g o o d s . ( 3 7 2 )  when the creditor 
applies to the Execution Administration Office with a copy of the court's decision, and 
it includes an order to oblige the debtor to perform, i.e., "to give something by either 
measuring, weighting, of counting", the Execution Administration Office should 
inform the debtor to give what he has been asked for per se. If he refuses to comply 
and still has the same goods or something else which may replace the subject matter of 
his o b l i g a t i o n , ( 3 7 3 )  the Execution Administration Office confiscates the goods and 
deliver them to the applicant "the c r e d i t o r " . ( 3 7 4 )  jf the goods cannot be found with the 
debtor, the creditor is permitted to buy similar goods at the debtor's expense, under the 
supervision of the Execution Administration O f f i c e . ( 3 7 5 )  The debtor may be 
imprisoned if he has hidden his property to avoid p e r f o r m a n c e . ( 3 7 6 )
2-The goods are specific, i.e.,"specific goods". When the goods are found with 
the debtor, they will be taken from him by the Execution Administration Office, and to 
be delivered to the c r e d i t o r . ( 3 7 7 )  The debtor may not be imprisoned in such a
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case,(378) for imprisonment is a mean should be used only to enforce the refusing 
debtor to fulfil the decree.
A corporate body can be compelled to perform specifically when it becomes a 
debtor. There is no special treatment for a corporate body as regards complying with 
the judgment of the court to perform specifically. In addition, according to Article 22 
(First) of the Execution Code, if the debtor refuses to perform the judgment or the 
executive deed, with consent, the obligatory performance against him shall be achieved 
by the Execution Administration Office in accordance with the rules of this law. 
Furthermore, the obligation of the company can be executed through its legal 
representative such as director, or liquidator in the case of a liquidated c o m p a n y . ( 3 7 9 )  
The creditor should apply for execution of the obligation against the 
representative. (380) Thus, there is no way for the company to avoid performance of 
the decree of specific performance. The director is regarded as a legal representative, 
and he should execute all the obligations that the company undertakes. Under Article 
112 of the Companies Code the director and members of the managing committee of the 
company, in dealing with and exercising the company’s affairs, should take the same 
care which is taken by them in their private affairs, provided that care should not be less 
than the care of a reasonable person. Furthermore, under Article 29 of the Execution 
Code, any one who obstructs the Execution Administration's officials in executing the 
obligation, is liable to compensate the applicant for any damages occasioned by reason 
of such refusal or obstacle, and may be punished under the law. It seems that there is 
no way to avoid the remedy of specific performance.
The agent cannot be enforced to execute the obligation if he rejects the 
representation .(381)
It is submitted, however, that enforceability of a decree of specific perfromance is 
not affected by the fact that the debtor is as a company. The law takes no account of the 
fact that a company cannot be imprisoned. In addition, there is no provision which 
discriminates between a company or corporate body and an individual debtor. (3 82)
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Further, the director or manager or liquidator, or whoever is in charge of the company, 
may be subject to punishment if he refuses or prevents or obstructs the execution of the 
d e c r e e . ^ 3 )  Furthermore, the corporate body must pay penalties, in accordance with 
Article 2 5 3  of Civil Code, which provides; ’’When specific performance of an 
obligation is not practicable, unless performed by the debtor himself, the creditor may 
obtain a judgment ordering the debtor to perform the obligation, and to pay penalty if he 
abstains from performing his obligation". This provision raises a number of questions, 
namely:
1-The provision has restricted performance to the debtor himself, but what if the 
agent or representative can perform the obligation.
2-The impression given by the provision of Article 2 5 3  of Civil Code is that it 
covers only the obligation to do something, and no consideration has been taken by the 
Code to the obligation not to do something. It seems that the provision has ignored 
obligations of that nature, bearing in mind, that the debtor may be subject to a penalty if 
he refrains from performing the o b l i g a t i o n . ^  84)
If the debtor refrains from delivering the specific goods and the Execution 
Administration officials cannot obtain them for one reason or another and there is no 
other property to be confiscated by the Execution Administration Office, he must pay 
penalty. In addition, he should pay greater penalty if he continues his unjustifiable 
attitude. Is it fair and just not to impose a penalty on such a debtor, merely because his 
obligation is to give something, but, not to impose any penalty on him when his 
obligation is not to do something. Unless circumstances prevent him from performance 
of his obligation specifically, such as impossibility or exceptional hardship or undue 
difficulty, the debtor should be compelled to pay penalty until he fulfils the decree of 
the court.
According to the above statement, the agent or the representative could be ordered 
to perform specifically and could be ordered to pay a penalty if he fails to perform the 
obligation. For if he fails to perform he has been instructed by his principal not to do
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so, otherwise, he has no interest not to perform the obligation, but he must perform the 
obligation specifically.(385) whereas, in the case of an obligation not to do something, 
that kind of obligation can be performed s p e c i f i c a l l y , ^  86) and the debtor who 
continues to breach his obligation may be subject to p e n a l t i e s . ^  87) Thus, the company 
or the corporate body can be ordered to perform specifically, and cannot avoid it just 
because the corporate body cannot be imprisoned, as imprisonment is not fundamental 
matter in the remedy of specific performance in Iraqi civil law.
Comment
1-Enforcement of the court's decree in performing specifically, cannot occur easily - 
sometimes, but some other times, a decree of specific implement cannot be executed in 
Scots law, if the debtor is a corporate body or a company, because a corporate body 
cannot be imprisoned. However, practice has shown that this dilemma can be avoided. 
Nevertheless, execution of a decree of specific implement is affected despite that, for it 
cannot always be used successfully to overcome the corporate body's refusal to 
perform the decree.
In Iraqi civil law, the case is different, for there is no difference between an 
individual and a company or corporate body concerning execution of a decree of 
specific performance. Nevertheless, the difference between Scots and Iraqi laws has 
been minimised by the means adopted to solve that dilemma, such as empowering the 
court's officials to do equivalent act, or the act could be done by the corporate body's 
officials. In addition, Iraqi law has one more effective principle, namely, to order the 
refusing debtor to pay penalty until he performs the decree of specific performance. 
Also, a director or a liquidator may be imprisoned if he obstructs the execution of the 
decree. It seems that all these means render Iraqi civil law more effective than Scots 
law in enforcing the decree of specific performance.
2-Iraqi and Scots laws are consistent in relation to the searching of a debtor’s 
premises before imprisonment. If the subject matter is found with the debtor, there is 
no need for imprisonment. However, if there is a suspicion that the party has refused
300
to perform the decree without any legal reason, he may be imprisoned for four months 
under Iraqi civil law, and six months in Scots law. In Iraqi law, he should pay penalty 
which may be increased in accordance with the debtor's unjustifiable attitude and within 
the court's discretionary power.
3-rendering specific implement impossible by any reason whatsoever, in both 
laws, gives the court the opportunity to consider the alternative, which is damages, 
unless the reason for impossibility is either the creditor's "the buyer’s" fault or a reason 
beyond the debtor's control, so that no damages can be decreed. Thus, the court can 
amend or recall the judgement in both Iraq and Scotland, when something serious, 
which affects the execution of the decree, takes place.
CONCLUSION
1-The action of specific implement has no special consideration under the 
competent jurisdiction of the court. It is similar to any other action relating to 
movables. However, in Scots, law it may be subject to different court rules. It 
depends on the value of the cause, and subsequently different jurisdiction and 
procedures should be considered.
When the court examines the case, it considers the circumstances of whether the 
case is subject to its jurisdiction or to another court's jurisdiction. The court considers 
the subject of the action. Thus, if the action is accepted as a competent one under the 
court's jurisdiction, specific implement may be decreed.
Specific implement cannot be decreed and will be rejected even after being granted 
if it is pronounced by a court which its jurisdiction over the action is incompetent.
2-Specific implement at the first stage of the action could be regarded as a 
procedural remedy, for in the case of commencement of such action all means of 
accuracy and precison are required. Furthermore, ignoring or even neglecting these 
elements leads to reject the remedy.
3-Ambiguity and vagueness in the decree itself affects the enforceability of the
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decree and consequently may lead to either recalling the decree or amending it.
4-The surrounding circumstances affect the enforceability of the decree to a certain 
extent, and may lead to recall the decree and grant damages instead.
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CONCLUSION
Specific implement as a remedy for breach of the contract, whether with respect to 
sale of goods or hire purchase or sale of land....etc., plays a leading role in the 
remedies system. It is the contracting party's means of obtaining the subject-matter he 
has contracted for.
The concept and the definition of the remedy of specific implement is based on 
specific and certain gounds, First; the goods must be specific or ascertained and 
Secondly; the aggrieved party must apply for the remedy. These constitute the legal 
grounds of the remedy and give it its nature and concept as an ordinary, legal remedy, 
as distinct from a discretionary, equitable remedy. Thus the remedy is not a 
discretionary or equitable one. The court's discretion is extremely restricted, and it 
could be said that it does not exist where there are no equitable grounds or grounds of 
law against granting it.
Both Iraqi and Scots law grant the remedy of specific implement. Is it an essential 
remedy? What are the consequences of not having such a remedy?
Specific implement is an order against the party in breach of his obligation, ordering 
him to perform what he has undertaken precisely and accurately. Thus, it is considered 
as essential to achieving a satisfactory outcome for the contracting party. Further, 
specific implement satisfies the requirements of the contracting party more than 
damages, for giving the aggrieved party damages, and leaving him without the goods, 
will not achieve the same consequences as compelling the delivery of the goods to him.
Specific implement is available to the aggrieved party as a matter of legal right. It 
means that it is granted whenever it is possible. Nevertheless the remedy may be 
rendered inappropriate when the party in breach of his obligation raises a claim of 
impossibility, exceptional hardship, or breach of contract, because the remedy is then 
subject to the court's discretionary power, and it may or may not be granted, according 
to that discretion. The effect is that the aggrieved party loses confidence in the
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efficiency of the remedy of specific implement.
The aggrieved party prefers specific implement rather than damages, for specific 
implement gives him delivery of the goods he has contracted for if he is a purchaser, 
and gives the aggrieved party, in general, what he has contracted for.
Damages, sometimes, are ordered in substitution for the remedy of specific 
implement under specific circumstances. Can the remedies system survive and be 
effective enough without the remedy of specific implement? What would such a 
hypothesis mean to the aggrieved party?
A legal system which had no remedy of specific implement would suffer the 
following consequences.
1-If damages are the only remedy the aggrieved party can obtain, then a purchaser 
may have his compensation, but not the goods for which he contracted. His 
primary .need may be for the goods and not for the money. His situation may be 
desperate.
2-The need for the goods sold by the aggrieved party in certain circumstances 
reflects the necessity of ordering the refusing party to deliver them rather than to pay 
damages. Otherwise the situation of the aggrieved party will become extremely bad, 
especially if he is in immediate need.
3-The seller may take advantage of non-performance of the obligation specifically 
by refusing to deliver the goods sold to the aggrieved party, if he finds selling them to 
another buyer is beneficial to him. Damages will be ordered against him, but damages 
cannot compensate the aggrieved buyer who is desperate to have these goods.
It seems that the buyer will suffer economically without the remedy of specific 
implement, because that is the only remedy which will give him what he contracted 
for, i.e., the goods.
Again the buyer may face a problem of repetition of his predicament, the seller 
being more likely to breach the contract again when he knows that he will not be 
compelled to deliver the goods to the purchaser. So, he may breach the contract
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whenever he finds a chance to sell at a better price.
4-Disregard of specific implement as a remedy for breach of contract for sale of 
goods, may affect the seller himself. If, for instance, the purchaser knows that he is 
not compelled to take delivery of the goods sold, he may breach the contract whenever 
he finds an opportunity to buy at a lower price.
Specific implement in Scots and Iraqi systems seems to be settled on the point that 
the remedy of specific implement is an ordinary legal right to the aggrieved party. That 
may save the aggrieved party from the unjustified and wrongful and illegal refusal to 
perform by the party in breach, bearing in mind, that the seller in Scots law is not 
entitled to obtain specific implement.
Is the remedy effective enough to hold the party in breach liable towards the 
aggrieved party?
To what extent the aggrieved party can truly benefit from the remedy of specific 
implement, is a matter subject to practice. It is open to a party to a contract to ask the 
court to order the party in breach to perform his obligation by a decree ad factum 
prestandum. Thus, specific implement is a judicial order against the refusing party to 
perform the obligation. In addition, the contract of sale of goods is enforceable by such 
a decree as long as the subject-matter is specific or ascertained according to Sec. 52 of 
Sale of Goods Act 1979. Consequently, specific implement, apparently is applicable to 
the sale of goods contract and on the refusing party to such contract. However, the 
problem is that the remedy may not always be applicable so readily, and the aggrieved 
party may not truly benefit from specific implement, by virtue of specific reasons, 
namely:
1-The remedy is refused when certain and specific circumstances stand against 
granting it. Thus, it is inconceivable that the remedy is disputed by the seller and the 
buyer without claiming that performance is either impossible or exceptionally hard or 
unduly difficult, or breach of the contract has been committed by the party who claims 
specific implement.
2-As soon as a claim of impossibility or hardship or breach of contract is raised by
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the refusing party against the party who claims specific implement, the court’s 
discretionary power will be involved and the remedy then subject to its discretion. It 
may be granted or refused in accordance with the court's opinion.
3-Considering the remedy as an ordinary legal right to the aggrieved party is not 
sufficient, and in practice is not effective enough to make the aggrieved party rely on it, 
for the remedy in one way or an other is subject to the court's discretion under specific 
circumstances. Such discretion may deprive the party of his right to the remedy of 
specific implement. The aggrieved party faces the reality of the court's involvement in 
granting or refusing the remedy despite the fact that it is considered as an ordinary, 
legal right.
Despite the court's discretion in granting or refusing specific implement, the 
aggrieved party's hope in obtaining the remedy may be achieved, and the party in 
breach may be held liable if the court thinks that the remedy of specific implement is an 
appropriate remedy. For instance, when the refusing party claims that it is impossible 
or exceptionally hard for him to perform, or it is unduely difficult to fulfil his 
obligation, he may not be discharged by the court when the court thinks that 
performance of the obligation specifically is possible. It seems that the remedy is 
effective enough to hold the party in breach liable towards the aggrieved party. 
Furthermore, the remedy is considered very effective if no claim or opposition of that 
nature is raised against specific implement. Aboveall when the claim of impossibility or 
hardship or breach of con tract...etc, is proved to be wrong by the pursuer, the court 
must grant specific implement. It has no other choice. Thus, the remedy is proved to 
be a legal and ordinary remedy and not a discretionary remedy.
What are the basic criteria to create a perfect system of specific implement?
Considering the remedy of specific implement as an ordinary remedy for breach of 
a contract for sale of goods and granting it to the aggrieved party as a matter of legal 
right may create a perfect and effective remedial system. That may be achieved by the 
following grounds.
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1-Avoiding certain factors to be involved in the case of granting the remedy, such 
as the circumstances of pretium affectionis and uniqueness test. These two 
circumstances are changeable within the circumstances of the disputed case, and are 
purely discretionary matters. That may achieve the following advantages.
(1)-The remedy of specific implement becomes more effective, because the 
aggrieved party becomes more certain of the outcome i.e., obtaining the thing sold, for 
he knows that the remedy is based on certain legal grounds, and he (the aggrieved 
party) satisfies these grounds. He may thus rely on the remedy.
(2)-The remedy of specific implement will be granted more often because granting 
it is based on legal grounds rather than relying on ambiguous and vague conditions, 
such as the involvement of the consideration ofpretium affectionis and the test of 
uniqueness. If these two considerations are involved there is no doubt that the court's 
dicretionary power becomes wider. There is no doubt, also, that there is greater risk of 
denying the right of the aggrieved party in specific implement, because there is no rule 
or ground upon which the court may rely. The case of granting the remedy then 
becomes a purely discretionary matter. The result will be uncertainity of the remedy
(3)-Greater objectivity is achieved by avoiding the circumstances of pretium  
affectionis and uniqueness, since the circumstances of pretium affectionis and 
uniqueness are subject to the court's discretion "if it thinks fit". Also, the remedy 
which is rejected on the ground of uniqueness or pretium affectionis by one court may 
be granted by another court because there are different approaches and understandings 
of the case by each court, and there is different understanding of the parties' needs by 
each court. These circumstances are relatively changeable from one party to another 
and from one court to another.
2-Considering specific implement as an ordinary legal remedy, which is based on 
certain legal grounds, may represent a general rule which can be applied to each case 
carrying these elements. It becomes the criterion of solving the disputed contract 
whether for sale of goods or other contracts. The basic criterion to make specific
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implement more effective legally, is to stand on certain legal conditions rather than 
ambiguous, vague, unclear grounds such as the considerations of pretium affectionis 
and uniqueness.
The efficiency of the remedy of specific implement as a legal remedy is based on 
certain legal grounds, which may be affected to a certain extent by the fact that, 
"refusing the remedy of specific implement is based on equitable and legal grounds". 
Defining the circumstances upon which the remedy is refused a very crucial and 
substantial matter. Upon the answers, depend the availability and the existence of the 
remedy. It may render damages superior to specific implement. Unfortunately, there is 
no guide to solve this problem, because it is a discretionary matter. It depends on the 
court's opinion of the merits of disputed cases and their surrounding circumstances.
The existence of equitable grounds for refusing the remedy of specific implement 
and when these apply, is the major obstacle against the remedy in Scots and Iraqi 
systems, because the remedy may be rejected on several occasions on the grounds that 
performance of the obligation is impossibile or exceptionally hard or unduly 
difficult...etc., under the court's discretionary power. To counter, or mitigate the 
influence of equitable grounds on the remedy of specific implement it would be better if 
the court were to rely on two criteria in examining the case of refusing the remedy of 
specific implement for equitable reasons. These two criteria are subjective and 
objective criteria, i.e., "circumstances related to the disputed case, and circumstances 
surrounding the party in breach, his personal circumstances", by which the court could 
achieve better results for both parties and for performance of the obligation.
3-Disregarding the principle of "where complete justice can be achieved by granting 
damages, no longer specific implement is granted, and vice-versa", to be one of the 
principle upon which granting the remedy of specific implement is based. If the above 
principle is considered as one of the principles of specific implement, the following 
consequences will take place.
(l)-The court's discretionary power will be widely involved in examining the case 
of which one, damages or specific implement is most likely to achieve justice, if the
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above principle is applied, then, assuming the availability of ordinary commodity, 
specific implement will never be granted, regardless of the existence of the grounds for 
granting it.
(2)-The principle of "where complete justice can be achieved by damages, specific 
implement will not be decreed and vice versa", leads to ignoring the real situation of the 
remedy of specific implement, which is that "it is not one for the court to grant if it 
thinks fit", in the normal circumstances.
4-The adequacy of damages test which plays a substantial role in granting and 
refusing the remedy of specific performance in English law, should not play any part or 
role in the case of specific implement in Scots and a fortiori in Iraqi civil law. It is 
based on a flexible and unclear circumstance. It is a controversial principle. It is a 
relative principle and changable from one case to another and from one court to another 
within the circumstances of the case. It is subject to the full discretion of the court, for 
there are no certain legal grounds to judge or to examine whether damages are or are not 
adequate remedy. Therefore, involving such a principle to play a role in the case of 
specific implement may change the concept and nature of the remedy.
5-Restricting the remedy of specific implement in Scots law to the case of an 
aggrieved purchaser and depriving the seller of such a right, does not represent the 
concept of the remedy. It does not achieve equality between the two contracting 
parties. Further, it does not reflect on the principle that specific implement is an 
ordinary legal remedy and it is a matter of legal right to the aggrieved party. It is not so 
at least for the seller, who may perform every obligation he has undertaken under the 
sale contract, but he has no opportunity to compel the purchaser who has wrongfully 
refused to take delivery of the goods. Refusing the remedy to the seller, may be 
applied to all cases in which the seller is involved, such as insolvency , bankruptcy, 
assignation, agency, ...etc. Thus, no insolvent seller can be granted the remedy. 
Further, when the seller is an assignee, or an agent,....etc, specific implement is 
granted against him.
324
Damages may be granted in addition to the remedy of specific implement when 
granting specific implement alone is not enough to indemnify the aggrieved party. It 
seems that the area which is covered by specific implement is wider than that of 
damages, because specific implement is granted easily and ordinarily. The case of 
specific implement in Scots law is different. Specific implement is restricted to the case 
of breach of the obligation to deliver the thing sold. If the obligation is of another 
nature, damages are the appropriate remedy. Also, the remedy of specific implement is 
granted against the seller only. It is inapplicable to the case of the aggrieved seller.
When the obligation is of a negative character, damages (not specific implement) 
will be granted in addition to the remedy of interdict. All the above cases, undoubtedly 
minimise the efficiency of the remedy of specific implement and deprive the remedy of 
its nature as an ordinary legal remedy covering a very wide area.
To what extent do the Scots and Iraqi laws fulfil the requirements of the above 
perfect system?
Scots and Iraqi systems are in accord towards; avoiding the considerations of, 
pretium affectionis and uniqueness and their consequences, the legal grounds for 
granting the remedy; disregarding the principle of "where complete justice can be 
achieved by granting damages, no longer is specific implement ordered", and its 
consequences, and the adequacy of damages test and its consequences. It could be said 
then that Specific implement in Scots and Iraqi systems have achieved to a certain extent 
the requirements of a perfect legal system concerning specific implement for the 
aggrieved party. Scots law however, does not achieve the full requirement of that 
perfection, for it does not confer the remedy to the aggrieved seller, and it restricts the 
remedy to one particular obligation, which is delivery of specific or ascertained goods. 
Such restriction to the remedy limits its scope or its application to wider circumstances, 
unlike the remedy of specific performance in Iraqi civil law.
In Scots law, despite many calls for reforms from the judiciary and scholars that the 
remedy of specific implement should be considered as an ordinary legal remedy, it
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remains restricted to being an appropriate remedy only for one case, which is the case 
of delivery of specific or ascertained goods.
To give the remedy of specific implement the opportunity of being the remedy for 
breach of many other obligations not just the obligation of delivery of specific or 
ascertained goods, many steps should be taken into consideration. They are as 
follows.
1-Open the door to every obligant to the contract of sale for goods to claim specific 
implement. The remedy then will be rendered available to every aggrieved party as a 
matter of right, no matter who that party is.
2-Extend the remedy to include every obligation which may be performed 
specifically within the circumstances of the disputed case.
Specific implement as a remedy for breach of a contract for the sale of goods in 
Scots and Iraqi systems may learn many things from each other, namely:
(1)-Specific implement in Scots law may benefit from Iraqi civil law of specific 
performance in the case of avoiding the problem of pretium affectionis and the 
uniqueness test. These two cases should be ignored completely by the Scots law in 
order to create an ordinary legal remedy and routinely applicable right to the aggrieved 
party.
(2)-The refusing party may be made to pay penalties if he insists on not fulfilling 
his obligation wrongfully, including imprisonment under certain circumstances and on 
the existence of the court's discretionary power. That may help the aggrieved party to 
obtain his right of specific implement against the refusing party who is persisting in not 
doing what he has undertaken to do without any justifiable reason.
(3)-Extend the remedy of specific implement to be granted as a matter of legal right 
to every aggrieved party instead of restricting it to the aggrieved purchaser, and make it 
cover every obligation thus rendering the remedy more effective. For instance, the 
purchaser, is obliged to take delivery and to pay the money price while the seller is 
obliged to deliver the goods sold. Accordingly, the obligant has no escape from 
performing the obligation, and subsequently the contracting parties may feel safe and
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secure towards their contracts and obligations, for every obligation will be performed 
specifically.
Also a perfect combination shall be concluded by putting the above hypothesis in 
practice between specific implement and the principle of "Exceptio non adimpleti 
contractus", for the seller or the buyer cannot insist on having specific implement 
unless he himself is ready and willing to fulfil his obligation under the contract. 
Subsequently, each obligation will be subject to the test and satisfaction of the other 
party under the conditions and terms of the contract, in addition to the court's 
supervision in cases where unjustified refusal has taken place by one of the contracting 
parties.
(4)-Extend the remedy of specific implement to include the case of the obligation of 
negative character, i.e., not to do something, and applying the remedy to it. Thus, an 
obligation of refraining from doing something will be subject to legal grounds rather 
than discretionary and equitable grounds.
Specific performance in Iraqi civil law may benefit from Specific implement in 
Scots law in the following cases.
1-The case of "clear, unambiguous and definite crave", for that case has been 
expressed so well in Scots law. It undoubtedly serves the litigants and their disputes 
and the court. The court becomes fully aware about what the plaintiff intends to apply 
for and the decree subsequently is pronounced clearly, specifying accurately what 
should be done by the refusing party. Otherwise the party against whom the decree is 
pronounced may be exposed to penal consequences unfairly as a result of the 
ambiguous decree.
2-The court's privative jurisdiction.
The Iraqi Court of First instance does not enjoy any privative jurisdiction. 
Therefore every action is reviewable by the higher court. That may deprive the Court 
of First Instance of any independence respecting the action examined by such a court, 
thus engendering reliance on the higher court in every single action, even if it is a
simple one. It would be better to give the Court of First Instance some independence 
by giving privative jurisdiction in certain and specific actions.
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